Re: Surrogate factoring, random is better?

From: David Kastrup (dak_at_gnu.org)
Date: 02/18/05 

Date: Fri, 18 Feb 2005 02:30:29 +0100

jstevh@msn.com writes:

> David Kastrup wrote:
>
>> No. Your method does not work because choosing m correctly is not
>> shown to be any easier than factoring the original number.
>>
>> [More nonsense snipped]
>>
>> > Now then, I would be curious if any poster might reply explaining
>> > how there is some other possibility than I mentioned:
>> >
>> > 1. A perfect random number generator
>> >
>> > 2. A method that must work in some deterministic fashion.
>>
>> The method works in a deterministic fashion: you need to find
>> particular values of m, and you give no relations or mechanisms for
>> doing so that would not require more work than factoring by ggt
>> with random numbers.
>>
>> I mean, that is the same principal problem with public key
>> cryptography: obviously, there is a _deterministic_ relation
>> between the public and the secret key. And it is easy to check
>> that two keys belong to one key pair. But given only one key, the
>> other is darn hard to find...
>>
>> And that's the same here: not given the factors of the original
>> number, your m is still darn hard to find.
>
> Yeah, but if you *know* the factors of M,

You have to catch M before it makes sense talking about its factors.

> You can play stupid, but it won't help you later. And being in
> Germany won't help you either as the German people will probably go
> after you as well.

Forget it. Nobody will go after anybody that says that a nincompoop
doodling inconsequently with factoring is not of mathematical
interest.

> If there's no reason to the method, if it's as random as you people
> claim, then necessarily it's a perfect random number generator.

Well, so is the entire public key cryptography according to your
reasoning. So what?

> If not, then you are, as I said, setting the world up for anyone who
> can figure out how to get this to work,

The world _is_ already set up for anyone who can factor large numbers
with a larger jump in efficiency than thought possible. And it has
been set up this way for decades. That's why key sizes are growing.

> and if they are terrorist, then God help everyone else, as you
> people have set them up like no one else could, set them up for the
> worst case.

It just so happens that teller card fraud _is_ already big business.
I suggest you clean out your pants and get real. 

-- 
David Kastrup, Kriemhildstr. 15, 44793 Bochum

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