Re: The fallacy of strengthened liar's paradox.
- From: stevendaryl3016@xxxxxxxxx (Daryl McCullough)
- Date: 4 Jan 2008 15:45:33 -0800
Newberry says...
On Jan 2, 9:40=A0am, stevendaryl3...@xxxxxxxxx (Daryl McCullough) wrote:
42. No sentence that is syntactically identical to sentence number 42 is
true.
56: Sentence number 42 is meaningless.
Where is the contradiction?
The same reasoning that leads to the conclusion that sentence 42
is meaningless allows you to conclude that *any* sentence syntactically
identical to sentence 42 is meaningless (at least in a context in
which "sentence 42" refers to the above sentence).
Let C = the set of all sentences that are syntactically identical
to sentence number 42. Each sentence in C is either true, false,
or meaningless. So either (1) at least one sentence in C is true, or
(2) at least one sentence in C is false, or (3) all sentences in C
are meaningless. Let's consider these possibilities.
Case (1) Assume that some sentence, call it "P", in C is true.
By definition of C, P must be syntactically of the form
"No sentence that is syntactically identical to sentence
number 42 is true." If P is meaningful, then it is equivalent
to the following sentence:
"No sentence in C is true."
But P *is* a sentence in C. That's a contradiction.
So Case (1) is impossible.
Case (2) Assume that some sentence, call it "P", in C is false.
By definition of C, P must be syntactically of the form
"No sentence that is syntactically identical to sentence
number 42 is true." If P is false, then its negation is true.
The negation of P is equivalent to the following sentence:
"Some sentence that is syntactically identical to sentence 42
is true."
which is equivalent to the following sentence:
"Some sentence in C is true."
But we already agreed that that is impossible (in case (1)).
So Case (2) is impossible, also.
Case (3) Assume that every sentence in C is meaningless.
From this it follows that:
"No sentence in C is true."
From this, together with the definition of C, the followingsentence follows:
"No sentence that is syntactically identical to sentence 42
is true."
But that sentence *itself* is syntactically identical to
sentence 42. So that sentence itself must be meaningless!
So in particular, it can't be *true*. But it follows
from the assumption that every sentence in C is meaningless.
So that assumption cannot be true. So Case 3 is impossible.
That's the paradox: We can prove that either Case (1),
Case (2), or Case (3) must hold. But we also can show
that none of these cases is possible. That's a contradiction.
--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY
.
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