Re: Russell diagnosis.
- From: Chris Menzel <cmenzel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2008 03:07:12 +0000 (UTC)
On Thu, 13 Nov 2008 18:41:44 -0800 (PST), Bill Taylor
<w.taylor@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> said:
Chris Menzel <cmen...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Daryl McCullough <stevendaryl3...@xxxxxxxxx> said:
Kid: I know what's wrong: the warning light doesn't work.
Cute. And that's *very* close to the sig-line I had from "Dr
Strangelove"
"The auto-destruct mechanism blew itself up!"
Thus, he truly believed there was something wrong with the car and
was justified in so believing, since, other things being equal,
warning lights are usually reliable indicators of trouble. So the
traditional definition of knowledge -- justified true belief -- seems
to be satisfied.
I don't think the "traditional" definition is too troubled by this.
Well, it is if it is supposed to provide an intuitively adequate account
of knowledge, i.e., one whose conditions for knowledge are satisfied,
for an agent S and proposition P, if and only if it is intuitively the
case that S knows P. In the case in question, the traditional
conditions for knowledge seem to be satisfied but, intuitively, it is
not the case that the guy knows the car is broken.
On one level, what you say about the reliability of indicator lights
is correct, and so he is "justified".
But on another level, he didn't know this particular light was on the
blink (HAH!), so was unjustified.
Right, one of the main upshots of so-called Gettier cases like this was
to refocus work in epistemology on the nature of justification, as an
obvious path to a solution here is to come up with a reasonable
definition of justification on which the warning light did *not* in fact
provide adequate justification for the true belief of the guy in the
story to count as knowledge.
There will be debate about which takes precedence in the traditional
definition, but your comment that...
intuitively, he didn't really *know*
...suggests that you take the latter case to be more appropriate.
I imagine that would also be the more popular view.
So the traditional definition of knowledge appears to be flawed.
I hold that it IS flawed, but not for your example's reason.
In fact, IMHO, it is "not even wrong". That traditional definition
is a bad category mistake, (or as I prefer to name it, context error).
There is, IMHO, almost no connection between knowledge and belief.
One is in Popper's 3rd world, and the other in his 2nd.
However, to elaborate on this fully, would need a whole paper,
or perhaps even a conference!
There's been more than a few of both on this topic!
.
- References:
- Russell diagnosis.
- From: Bill Taylor
- Re: Russell diagnosis.
- From: Daryl McCullough
- Re: Russell diagnosis.
- From: Chris Menzel
- Re: Russell diagnosis.
- From: Bill Taylor
- Russell diagnosis.
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