Re: Continuum hypothesis
- From: stevendaryl3016@xxxxxxxxx (Daryl McCullough)
- Date: 20 Aug 2007 13:28:53 -0700
Alan Smaill says...
george <greeneg@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
On Aug 20, 11:39 am, stevendaryl3...@xxxxxxxxx (Daryl McCullough)
wrote:
Bell's Theorem proves that no measurable function f can possible
satisfy this constraint. However, Pitowsky proved that if one
assumes the continuum hypothesis, one can construct a nonmeasurable
function that satisfies this constraint.
One line of the truth table still has not been completed here.
If one DENIES the continuum hypothesis, can there still
exist a NON-constructible nonmeasurable function that
satisfies the constraint? Or is the truth of the CH necessary
to the existence of the non-measurable function at all (regardless
of whether it can be proven to exist)?
Since the proof given uses Martin's Axiom and not the stronger CH,
and ZF+MA is consistent with not AC (assuming ZF consistent,
presumably), the existence of such functions is consistent
with not CH.
As I understand Pitowsky's construction, what is needed for the
construction to go through is something along the lines of this axiom:
A: There exists a well-ordering < of the reals such that for every
real x, the set of all y < x has Lebesgue measure 0.
The continuum hypothesis of course implies this (because if
you well-order the reals with order type omega-1, then the
set of all y < x will always be a countable set, which always
has Lebesgue measure zero). But my axiom A doesn't imply the
continuum hypothesis.
--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY
.
- References:
- Continuum hypothesis
- From: djrt20
- Re: Continuum hypothesis
- From: aatu . koskensilta
- Re: Continuum hypothesis
- From: Daryl McCullough
- Re: Continuum hypothesis
- From: george
- Re: Continuum hypothesis
- From: Alan Smaill
- Continuum hypothesis
- Prev by Date: Re: Scott and George's Teaching Thread
- Next by Date: Re: Continuum hypothesis
- Previous by thread: Re: Continuum hypothesis
- Next by thread: Re: Continuum hypothesis
- Index(es):
Relevant Pages
|