Re: Choice sequences, intuition, etc

On Oct 20, 11:12 pm, Bill Taylor <w.tay...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
|If so, I think this is actually a *better* definition than
|the various others given, as it is simpler to understand,
|and emphasizes that the essential point of intuitionism involves
|*knowledge* about what is the case, as opposed to the orthodox
|concern with merely what IS the case.

I'm not sure why it is that you feel so comfortable with
this sort of pronouncement, given how little you seem
willing to explain where it's coming from.

|Now, for one reason or another, intuionists tend to shy away
|strongly from this admission - that knowledge is a key element
|of their PoV.  I'm not sure why they should - they can hardly
|be worried by what orthodox mathies think about its possible
|vagueness, as their other pronouncements are regularly met
|with such criticism anyway.

See, you're so confident, you don't even feel the need to
keep it as a tentative impression. No, you think you know,
clearly enough that failing to agree can well be described
as "failing to admit". But why? You just seem quite glib.

If you want to distinguish between "concern" for truth and
"concern" for knowledge, you need to say something about
how concern for what's "merely" true is expressed, aside
from attempting to gain knowledge about it.

Keith Ramsay
.