Re: Logical Language and Wittgenstein

John Jones wrote:
A logical language, a logical proposition, isn't discourse. Language
that is analysed logically is no longer discourse. Propositions
(logical) are parasitical on discourse or first use of language. In
normal discourse sense emerges or arises in one activity and is not a
summation or terminus of the logical or familiar movements of signs
impaled on a semantic abicus and of the summation of actions performed
on the segments of a string of signs. A logical lanuage or proposition
arises as a mechanical picture that can be compared only to a
mechanical reality.

If we choose for our logic non-familiar logics then likewise these too
will limit the world to that non-familiar picture. If there is a
movement on the string of our new logical proposition then there is a
corresponding movement in reality. The picture of the string mimics
reality like a picture, it reaches right out as a picture to the
reality. We can see from this account that the string itself cannot
both picture the logic that dictates the movements of its signs and
describe it. This disposes of paradoxes such as the liar paradox which
attempts to both show and describe its sense. "This sentence is false"
attempts both picture and description.

The idea that a string is a sequence of instructions for meaning,
action or use must lead to a mechanical impoverishment of language
where it is logically inevitable that non-mechanical movements of its
signs - the ineffable - cannot be pictured or portrayed. It is
essential that such pictures are ultimately disposed of if we are to
return to discourse proper. But Wittgenstein cannot return to
discourse proper by this means for at the time he wrote the Tractatus
he thought that a logical language WAS discourse proper.


Utterly bull***.

The signs are interpreted, and may have many different
interpretations. Math is an open game.

What you are describing are images, or even animated
sequences of images. This is not the same game.

Bye
.