Re: Technical Animism

On Dec 4, 10:53�pm, Jan Burse <janbu...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
John Jones schrieb:

On Dec 4, 8:05 pm, Jan Burse <janbu...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
John Jones schrieb:
Let us say that appropriate task outcomes identify intelligence.
Certain structures will give certain repeatable responses but what
TELLS ME that they instantiate an agency called intelligence or
emergence?

Intelligence is the explanadum.

�> And if responses are not repeatable, then do structures

instantiate something else, like stupidity?

Yes, maybe the structure has fallen into stupidity. You know
accidents may change.

Another objection - how can we identify intelligence without falling
into circularity? If we avoid circularity and say that intelligence is
about 'appropriate' outcomes, and not about emergence, then the
definition of �'appropriate' launches us back into circularity.

I have never seen my teacher falling into a circularity whole,
when correcting my exercises. What do you mean?

I suggest that there is no definition of intelligence that can give us
a criteria of what we should be looking for to find it. I also suggest
that the term is a social conceit.

Yes sure, as we have social conceit = accident

But why did you ask in the first place what "TELLS YOU" what
intelligence is, when you have this suggestion?

Anyway, after making the distinction between substance and accident,
Aristotele goes further on to make distinctions inbetween
substances and distinctions inbetween accidents.

Among the accidents we find relatives. In summary
aristoteles says:

� � Chapter 7: Of relations.
� � � Preliminary definition.
� � � Some relatives have contraries.
� � � Some relatives admit of degrees.
� � � Every relative has a correlative.
� � � The relative must have its proper name; only so
� � � � �is the correlative evident. Necessity in certain
� � � � �cases for coining new names for the purpose.
� � � Relatives usually come into being together. Exception
� � � � �in the case of perception and knowledge.
� � � Primary substance never relative, neither any part of
� � � � �such substance.
� � � Corrected definition of relatives.
� � � Impossibility to know that a thing is relative
� � � unless its correlative is known.
� � � (Loeb Classical Library, The Organon I: The catgeories,
� � � Harold P. Cooke, 1949)

I assume individual psychological Aristotele wouldn't say
that intelligence is a relation, because the perceiving self
or other doesn't count as a correlative.

But social psychological speaking, we have groups perceiving
other groups, and thus intelligence becomes a relative. Like
in "stupid blondes".

Bye

What tells me that intelligence is exhibited by a structure? Until I
define intelligence then nothing can tell me.

But you are saying that intelligence (like a spirit) suddenly arises
within 'organised' matter, and that the matter then becomes an
intelligent structure. This is animism.

The sun, which is both mind and body, exhibits intelligence because
its functions always achieves its outcomes - giving out light. The
mistake, of course, is to regard intelligence as a property of
structure.

It is circular reasoning to say that there is a causal relationship
between 'organised' or 'emergent' matter and 'appropriate' intelligent
outcomes. No such causal claim can be made. For what is 'appropriate'
is by definition what is 'organised' and what is 'organised' is by
definition what is 'appropriate'.
.

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