Re: Incompleteness vs. Mechanical Reasoning

On Apr 6, 8:46 am, Newberry <newberr...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Apr 5, 11:33 pm, Marshall <marshall.spi...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

Any claims to the contrary are claims of the existence of
the supernatural.

So how do you explain that we know the truth even if we cannot derive
it?

We can execute algorithms without consciously being aware of
what they are. In fact, there are plenty of results from cognitive
psych in which people report with a great deal of confidence
exactly what they think their thought processes are and how
they work, and experimental results show those reports to
be incorrect.

Our consciousness is not the extent of what's going on inside
our heads. Sometimes it isn't even relevant.


Marshall
.

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