Re: The fallacy of strengthened liar's paradox.

On Dec 31 2007, 4:18 am, LauLuna <laureanol...@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Dec 29, 5:14 pm, stevendaryl3...@xxxxxxxxx (Daryl McCullough)
wrote:

LauLuna says...

Assume there is a collection C of syntactic marks or types (expressing
levels, interpretations or whatever is required for disambiguation) by
which natural language can be so extended that any expression gets
logically disambiguated. C should be a part of a grammar able to
disambiguate all expressions; as such C must be nameable. Now consider

LC  'this sentence is meaningless in all levels/interpretations in C'

That shows that the collection C cannot be expressed in natural language..
It doesn't show that C does not exist.

How could a set of symbols belonging to a grammar (i.e. an algorithm
generating formulas) be unnameable in natural language?

The set of names that do not name themselves (e.g. "numbers" but not
"words") is unnameable in natural language.

C-B

Anyway, it seems the Liar sentence can be denied a univocal
propositional content for two main different reasons:

1) Because its subject fails to denote anything (the 'attempted' self-
reference is impossible).

2) Because the natural language truth predicate is ambiguous.

I'd say the first is a rather Russellian approach while the second is
a Tarskian-Quinean one.

As I see it, the difficulties the first approach appears to encounter
(namely, the apparent existence of successful self-references) get
solved by the distinction between sentences and propositions, and the
qualified rejection of self-reference, which states that no
proposition refers to itself but some propositions do refer to the
sentences that express them.

In contrast, the second approach seems to me to be unbearably
counterintuitive.

Regards

.

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