Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science

From: aeo6 (aeo6_at_cornell.edu)
Date: 02/28/05 

Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2005 13:31:53 -0500

Albert said:
> Tony Orlow (aeo6) wrote:
> <snip>
>
> This post/reply had grown exceedingly long and has become
> confusing to me. I have snipped all but the final paragraph.
>
> > Your objection at this point is the equivalence between absolute
> > foreknowledge and predetermination, and the contradiction between that
> > foreknowledge and free will, because you make some distinction between
> > knowing for sure something will happen (absolute foreknowledge) and the
> > fact that it will surely actually happen (predetermination).
>
> This sentence does not accurately portray my objection to your
> proposition.
The please elucidate me on exactly what your objection is, in
straightforward language, without resorting to more irrelevant
gendankenen.
>
> > I don't see
> > how you can say God knows for sure what will happen in the future, and
> > at the same time that we have any ability to change the future from that
> > course, or that our choices aren't part of what God can actually
> > accurately foresee, which should be everything.
>
> Yes. I know you don't see it and I know of no better
> illustration of it than the time traveler thought experiment.
> You insist on inserting God into the argument, when God is an
> unnecessary concept in showing that foreknowledge is not
> identical to predetermination. That is *precisely* why the
> gedanken used a time traveler incapable of predetermining
> anything, rather than God. You agreed to this principle once
> before, yet changed your mind for reasons you have chosen not to
> share.
>
>
Albert, you're twisting things again. What I agreed to was that your
gedanken exhibited no paradox or contradiction. I also went on to say
that was because it wasn't the same situation. I have said all this, so
don't say I haven't. But, I'll repeat it anyway.

There is no foreknowedge in your example. When I wrote the letter it was
about that time's past, the Traveler doesn't know what is in it until I
open it, and by the time I open it, the truth is in that time's past.
Whose foreknowledge are you talking about, the letter's? Besides, you
have already conceded that if you somehow classify this as
foreknowledge, it can still be wrong, possibly because I lied in the
letter, which makes the foreknowledge on the part of the letter far from
absolute. Therefore this "gedanken" is irrelevant to the question as to
whether absolute foreknowledge as attributed to God is compatible with
free will as attributed to man. To the extent that knowledge is
absolutely correct, it can never be wrong, whether it's knowledge about
the future or anything else. Foreknowledge that can be false is not
absolute and is consequently irrelevant to this argument. 

-- 
Smiles,
Tony

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
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    (sci.cognitive)
  • Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
    ... > free will and foreknowledge." ... between free will and predetermination, but that doesn't seem to be the ... >> omniscience of God, which you said was not equal to predetermination. ... That depends on the realtionship between predetermination and absolute ...
    (sci.physics)
  • Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
    ... >> Your objection at this point is the equivalence between absolute ... >> foreknowledge and free will, because you make some distinction between ... or that our choices aren't part of what God can actually ... > illustration of it than the time traveler thought experiment. ...
    (sci.physics)
  • Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
    ... >> Your objection at this point is the equivalence between absolute ... >> foreknowledge and free will, because you make some distinction between ... or that our choices aren't part of what God can actually ... > illustration of it than the time traveler thought experiment. ...
    (sci.cognitive)
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