Re: Science, Philosophy, Mysticism, Art, Mathematics, and Physics

From: Gregory L. Hansen (glhansen_at_steel.ucs.indiana.edu)
Date: 12/17/04 

Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 17:42:23 +0000 (UTC)

In article <41c3a19c.82764926@netnews.att.net>,
Lester Zick <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 21:29:00 +0000 (UTC),
>glhansen@steel.ucs.indiana.edu (Gregory L. Hansen) in
>comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>>In article <41c287c2.75781421@netnews.att.net>,
>>Lester Zick <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>>>On Thu, 16 Dec 2004 18:40:26 +0000 (UTC),
>>>glhansen@steel.ucs.indiana.edu (Gregory L. Hansen) in
>>>comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

[...]
>>Did you think F=ma is any more explanatory?
>
>Oh, hell, yes. F, m, and a are explained in terms of one another. QM
>merely asserts there is some explanation but can't say what it is.
>
>>The potential in quantum mechanics has the same role as the index of
>>refraction in optics. And, in a sense, the same role as force in
>>classical mechanics. A wave packet will tend to be drawn toward low spots
>>of the potential and pushed away from high spots. Electrons are bound to
>>atoms because of the attractive force between the two; an atom can
>>transition to a higher energy state when, e.g., another atom bumps into it
>>and pushes the peices around.
>
>Yes, yes, this is all very interesting. I always imagined there was
>some reason electrons didn't go marching down Main Street in unison on
>New Years Day. QM just doesn't explain what all this anthropomorphism
>really amount to.

If you like F=ma, then I don't know why you'd have a problem with a
wavefunction attracted to lows and repelled from highs in the potential.
Do you know how force and potential energy are related?

And did you, by any chance, notice that force in classical mechanics isn't
itself explained, but simply defined as that which causes an acceleration?

[...]

>>>>What makes you think mechanics or science are more than self-consistent
>>>>plausibilities?
>>>
>>>Well, the point of my observation was the standard of plausibility
>>>and not self consistency. If all science is based on is plausibility,
>>>it, like Euclidean geometry, rests on a rather sandy foundation.
>>
>>Get used to it. As Poincare said, science doesn't tell you what things
>>are. It organizes relationships between them, and any theory is a true
>>theory to the extent that if faithfully describes those relationships
>>within the theory's valid regime of application. Read "Science and
>>Hypothesis" by Poincare, which is usefully close to modern views on the
>>philosophy of science despite being a hundred years old.
>
>No, no. Science tells us what things are. That's why we keep it
>around. It's mysticism that doesn't tell us what things are but
>maintains it needs to be kept around as a substitute for science.

Science has grown out of that viewpoint after a few theories that say what
things are have fallen away.

But to claim to know what things REALLY are seems far more akin to
claiming knowledge about spirits and other unmeasurables to me.

[...]
>>>You're talking empiricism not knowledge. Precisely what's wrong with
>>>positivism. A thousand years of observations do not an idea make.
>>
>>Science is an empirical practice. A theory is good if and only if it
>>stands up to empirical scrutiny. If it can't, the theory is flawed. And
>>if you can't measure every part of every phenomenon with infinite
>>precision from the beginning to the end of time, then you might never know
>>you have a flawed theory.
>
>And my point is empiricists never empirically know anything.

You can't have missed the existence of modern technology, so I think you
must be using a personal, restrictive definition of what it means to know
something.

[...]
>>>Well, since you chose not comment on my discussion of contraction
>>>hypotheses, I can't comment on Lorentz except to say that MM can be
>>>performed successfully with radiation polarized normal to the plane of
>>>rotation and the absolute motion of the earth through space detected.
>>
>>Okay, I'll comment on it. The Lorentz transforms form a group, which
>>means if you think you find a contradiction in them, you owe it to
>>yourself to figure out why you're wrong.
>>
>>In your particular example, the length of an object is defined by the
>>front and back of the object. If some particle, like a gas molecule in a
>>hollow cube, is moving around in there, that doesn't make a bit of
>>difference as long as you know what you want to call the front and what
>>you want to call the back. The gas molecule might itself have a different
>>length contraction than the block as a whole, but if it's between the
>>front and back in any frame, it will be between the front and back in all
>>frames. The object itself isn't even necessary. Pick any two points.
>
>You mean different geometries apply to interstitial particles? Then
>how do we average all these different frames of reference since any
>average of v's would be linear but the effect is non linear?

If you want to calculate a length from the frame of each individual
particle, that's up to you, and the process is straightforward. But an
observer is not oberving simultaneously from all those different reference
frames. The observer observes from his own rest frame.

>Einstein's geometric contraction hypothesis applies to a body moving
>at any particular velocity. Different v's, different contraction
>factors. So, which geometry applies to the group of interstitial
>bodies that constitute the body as a whole that Einstein uses to
>explain frequency dilation at v when there are numerous different v's?
>Surely, you're not going to say net v for the body as whole because
>there is no body as a whole; there are only aggregates of interstitial
>frames of reference with v's of their own. And v's average linearly
>whereas frequency dilation factors are non linear.

Einstein's geometric contraction hypothesis relates a length measured in
one frame to a length measured in another frame. When you, Lester,
measure (taking an example from in front of me) the diameter of a
Vanilla Pepsi can, do you need to measure the speeds of each individual
atom within the can? Review the derivation of length contraction and the
definition of length that is used.

>>>>A pre-"The Matrix" twist on Descarte's question, from a philosophy class,
>>>>is how do you know you're not a brain in a jar with memories and sensory
>>>>data given you by an interactive computer program, and all your
>>>>experiences lead you to conclude the wrong laws of nature?
>>>
>>>Probably the same way you can know that you're not standing on your
>>>head: logical inference. Science should try it some time.
>>
>>How is your logical inference different from the way you want things to
>>be?
>
>It doesn't. It's just different from empirical observation. Empirical
>observation isn't knowledge. Logical inference is. It may be right or
>wrong knowledge, but it's the only form of knowledge there is.

Logical inference without data is fantasy. If you're not beholden to
empirical observation, you can build any kind of abstract world that you
like.

>
>>Logic doesn't tell you what your premises have to be, which is why it's
>>always bugged me when Vulcans in Star Trek go running around saying
>>"That's illogical." It's pragmatic to suppose that you're not a brain in
>>a jar being fed false experiences, but you can't prove it from a priori
>>considerations.
>
>Well, you are a brain in a jar, the skull, being fed experiences by
>the senses, and it's up to the brain in the jar to decipher truth from
>falsity through logical inference. I don't know what a priori
>considerations are and neither does anyone else except to say that
>they're assumptions, neither true nor false.

A priori means knowable without reference to particular facts or
experience. Your logical inference is something that is done with
postulates. Where do those postulates come from? As far as I can tell,
you want postulates that do not appeal to any particular facts or
experiences, and yet say something useful about particular facts or
exeriences. Good luck.

[...]
>
>>I think you must have meant an explanation with elements that nobody
>>thinks to ask the explanation of.
>
>No, I mean an explanation with elements that nobody needs to ask the
>explanation of because the explanation is evident in the explanation
>without interpretation or the divine intercession of an interpreter.

The explanation is "evident" in the explanation? Go right ahead, but I
urge you again to be careful of unstated assumptions without which the
explanation would not be so evident.

I'll revisit particles. I've already mentioned how they can be seen as an
interpretation of quantum fields. There's another view advanced by a
gentleman on sci.physics that particles are excitations in a fluid. It's
a basic result in fluid mechanics, for instance, that two vortices will
attract or repel each other, according to the relative directions of their
spin axes, analogously to a Coulomb force. He likes to think of a fluid
that's ultimately particulate, but fluid mechanics is typically done in
the continuum limit and I see no logical problem with assuming the fluid
is itself a continuum.

So if, for instance, you take the existence of particles as self-evident
and necessary, you're fooling yourself. First, because you know from
experience that there are particle-like things to be described. But I've
given you two concrete examples of how particles can seem to exist when
no particles have ever existed. That's the problem with claiming a
priori knowledge. Even if there were no concrete examples there will
always be possibilities that just haven't occured to you yet, or the
possibility that there are possibilities that haven't occured to you yet. 

-- 
"Then they placed the ark of the Lord on the cart; along with the box 
containing the golden mice and the images of the hemorrhoids." 
  -- 1 Samuel 6:11

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