Re: Technical Animism
- From: Jan Burse <janburse@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 04 Dec 2007 23:53:10 +0100
John Jones schrieb:
On Dec 4, 8:05 pm, Jan Burse <janbu...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:John Jones schrieb:
Let us say that appropriate task outcomes identify intelligence.
Certain structures will give certain repeatable responses but what
TELLS ME that they instantiate an agency called intelligence or
emergence?
Intelligence is the explanadum.
> And if responses are not repeatable, then do structures
instantiate something else, like stupidity?
Yes, maybe the structure has fallen into stupidity. You know
accidents may change.
Another objection - how can we identify intelligence without falling
into circularity? If we avoid circularity and say that intelligence is
about 'appropriate' outcomes, and not about emergence, then the
definition of 'appropriate' launches us back into circularity.
I have never seen my teacher falling into a circularity whole,
when correcting my exercises. What do you mean?
I suggest that there is no definition of intelligence that can give us
a criteria of what we should be looking for to find it. I also suggest
that the term is a social conceit.
Yes sure, as we have social conceit = accident
But why did you ask in the first place what "TELLS YOU" what
intelligence is, when you have this suggestion?
Anyway, after making the distinction between substance and accident,
Aristotele goes further on to make distinctions inbetween
substances and distinctions inbetween accidents.
Among the accidents we find relatives. In summary
aristoteles says:
Chapter 7: Of relations.
Preliminary definition.
Some relatives have contraries.
Some relatives admit of degrees.
Every relative has a correlative.
The relative must have its proper name; only so
is the correlative evident. Necessity in certain
cases for coining new names for the purpose.
Relatives usually come into being together. Exception
in the case of perception and knowledge.
Primary substance never relative, neither any part of
such substance.
Corrected definition of relatives.
Impossibility to know that a thing is relative
unless its correlative is known.
(Loeb Classical Library, The Organon I: The catgeories,
Harold P. Cooke, 1949)
I assume individual psychological Aristotele wouldn't say
that intelligence is a relation, because the perceiving self
or other doesn't count as a correlative.
But social psychological speaking, we have groups perceiving
other groups, and thus intelligence becomes a relative. Like
in "stupid blondes".
Bye
.
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