Re: Platonism

From: Lester Zick (lesterDELzick_at_worldnet.att.net)
Date: 12/09/04 

Date: Thu, 09 Dec 2004 19:30:02 GMT

On Thu, 09 Dec 2004 17:12:46 +0100, Mitch Harris
<harrisq@tcs.inf.tu-dresden.de> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>Lester Zick wrote:
>> On Thu, 09 Dec 2004 10:27:37 +0100, Mitch Harris
>> <harrisq@tcs.inf.tu-dresden.de> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>
>>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>>
>>>>(Mitch Harris) in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>mathematical facts themselves are not contingent on our observing them.
>>>>
>>>>No empirical facts are contingent on our observing them.
>>>
>>>OK. But then I'm unclear as to what empirical means anymore (uh...in
>>>this context).
>>
>> Just the first or positive half of a tautology.
>
>Oh.

Mitch, let me see if I can explain what I think you and others may be
experiencing in reaction to these kinds of definitions.

We have an enormous investment in what and how we think about things
like empircality and cardinality. These terms means all kinds of
things to all kinds of people who use them to describe various ideas.
Then I come along and define them in very specific ways that seem
completely at odds with that body of learning and application.

I think most people experience a feeling of complete intellectual
nudity under such conditions and it makes them very uncomfortable
because they don't understand how to work with such ideas in
intellectual terms. It's one of the problems with actually achieving a
mechanical reduction intellectually. Assuming it is correct, people
still have no idea how to work with the result and there is no body of
accepted intellectual techniques couched in such terms.

I agree and find that I can only apply results one step at a time. But
that doesn't mean results are useless. They can still be applied in
very formal situations with respect to other questions of fundamental
formative importance.

When I say that empirical observations are just the first or positive
half of tautologies or that cardinality just means equal differences,
it isn't because I trying to be an *** upsetting everyones apple
carts but just because things work out that way.

Let me see if I can explain why the idea of empirical observations
works out the way it does. Let's suppose we have something we call an
empirical observation based on conventional ideas of experience,
observation, or whatever. Then we have something else called a
tautology according to conventional ideas on tautologies of the
general form t:[subject][not subject].

And, further, according to conventional ideas we find that tautologies
are considered always true. Thus we find that every empirical
observation must ultimately form part of a tautology or it cannot be
true because if tautologies are always true, anything not a tautology
must necessarily be false just because tautologies must always be
true.

Thus we find that anything which can be true must form part of some
tautology including conventional notions of experiential empirical
observations as well as completely theoretical mathematical or logical
observations. Hence I take any idea or observation which can be true
to be part of some tautology. And this in turn makes every positive
part of any tautology empirical whatever its source.

It's similar to my definition for cardinality of equal differences.
Just find that which makes anything what it is and without which it
cannot be what it is thought to be, and in point of fact that has to
be its defining property or definition. Works for me.

Regards - Lester