Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science

From: aeo6 (aeo6_at_cornell.edu)
Date: 02/25/05 

Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2005 12:41:09 -0500

Albert said:
> Tony Orlow (aeo6) wrote:
> > Albert said:
> >
> >>Tony Orlow (aeo6) wrote:
> >>
> >>>Albert said:
> >>>
> >>>>Tony Orlow (aeo6) wrote:
> >>>><snip>
> >>>>
> >>>>>If God views all moments in
> >>>>>history as they must be then that view is static and history is
> >>>>>predetermined.
> >>>>
> >>>>If history is determined by the free will of participants
> >>>>exercised in their Present, then it simply does not follow that
> >>>>it is predetermined.
> >>>
> >>>It is not determined by free will, because free will doesn't exist.
>
> Free will may or may not exist. How does that alter the validity
> of a hypothetical statement?
Depends on the statement. If the statement assumes the existence of
something that doesn't exist it's useless.
>
> >>Your lack of reading comprehension is leading you astray yet
> >>again, Tony. There is an 'If' as the first word in that sentence.
> >
> > I saw the "if". Your sentence is a logical statement of implication of
> > the form "if this then that":
> >
> > "determination of history by free will" -> "no predertmination to
> > history"
>
> That is an unwarranted expansion of the proposition. I choose to
> stick with the much simpler and more straightforward statement
> that I have been defending: "There is no contradiction between
> free will and foreknowledge."
This is the "if" sentence I was referring to, copied from above:

"If history is determined by the free will of participants exercised in
their Present, then it simply does not follow that it is predetermined."

I can only read that to mean, as I said, that there is a contradiction
between free will and predetermination, but that doesn't seem to be the
issue any more. now the problem is the equivalence of foreknowledge and
predetermination.
>
> > Since your premise is incorrect, the conclusion cannot be deduced from
> > it. Weren't you the one that wanted all starting assertions for logical
> > arguments to be true? If you can prove to me that free will determines
> > history, and not will determined in turn by its own history, then you
> > will have made a point, finally. However, you have made no effort to
> > demonstrate this central point.
>
> The existence or non-existence of free will is irrelevant to the
> validity of the statement: "There is no contradiction between
> free will and foreknowledge."
No, but it is totally relevant to the statement that such a
contradiction exists, because if it does, then omniscience can only
exist in the absence of free will, and vice versa. If I reject the
premise, then the conclusion goes with it.
>
> > The comprehension problem is not mine, Albert.
> >
> >>>This
> >>>is as I said to Allan. Free will is the contradiction of
> >>>predetermination.
> >>
> >>No, it is not.
> My error. Here and in several other places noted below I read
> 'predetermination' and understood 'foreknowledge'. I apologize.
That's okay. We're all human here and it gets heated. No biggie.
> >
> > You said in the "if" sentence that predetermination does not follow from
> > free will.
>
> No, I did not.
Well, yes you did. See above.
>
> You said:
> "If God views all moments in history as they must be then that
> view is static and history is predetermined."
>
> To which I replied:
> "If history is determined by the free will of participants
> exercised in their Present, then it simply does not follow that
> it[history] is predetermined [by God]."
Which is what I said. Please explain the difference...
>
> > Since no one has been retarded enough to assert that it does,
> > I can only conclude that what you are saying is that free will precludes
> > predetermination. If that is true then predetermination also precludes
> > free will, logically (see below). They are mutually contradictory.
>
> In the limited context we are discussing, yes.
....or, move on. :)
>
> >>>If you assume free will you disprove predetermination,
> >>>and if you assume predetermination you disprove free will.
> >>
> >>No.
> Same error I made above. I misread and should have replied "In
> the limited context we are discussing, yes."
No prob. The disagreement now seems to be in the equivalence of
foreknowledge and predetermination.
>
> > Explain.
> >
> >>>You are
> >>>assuming free will in your attack on predetermination, which proves
> >>>nothing since it's based on the assumption that you're right.
> >>
> >>No. I am making no attack on predetermination. I am saying and
> >>have said nothing more than there is no contradiction between the
> >>concept of free will (whether you believe it exists or not) and
> >>predetermination (whether you believe it exists or not).
>
> Yet a third instance of the same error on my part. The last
> 'predetermination' should have been 'foreknowledge.' My apologies.
>
> > Then you have changed positions. We were originally talking about the
> > omniscience of God, which you said was not equal to predetermination.
> > Now you say those two are the same, but predetermination is compatible
> > with "free" will? What does "free" mean here, then? And, don't bother
> > calling me a liar. That WAS your position.
>
> Yes. I misread and misspoke on the several occasions I noted
> above. My apologies.
>
> >>>The problem here is a failure to find contradiction between absolute
> >>>knowledge of people's choices and their freedom to choose.
> >>
> >>The only problem is in your mind.
> >
> > I have no problem. I have dispensed with free will and its inherent
> > contradictions.
>
> As a personal philosophy that is certainly allowed. However, it
> does not invalidate the statement: "There is no contradiction
> between free will and foreknowledge."
That depends on the realtionship between predetermination and absolute
foreknowledge.
>
> >>>Either that
> >>>knowledge is absolute and you are bound to act according to it, or you
> >>>are free to contradict that knowledge by acting otherwise, therefore
> >>>making that knowledge not absolute. You cannot have it both ways.
> >>
> >>I see that you are confused by more than just time. You also
> >>seem to believe that *you* would be in possession of
> >>foreknowledge and are therefore free to turn it into a lie by
> >>acting contrary to it. That, of course, is a new condition, that
> >>simply invokes a paradox: Foreknowledge of choice A, is made
> >>false by choice B, then the foreknowledge of choice B, is made
> >>false by choice A, etc., etc. ad infinitum, ad nauseum. You will
> >>note that in my illustrative gedanken, I avoided that paradox by
> >>not revealing the foreknowledge until you made your choice.
> >
> > My point doesn't involve your foreknowledge or knowledge of whether God
> > was right or wrong. It isn't dependent on time. It simply consists of
> > the idea that absolute knowledge is equivalent to fact, so that absolute
> > knowledge of the future is determination of the facts of that future.
>
> Your use of 'determination' in the last sentence is ambiguous.
> Are you attempting to say that foreknowledge amounts to
> predetermination? Or are you using 'determination' as in
> 'ascertain' or 'discover'?
I am using determine to mean ascertain. Determination may also imply
imposing one's will to cause a fact. To me it doesn't matter. God may or
may not be causing things to happen. It's the absolute knowledge of the
future that causes it to be unchangeable by will.
>
> > According to any reasonable definition of "free" will that I can glean,
> > it is antithetical to predetermination. That's what makes it "free".
>
> OK.
>
> >
> > Again, could you enlighten me as to exactly how you define "free" in the
> > context of will?
>
> In the limited context of the statement, "There is no
> contradiction between free will and foreknowledge," 'free' would
> be defined as 'not determined by foreknowledge'.
>
> >>>>>If you can change future history from what God already
> >>>>>sees in his view,
> >>>>
> >>>>You change future history only by acting in the Present. What a
> >>>>being outside of time sees does not alter the fact that the only
> >>>>determinant is your own choice.
> >>>>
> >>>>>then that view isn't static,
> >>>>
> >>>>Only the Past may be thought of as static, and then only from
> >>>>some Present.
> >>>
> >>>Allan, and I think Wolf originally, was suggesting that it made a
> >>>difference whether God is within time and knowing the future through
> >>>perfect prediction, or outside of time and knowing the future by simply
> >>>seeing it. The point I am making is that this just changes the question
> >>>superficially, so that it takes the form: Can we change this picture of
> >>>history that God sees, or is it static and unchangeable in God's eyes?
> >>>The first implies free will, the second God's omniscience. Does God's
> >>>knowedge change or does God already know everything there is to know?
> >>>
> >>>>>in which case this view
> >>>>>does not tell God everything that will happen,
> >>>>
> >>>>What will happen from the perspective of the Present, can only be
> >>>>known by viewing the Past from some point in the Future.
> >>>
> >>>You mean we can only know the past at any given moment? Yes, and we can
> >>>only guess the future, because we're not omniscient.
> >>
> >>OK.
> >>
> >>>>>unless God also knows
> >>>>>everythign about how will can change the course of history.
> >>>>
> >>>>Another point entirely.
> >>>
> >>>Not at all.
> >>
> >>No. Another point, specifically, God's knowledge of all possible
> >>futures.
> >
> > Does God know which of the possible futures is the actual one that will
> > happen? I think an omniscient god would.
>
> I would think so too.
> I would also prefer to stay on topic: "There is no contradiction
> between free will and foreknowledge,"
Then I guess you agree that the timelessness of God is irrelevant to the
topic. Don't get upset, I know you didn't raise the objection, though
you seemed to think it was important at one point (I think).
>
> >>>If the picture of history that God sees can change because
> >>>of our will, but God knows exactly what makes it change and how, then
> >>>God could predict the changes in that picture of history, and retain
> >>>omniscience by, again, perfectly predicting our will. Of course, in this
> >>>case, the picture would not be of actual history, but of a possible
> >>>history that changes according to rules that affect the possibilities.
> >>>If there are no rules that govern these changes in history, then God
> >>>cannot predict those changes, and is therefore not omniscient.
> >
> > Read this again. Slowly. Three times.
> >
> >>>>>Either an
> >>>>>omniscient God is viewing exactly what history must be,
> >>>>
> >>>>Based only on your own choices in your own Present.
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>>or only what
> >>>>>history might be, in which case God is not omniscient.
> >>>>
> >>>>What 'might' be can only be guessed in a Present. What must be
> >>>>is the Past.
> >>>
> >>>So, you missed the idea that God is outside of time, and therefore have
> >>>no idea what we are talking about. Why am I not surprised?
> >>
> >>Huh?
> >
> > Why are you talking about the past, and present, and guessing if we are
> > talking about an omniscient God outside of time? Did you miss that? Huh?
> >
> >>>>>This is why I say
> >>>>>it makes no difference to the argument.
> >>>>
> >>>>Yes, you keep saying that. Yet, the fact remains that there is
> >>>>no contradiction between a concept of free will and a
> >>>>foreknowledge based on an ability to move freely out of time.
> >>>>This point was illustrated for you earlier in a thought
> >>>>experiment. You agreed at that time that there was no contradiction.
> >>>
> >>>That "thought experiment" was irrelevant for reasons I have repeatedly
> >>>pointed out to you.
> >>
> >>No. It is not irrelevant to the proposition that free will does
> >>not contradict foreknowledge.
> >
> > Yes it is. Foreknowledge is predetermination.
>
> <sigh> No. It is not.
>
> > You have determined the
> > future beforehand. That's what it means.
>
> No. and no.
>
> > What is "free will" free from,
> > if not predetermination? The question is whether you are ever free to
> > contradict absolute foreknowledge, which is included in omniscience, and
> > which is equivalent to predetrmination.
>
> No, foreknowledge is not not equivalent to predetermination.
Double negative.....so you agree they're equivalent!!!
> >
> >>>It avoided the contradiction because the prediction
> >>>was correct, when the question is whether the prediction can ever be
> >>>incorrect. See, if you can give me an example where God is all knowing,
> >>>and yet you are free to violate that knowledge, get back to me.
> >>
> >>Your hang up is apparently the use of the word 'God'; Which is
> >>why I attempted on several occasions to make my point without
> >>recourse to the word. It is the very reason that in my
> >>illustrative gedanken there was no God, but only a hypothetical
> >>time traveler. You might help yourself to a proper understanding
> >>by omitting all references to God. The proposition does not
> >>require God, merely a time traveler.
> >
> > Yes, and if the Time traveler has the wrong answer, then how do you
> > explain it?
>
> The time traveler merely brought back from the future a hand
> written message from your future self to your past self. If the
> wrong answer was given then I would assume that you lied to
> yourself. Of course, that in no way altered what choice you
> actually made about breakfast, nor the fact that the time
> traveler knows the truth because he is able to observe both what
> you actually did and your future lie about what you did.

This is where your gedanken is a detour. It brings in things like MY
knowledge, my ability to LIE to myself. MY knowledge is irrelevant. I am
not the omniscient one. Neither is the Traveler. The ability to explain
away a letter from the future by saying I lied demonstrates that it's
not a pertinent example. If you bring the gedanken back to God, the one
with the omniscience in question, and God hands you an envelope with a
note that you didn't write, but contains God's statement of what you
ate, can it ever be wrong? Assume God presented the letter to you before
you chose, but you opened it after you chose, and it was wrong, how
would you explain that?
>
> > More importantly, could the Time Traveler ever POSSIBLY have
> > the wrong answer,
>
> The time traveler could only possibly know what happened in the
> past of any future present that he might visit.
And yet God knows all. Let's leave the Traveler out of it.
>
> > or are you bound, whether you know it or not, to agree
> > with the future as it is already known?
>
> Illogical question. All that is bound is the past.
Then God's absolute knowledge of the future is not binding? What is
absolute knowledge if not correct? How can it ever be wrong?
>
> > Albert, it all boils down to this, in rawest possible terms:
> >
> > 1. Absolute Foreknowledge=Predetermination
>
> Believing this statement is your error.
Explain the difference between absolute knowledge of a future event and
the fact that it must occur. If it doesn't occur then the knowledge that
foresaw it was not absolute.
>
> > 2. Free Will = ~Predermination => Predetermination->~Free Will
> > 3. Therefore, taking 1. and 2., Absolute Foreknowledge -> ~Free Will
> >
> > Now, please explain precisely where this argument breaks down. Here are
> > the two choices:
> >
> > A. Definition 1 is wrong. Please explain the difference between absolute
> > foreknowldge and predetermination;
>
> Definition 1 is wrong. I have just spent several hours and
> dozens of messages explaining why. Reread the gedanken.
The gedanken is irrelevant for the reasons I have mentioned. Please drop
the gedanken and stick to the topic of God's knowledge, not mine or the
Traveler's.
>
> > B. Statement 2 is wrong and there is no contradiction between free will
> > and predetermination. Please explain what free will is "free" from, if
> > not predetermination.
> >
> > I hope this clarifies and reduces things enough for you to discern
> > clearly my logical assertion, and identify exactly what it is you object
> > to.
>
> Your *illogical* assertion is *crystal clear* and has been so
> since you first introduced it. It is also dead wrong. The fact
> that you refuse to consider the possibility that it is wrong is
> what I object to.
I am willing to consider any objection that isn't immediately
dismissible. I had to think about the timelessness of God and whether
that affected the argument. My conclusion, and yours I think, is that
it's irrelevant.

Your objection at this point is the equivalence between absolute
foreknowledge and predetermination, and the contradiction between that
foreknowledge and free will, because you make some distinction between
knowing for sure something will happen (absolute foreknowledge) and the
fact that it will surely actually happen (predetermination). I don't see
how you can say God knows for sure what will happen in the future, and
at the same time that we have any ability to change the future from that
course, or that our choices aren't part of what God can actually
accurately foresee, which should be everything.
>
> 

-- 
Smiles,
Tony

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
    ... > free will and foreknowledge." ... between free will and predetermination, but that doesn't seem to be the ... >> omniscience of God, which you said was not equal to predetermination. ... That depends on the realtionship between predetermination and absolute ...
    (sci.cognitive)
  • Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
    ... > free will and foreknowledge." ... between free will and predetermination, but that doesn't seem to be the ... >> omniscience of God, which you said was not equal to predetermination. ... That depends on the realtionship between predetermination and absolute ...
    (sci.physics)
  • Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
    ... You said in the "if" sentence that predetermination does not follow from ... > have said nothing more than there is no contradiction between the ... > foreknowledge and are therefore free to turn it into a lie by ... My point doesn't involve your foreknowledge or knowledge of whether God ...
    (sci.cognitive)
  • Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
    ... You said in the "if" sentence that predetermination does not follow from ... > have said nothing more than there is no contradiction between the ... > foreknowledge and are therefore free to turn it into a lie by ... My point doesn't involve your foreknowledge or knowledge of whether God ...
    (sci.physics)
  • Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
    ... You said in the "if" sentence that predetermination does not follow from ... > have said nothing more than there is no contradiction between the ... > foreknowledge and are therefore free to turn it into a lie by ... My point doesn't involve your foreknowledge or knowledge of whether God ...
    (sci.math)
Quantcast