Re: Torkel Franzen on truth
- From: "Nam D. Nguyen" <namducnguyen@xxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2007 15:40:13 GMT
Daryl McCullough wrote:
Newberry says...
So noted. I also note that most people do not find Gentzen's proof
very convincing. And I still do not see how a proof in a stronger
system could be more convincing than a proof in the system itself.
The *strength* of the system is not relevant so much as whether the
axioms are themselves intuitively true. A proof in a theory whose
axioms are intuitively true is more useful and interesting than
a proof in a theory whose axioms are not intuitively true.
So, for example, a proof in PA + the negation of Goldbach's
conjecture would not be very convincing, because we have no
reason to believe that the negation of Goldbach's conjecture
is true.
Unfortunately mathematical reasoning isn't religion where "beliefs"
would be much relevant.
.
--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY
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