Re: Gödel's sentence is not self-referential
- From: LauLuna <laureanoluna@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2007 12:49:37 -0800 (PST)
On Nov 24, 12:26 pm, G. Frege <nomail@invalid> wrote:
On Sat, 24 Nov 2007 01:59:40 -0800 (PST), LauLuna
<laureanol...@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
3. A proposition can safely refer to the sentence that expresses it,
without any peril of circularity or paradox; consider
'this sentence has five words'
I get your point, LauLuna. Frege for example talked about the "thought"
a sentence expresses (which is its "sense"). One might equate Frege's
/thought/ with your /proposition/ (at least for the sake of the
argument).
Clearly
It rains.
and
Es regnet.
are zwo different sentences, but they express the same thought, namely
that it rains.
Now...
I believe that no proposition can be about itself [...]
Well... But why not? Consider:
(1) The thought sentence (1) expresses is clear!
:-)
Or maybe you will rather accept the following claim:
(2) The thought sentence (2) expresses is in no way clear!
:-)
Now it might seem that sentence (2) is _clearly_ true, since the thought
sentence (2) expresses is in now way clear! (But that does not prevent
the sentence from being true!)
F.
--
E-mail: info<at>simple-line<dot>de
I'd say (1) and (2) express no thought, hence no proposition, because
they fail referring to any thought.
If (1) and (2) were in fact able to accomplish self-reference, by
direct denotation, much easier would it be for:
(3) each proposition refers to something
to do it via subsumption under the concept of proposition.
But if (3) were efffectively self-referential, so would be:
(4) all non self-referential propositions are true
Now, if (4) could be self-referential it would be so iff it wouldn't.
I confess that my ultimate reason is of phenomenological origin; I
think no thought is about itself because no intentional act can be its
own intentional object. Suppose a function PSI(x) that takes
intentional objects and yields intentional acts. I dare say PSI(x) has
no fixed point. Assume there exists an x such that:
PSI(x) = x
We would have that
PSI(x) = PSI(PSI(x)) = PSI(PSI(PSI(x))), etc.
We would have an act and an object of infinite complexity, which seems
humanly impossible.
Regards
.
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