Re: Cantor's definition of set
- From: John Jones <jonescardiff@xxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 25 Oct 2007 13:25:01 -0700
On Oct 25, 9:18?pm, Peter_Smith <ps...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 25 Oct, 20:51, John Jones <jonescard...@xxxxxxx> wrote:
OK. But if the members of a set have nothing in common, then how can
we have a set of numbers, for numbers are derived from each other -
they have something in common.
Where on earth do you get the idea that the members of a set need have
nothing in common?? Take some set of people: the members of the set
have something in common (being human beings, for a start).
OK; then I can have a set of humans. Does this meet the criterion that
a set has unique members? If the answer is yes, then
1) we must presume that all humans are uniquely different. But
wouldn't this make a set dependent not on logical principles but on
material contingencies?
2) a set of humans describes what they have in common more than what
is different about them. should we redescribe the set so that it
mirrors the letter of the law as it were, and describes only what is
different about humans?
3) Can we have a set of differences?
.
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