Re: What should I say to the post-grads about Godel?

On Jun 15, 9:41 pm, Marshall <marshall.spi...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Jun 15, 9:17 pm, Rupert <rupertmccal...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:



This seems to be a good list of references discussing the issue of
what bearing Gödel's theorem has on the question of whether the mind
is a physical mechanism.

I just don't see how anyone sensible can entertain the question of
whether or not the mind is a physical mechanism. What things
in the universe are *not* physical mechanisms? Saying that
the mind might not be a physical mechanism is tantamount to
saying that it's magic, supernatural, etc. It is medieval thinking.

Consciousness--it's all in your head.

Marshall

First of all, I myself am quite friendly to the idea that the mind is
a physical mechanism and indeed that a complete description of
physical reality would be a complete description of all of reality,
and I believe Roger Penrose is also quite friendly to these
propositions (although he also thinks that a computational model of
the mind is inadequate). However, I would also say that I am not sure
that you can say that this proposition has been established beyond all
reasonable doubt. I will elaborate on this more below.

We find the following quotation from the article by Feferman to which
I linked previously:

"What was Gödel's own view? Typically cautious, in the Gibbs lecture
he stated his conclusion from the second incompleteness theorem only
as a disjunction, despite his person conviction that mind is not
equivalent to a finite machine. Apparently the reason he did that is
because he did not feel he had a knock-down proof of the falsity of
the mechanist position. Rather, he put forward various arguments
against that position, including several communicated to Hao Wang and
first recounted in the latter's book, 'From Mathematics to Philosophy'
and then at greater length in 'A Logical Journey. From Gödel to
Philosophy.'"

So it would appear that Gödel believed that a computational model of
the mind is inadequate. I am not sure if he also entertained the idea
that the mind is not a physical mechanism, or that physical
determinism is false. If Jesse Hughes wants to look into Gödel's views
on these matters, the references given in the above quotation might be
a good place to start.

In any event, it seems conceivable that Gödel entertained the idea
that the mind is not a physical mechanism, and Gödel was perhaps a
sensible person. (Had a few strange ideas towards the end of his life
when he was unwell, admittedly).

There's also a chap called Peter Unger who works at New York
University who has recently come up with a book called "All the Power
in the World" where he tries to argue that the mind is not a physical
entity. Now, I understand that some people might not regard Peter
Unger as a sensible person, because he has tried in various works to
argue that no-one knows anything to be the case, that there are no
people and no composite physical objects, and that we have a moral
obligation to donate just about all of our disposable income to
organizations like Oxfam and UNICEF. Nevertheless, I find him to be an
interesting thinker and I think he occasionally comes up with
arguments that are worth considering, and, while I haven't had a
chance to look at "All the Power in the World" yet, I'm going to give
it my serious attention.
.

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