Re: Game Theory question
- From: "Philippe Genthon" <genthon@xxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 4 May 2005 17:40:12 +0200
> Okay, it seems this problem is a bit ill-defined, I left out one more bit,
> which is that player 1 knows exactly the outcomes of all the games
> ever played, and while player 2 doesn't, they could take advantage of
> this (ie., cooperate) to maximise their pay-offs...
>
> Okay, it seems this problem is a bit ill-defined, I left out one more bit,
> which is that player 1 knows exactly the outcomes of all the games
> ever played, and while player 2 doesn't, they could take advantage of
> this (ie., cooperate) to maximise their pay-offs...
>
>
In this case (1 knowing the history and 2 not knowing the history) , if we
assume that 2 knows that 1 knows the history, I'll suggest for an iterated
game :
2 choose a strategy and keeps it, hoping that 1 will join !
Philippe
.
- References:
- Game Theory question
- From: Willem H. de Boer
- Re: Game Theory question
- From: Willem H. de Boer
- Re: Game Theory question
- From: Philippe Genthon
- Re: Game Theory question
- From: Willem H. de Boer
- Game Theory question
- Prev by Date: Re: When does weak convergence imply strong convergence?
- Next by Date: Re: abundance of irrationals!)
- Previous by thread: Re: Game Theory question
- Next by thread: Re: Game Theory question
- Index(es):
Relevant Pages
|
