Re: An argument against modus ponens

george wrote:
[re sentences in formal languages]
But they DO have truth-values, both presumptively and potentially.

On Sep 21, 3:46 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@xxxxxxx> wrote:
So the conditions in which a formal language is expressed enables it to
have access to possible weather conditions.

No, DUMBASS.
Formal languages ARE NOT "expressed".

So formal languages are not expressible?

But anything that is
communicated

Expressed?

by writing

Expressing?

has A CONTEXT IN WHICH it is written.

So a formal language has conditions in which it is expressed?

And the term IS
*CONTEXT*,

Conditions?

NOT "conditions". And when you DO say conditions, it's conditions
UNDER
which, NOT in which. And since it's conditions PLURAL, it would
"enable",
NOT "enables".

No. It's singular. A language doesn't have multiple conditions in which it is expressed.

You HAVE TO CARE about these things IF you are going
to
play THIS game!

It's fine. Try and stay with the point about formal language not being influenced by the weather.

They just do. It's just a fact about logic.
No. It's a fact about natural languages.

Well, certainly, it's a fact about natural languages TOO, but it
doesn't
stop being a fact just because we went formal. It's precisely because
these strings SHARE with natural-languages THE PROPERTY OF HAVING
TRUTH-VALUES that we CHOSE TO CALL them "sentences"!

Try and stay with the point about formal language not being influenced by the weather.

Logic is about what
happens
when you PRESUME that the truth of some sentence could somehow be
linked to the truth of another. That's just WHAT YOU ARE DOING
whenever
you are doing logic.

So logic is all about assumings, presumings and contemplations upon the weather, household activities and general commerce.

There are no presumptions in logic.

There are ALWAYS presumptions.
There is ALWAYS a PRIOR CONTEXT of things that HAVE BEEN
presumed. ALWAYS. That is not specific to logic. That's just how
people think.

So formal language is influenced by the weather.

P says no more than P.

It doesn't even say THAT much unless you know what context you're
saying
"P" in.

There's no presumption of R or not-P.

THERE IS SO TOO such a presumption IF, PRIOR to saying P,
YOU YOURSELF SAID "P, Q, and the like are going to denote
propositions"
or "are going to denote boolean variables". There IS SO TOO such a
presumption
IF YOU MADE that prior presumption. IF YOU DIDN'T, then we simply are
not talking
about the same thing.

P says Q then. ed to ask where I can see clearly.

You don't see ***.
You are stumbling all over things and lying in public, massively.


Oh, bull***. That is like saying you could be who and what you are
without a height or a weight.
Logic is not dependent on material contingencies.

It's not DEPENDENT ON ANYthing! It's STIPULATED!

You said it was presumed. Now you say its stipulated. But lord forbid, its not 'dependent' right? Well it looks like it from here.

These things INHERENTLY HAVE this
property
(of being boolean/bivalent in type).
No they don't. These things do not, cannot, have this property of
bivalency. I've said why,

You CAN'T POSSIBLY say why. WE SAID they did.
THEREFORE, THEY DO. IT REALLY IS JUST THAT SIMPLE.

I thought it was inherent and not stipulated? I can stipulate that A is not A when A is inherently A.


So you can't speak of P being false.
I CAN SO TOO. I just DO.
Why? Because a false P assumes both P and R.

There are 2 truth-values. P is the kind of thing that could
potentially have either.

What does P have exactly when P is false?

P is not the only thing in the world.
Both truth-values are in the world too.


I truly don't know what you mean by R.
If P is false then another thing must take its place.

That is simply bull***.

If P 'it's raining' is false, then R 'its not raining'.

OK, I finally get it.

You are talking about possible worlds.

No I'm not. I'm talking about the world denoted by 'it's raining' as true or false. To be false there must be an alternative. That doesn't mean there is another fantasy world.

If its not raining when I say it is, then 'R', 'its not raining', obtains, and not another weird parallel reality.


If P actually is false then there must be a possible world IN WHICH
P is false.

Don't go on about possible worlds.

This by definition cannot be any of the same possible
worlds
in which P is true.

Don't go on about possible worlds.

But that has nothing to do with inadmissibly
admitting
"not-P" to the universe after having only talked about P. The
possibility of
Not IS PRIOR TO ALL talk of P.

No it isn't. P, a solitary object, has no truth conditions.

Not applies to true and false, NOT
directly to P.

"Not-" simply means another object. It isn't a function of this or that object. The object denoted by 'not-x' is the same generic object that is denoted by P.

Not doesn't become applicable to P until AFTER you decree that P IS
THE KIND
of thing that can have a truth-value. WHICH WE DID.

P itself doesn't have a truth value. If you say that P has a truth value then all this means is that P and R obtains.

[strings] They don't tell us what the weather might be doing, whether
'it's raining' is false or not.
They do IF WE SAY they do.
Then for 'if P' you have to include R.

WE DO, DUMBASS!
We ALREADY SAID IN ADVANCE
that P *WAS BOOLEAN*, that it was THE KIND of thing that could be true
OR FALSE.

No. You have this weird idea that there are true and false objects.

In this language, EVERY sentence has a denial.
EVERY state of affairs has an opposite state of affairs.

A ridiculous, blindly made assumption, presented as righteous truth.

"Dog" IS A STRING, dumbass.
You can't claim that it doesn't MEAN a certain kind of 4-legged
carnivorous
mammal IF WE'RE SPEAKING ENGLISH.
I can if you say 'dog' is just a string. There are no implicit
differences between strings.

"Dog is just a string" IS NOT the ONLY thing I am SAYING about "dog"!
The strings in these formal languages HAVE STRUCTURE!

Strings don't have structure. If you want structure imposed on a string then it ain't a string. Dog is not a string if you say dog has meaning.

They HAVE PARTS
that are CONSTRAINED to relate to each other in certain ways! They
have
GRAMMAR!

Grammar is after the fact of meaning, so meaning is independent of grammar.

The fact that you haven't been exposed to any of this MAKES
YOU STUPID
but it does NOT entitle you to go around publicly expressing opinions!

Your books won't help you in the alchemists sky-castle.

Logic can borrow scenario's or contexts from natural language, but when
it does so it can't use the same syntax it does for a syntax-only logic.

ALL logic is syntax-only! That is THE DEFINING FEATURE of the field!
WHAT IS YOUR PROBLEM???

But before you said that logic has assumptions and presumptions. How can a syntax presume? I was right wasn't I. Logic presents itself.

P says P.

P doesn't say *** until AFTER YOU'VE said WHAT you mean by P.

I don't have to say anything about P in a syntax only logic.

And it very possibly doesn't say *** EVEN THEN, the point being that
P
is often used AS A VARIABLE.

Variables and functions can be represented by P (or S, z what have you).

But in the non-syntactical logic of 'if P' we must say P and R.

There is NOTHING NON-syntactical about "if"! The "if" operator in
this
context is just ~PvQ ! It is TOTALLY syntactical!

Not any more. You thought it was syntactical. I'm afraid that you must break with cherished tradition.

But you are right that alternative truth-values do involve semantics,
over
and above syntax. You are just talking about it in an unusually
belligerent
and contrarian way, e.g., "I'm not talking about possible worlds".
YES, YOU ARE.

Don't go on about possible worlds.

You continually appeal to an absolutist, truth conferring property of a
transcendent logic.

I do no such thing.
I am just appealing to the basics of the subject as stipulated in
elementary
introductory textbooks, which you are too stupid to understand.

I am not interested in hearing sermons taken from these text-books that you take for halo'ed truth. If you are going to propound text-book then I am out of here.

That is, you seem to think that all we have to do is
state something in logic and it becomes truth.

If I state something, then it DOES become an absolute truth
THAT I STATED IT.

No it doesn't. There are no truth conditions to performatives. Now why don't you go and look that up in your text-books.

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