Re: this is AWESOME


rebecca wrote:
> hell, you only live once, right? I think it's awesome that kathleen
> filed this.
> .......................................................................................................................

You know it really is amazing that in the entire document she NEVER
even mentions the words:

jurisdiction (or lack thereof), sovereign immunity, lack of in personam
jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper
venue...sovereign immunity...

In case anyone is interested here is a copy of the State of
Connecticut's Motion to Dismiss. This below is what she was purportedly
responding to--SUPPOSED to be responding to, REQUIRED to be responding
to.

I'll admit--that the State of Ct's motion and memo are annoying in that
they actually conform to the Rules, cite CASE LAW, accurately talk
about statutes and rules and laws and regulations--they're NOT just
making it up as they go like kathLOON.

OF COURSE, they're only lawyers NOT SCIENTISTS, so who can blame them?

I can see how it would have been quite bothersome for kathLOON to try
to actually respond to the legal pleading by doing the same!

Too much to expect. After all, she DID ask for Counsel! And for advice
from the Court! And how could she be expected to talk down to lawyer
level??? SHE'S A FREAKING SCIENTIST!!!

Really annoying that Ct points out all these legal issues!!

Plus theirs is BORING compared to hers!!! LOL


---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
KATHLEEN M. DICKSON
Plaintzfl
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
CIVIL ACTION NO.
CA-05-328-T
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Defendant NOVEMBER 15,2005

MOTION TO DISMISS

Pursuant to Rule 12 (b) (I), (2), (3) and (6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Defendant, State of Connecticut, respectfully
moves for dismissal of this action, based upon lack of subject matter
and personal jurisdiction, improper venue and failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. The grounds of this motion are set
forth with greater particularity in the accompanying memorandum of law.

No Oral Argument Requested

No Testimony Required

Case 1:05-cv-00328-T-DLM Document 21 Filed 11/15/2005 Page 1 of 17

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

DEFENDANT

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
ATTORNEYGENERAL
BY: IS1 /
John ~ . h c k e r
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
State of Connecticut
Federal Bar No. ct 04576
1 10 Sherman Street
Hartford, CT 06105
E-mail: John.Tucker@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Tel: (860) 808-5480
Fax: (860) 808-5595
James R. Lee
Assistant Attorney General
Department of the Attorney General lr
State of Rhode Island
R.I. Bar No. 4305
150 South Main Street
Providence, RI 02903
Tel: 274-4400
Fax: 222-2995

Case 1:05-cv-00328-T-DLM Document 21 Filed 11/15/2005 Page 2 of 17

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed in accordance
with Rule 5(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on this 15th day
of November, 2005, first class postage prepaid to:
Ms. Kathleen M. Dickson
23 Garden Street
Pawcatuck, CT 06379
(Plainti@
/
John E. Tucker
Assistant Attorney General

Case 1:05-cv-00328-T-DLM Document 21 Filed 11/15/2005 Page 3 of 17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

KATHLEEN M. DICKSON CIVIL ACTION NO.
Plainiff
CA-05-328-T

v.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT
Defendant
NOVEMBER 1 5,2005

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Background:

The plaintiff, a resident of Connecticut who has appeared pro se, filed
this action against the State of Connecticut. The initial complaint was
filed July 28,2005. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed amended complaints
on August 4,2005 and August 22,2005. The plaintiff offers a rambling,
lengthy diatribe against several Connecticut state agencies, including:
the Department of Children and Families (hereinafter "DCF"), the
Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, the Department of
Mental Retardation, the Division of Criminal Justice and the Office of
the Attorney General. The plaintiff includes a discussion of Lyrne
Disease. The gist of the
complaint appears to be that in the plaintiffs opinion the above listed
Connecticut agencies are not competently fulfilling their statutory
responsibilities.

There is no allegation that the matters discussed in the complaint or
that the plaintiff
herself have any connection with the District of Rhode Island.

The plaintiffs latest pleading, the amended complaint dated August
22,2005, FN 1 does not include a prayer for relief. However, as
reflected in the original complaint, it appears that the primary relief
sought by the plaintiff is $100,000,000.00 in damages. The plaintiff
also seeks the following injunctive relief: that DCF "be dissolved
completely and all related DCF statutes be stricken from Connecticut
General Statutes", for this court to establish a "forum for redress of
all DCF perjury committed in the last 15 years, and the return of
fraudulently taken children", the establishment of a research clinic
for vector borne diseases to be named "the Hospital of the Immaculate
Heart", and for this court to order the criminal prosecution of various
individuals, including the Assistant Attorney General who prosecuted
the plaintiffs child protection case, the former commissioner of DCF
and the former head of the Office of Policy and Management.

The plaintiff filed motions for appointment of counsel and relief
directed to ongoing
legal proceedings in Connecticut. This Court (Martin, U.S.M.J.) denied
these motions on October 19,2005 and October 24,2005 respectively.

Argument:

I. ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR WANT OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION.

A. No Jurisdictional Statement.

The plaintiffs rambling complaint does not provide this Court any basis
to exercise
subject matter jurisdiction. Rule 8 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that the complaint must contain "a short and plain
statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends."

The plaintiff has asserted no basis for this Court's jurisdiction,
including, what
presumably is the operative pleading, her latest amended complaint
dated August 22,2005 FN 1 As this Court (Martin, U.S.M.J.) has already
observed in its October 19,2005 ruling denying the plaintiffs motion
for appointment of counsel: "Plaintiff cites no statute or other
authority which would allow this court to exercise jurisdiction . . . .
The court is unaware of any grounds which would give it jurisdiction in
this matter." (Order Denying Appointment of Counsel dated 1 O/ 1 9/05)

B. Sovereign Immunity Bars Action

It is well established that sovereign immunity bars claims against the
state for money
damages except where sovereignty is expressly and unambiguously
abrogated by the legislature. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,750 (1999)
(claims against the state especially claims for money damages are
barred). FN 2 See Ford Motor Co. v Department of Treasury, 323 US
459,464 (1945) ("when the action is in essence one for the recovery of
money fiom the state, the state is the real, substantial party in
interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit . .
.. .'); Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S.
670,689-90 (1 982) (if an action "is allowed to proceed against the
officer only because he acted without proper authority, the judgment
may not compel the state to use its funds to compensate the plaintiff
for the injury"); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1 985) (the
bar of sovereign immunity "remains in effect when state officials are
sued for damages in their official capacity"); Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 US 58,68-69 (1989) (claim for damages under civil
rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the state or a state
official sued in official capacity was barred). Title and Trust Co.,
260 F. 2d 41 1 (7th Cir. 1958); Austin v. Spaulding, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4955 (D.R.I. 2001).

Any claims directed against the State of Connecticut are barred by the
Eleventh
Amendment, depriving this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. See
Ward v. Murphy, 330 F. Supp. 2d 83,97-98 @. Conn. 2004).

As noted above, there is no cause of action identified in the
plaintiffs latest, August 22, 2005, amended complaint. Even if this
court goes back to the original July 27,2005 complaint there is no
basis to for this court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction. The
plaintiff lists several statutes, including: 18 U.S.C. $6 241,242 and
245, the Americans with Disabilities Act, FN 3 "Risk of Injury to Minor
Children", and Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO).

Assuming for the sake of argument that the plaintiff intends to plead
these statutes as causes of action, none of these statutes provides a
basis to maintain this action.
18 U.S.C. $8 241,242 and 245 are criminal statutes and are not a basis
for civil liability. *** v. Consentino, 876 F. 2d 1,2 (lSt Cir. 1989);
Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F. 2d 1089,1092 (9th Cir. 1980); Sauls v. Bristol
Meyers Co., 462 F. Supp. 887,889-890 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Dugar v.
Coughlin, 613 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Risk of injury to a minor
refers to a Connecticut criminal statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. $53-21
(attached). It is not a basis for civil liability and does not permit
civil suit against the sovereign state.

"The legislative history of the RICO Act . . . fails to indicate that
Congress considered and firmly decided to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment immunity of the States." Productions & Leasing v. Hotel
Conquistador, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 71 7,720 (D. Nev. l982), Aff d, 709 F.
2d 2 1 (9th Cir. 1983). See Bair v. Krug, 853 F. 2d 672 (gth Cir. 1988)
(RICO claim barred by sovereign immunity); Molina v. State of New York,
956 F. Supp. 257,260-261 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("without a clear showing
that Congress intended abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment
governmental immunity, this Court will not infer that the RICO Act
deprives the State of its protection.", citing Productions & Leasing);
Gaines v. Texas Tech University, 965 F. Supp. 886,889 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(RICO claims against state university dismissed under Eleventh
Amendment); McMaster v. Minnesota, 819 F. Supp. 1429,1434 @. Minn.
1993), aff d, 30 F. 3d 976 (8" Cir. 1994) (states not subject to suit
under RICO, absent a state waiver of immunity). 4

"The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting
States may
not be sued by private individuals in federal court. . . . Congress may
abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both
unequivocally intends to do so and 'acts pursuant to a valid grant of
constitutional authority."' Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356,363 (2001). None of these statutes clearly abrogate sovereign
immunity.

Although prospective injunctive relief is potentially available in
order to enjoin state
officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of
federal law; see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); as far as the
defendant can discern, the plaintiff does not alleged facts to
establish that the defendant has violated federal law. Moreover, the
injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff does not address any alleged
violation of federal law. Accordingly, the Ex Parte Young doctrine is
not applicable. See generally Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).

For these reasons, the plaintiffs claims are barred by sovereign
immunity.


11. ACTION SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OR
IMPROPER VENUE.

A. No Personal Jurisdiction.

When a court's jurisdiction is contested, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving that
jurisdiction lies in the forum state. Dalmau Rodriguez v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 781 F. 2d 9, 10 (1st Cir. 1986). It is the responsibility
of the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.
Rodriguez v. Fullerton Tires Corp., 1 15 F.3d 8 1, 83-84 (1st
Cir.1997).

The proper exercise of specific in personam jurisdiction FN 5 hinges on
satisfaction of two requirements: first, that the forum in which the
federal district court sits has a long-arm statute that purports to
grant jurisdiction over the defendant; and second, that the exercise of
jurisdiction pursuant to that statute comports with the strictures of
the Constitution. Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53,60 (1st Cir.1994). In
Rhode Island, the long arm statute and the requirements of due process
are co-extensive. See Donatelli v. Nat'l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459 (1
st Cir. 1990); Brian Jachon & Co. v. Eximias Pharm. Corp, 248 F. Supp.
2d 31,34-35 (D.R.I. 2003).

The Fourteenth Amendment's concern of fimdamental fairness is achieved
by the central requirement that certain "minimum contacts" exist
between the defendant and the forum state. International Shoe Co. v.
State of Washington, 326 U.S. 3 10,3 16 (1945). This Circuit utilizes a
three-part analysis to determine if sufficient contacts exist to
exercise specific personal jurisdiction:

First, the claim underlying the litigation must directly arise out of,
or relate to, the defendant's forum-state activities. Second, the
defendant's in-state contacts must represent a purposeful availment of
the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thereby
invoking the benefits and protections of that state's laws and making
the defendant's involuntary presence before the state's courts
foreseeable. Third, the exercise of jurisdiction must, in light of the
Gestalt factors, be reasonable.
Brian Jaclcson & Co. v. Eximias Pharm. Corp, 248 F. Supp. 2d 31,35
(D.R.I. 2003) (citing Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F. 3d 138 1, 1389 (1''
Cir. 1995)).

DCF is a department within the executive branch of the State of
Connecticut. Conn. Gen. Stat. $94-38c, 17a-2 and 17a-3. By statute
DCF's mission is to serve the interests of neglected and abused
children in Connecticut. The Department's offices are located within
Connecticut. As a Connecticut state agency, the business of the agency
is transacted in Connecticut.

Similarly, the other agencies referenced in the complaint are located
within Connecticut and their mission is to serve the interests of the
State of Connecticut. See Conn. Gen Stat. $9 4-38c, 3-129.

The plaintiffs complaint is devoid of any allegation upon which
personal jurisdiction could be based.


B. Improper Venue

The venue statute, 28 USC 5 1391 (b), provides: "A civil action wherein
jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may,
except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial
district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the
same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial
part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3)
a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no
district in which the action may otherwise be brought."

Here, none of the parties reside in Rhode Island or have any connection
with this
jurisdiction. The matters contained in the plaintiffs complaint have no
connection with this jurisdiction. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. $ 1406
(a), the defendant respectfblly requests that the action be dismissed.

III. NO COGNIZABLE CLAIM.

In ruling on a motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept
the well pleaded averments of the complaint as true, and construe these
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Chongris v. Board
ofAppeals, 81 1 F. 2d 36,37 (lSt Cir. 1987). However, the court must
"eschew any reliance on bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, and
'opprobrious epithets."' Id., citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 10
(1944).

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a comprehensive statute
that prohibits
discrimination against individuals with disabilities. The ADA is
alluded to, rather than plead, in the plaintiffs complaint. (Pl's
8/22/05 amended complaint, p. 3) She does not identify what title of
the ADA she claims is applicable. FN .6 She does not appear to claim
that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA or that she was
discriminated against on the basis of that disability.

Even when the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, she has failed to allege disability status or any of the
other necessary elements of an ADA claim. See Parker v. Universidad de
Puerto Rico, 225 F. 3d 1,4 (1st Cir. 2000).


Although the plaintiff has listed several criminal statutes in her
pleadings, as discussed above, none of these statutes provides a viable
civil cause of action. The plaintiff has failed to state a cause of
action upon which relief may be granted.

IV. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ARE NOT JUSTICIABLE.

"Dual sovereignty is a defining feature of our Nation's constitutional
blueprint." FMC v. S.C. Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743,751-752 (2002).
"The seriousness of federal judicial interference with state civil
functions has long been recognized by this Court. We have consistently
required that when federal courts are confronted with requests for such
relief, they should abide by standards of restraint that go well beyond
those of private equity jurisprudence." Hufian v. Pursue. Ltd., 420
U.S. 520,603-604 (1975).

The Supreme Court has long held that injunctive relief is an
"extraordinary remedy" that should not issue as a matter of course or
to restrain acts whose injurious consequences are "merely trifling."
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305,3 1 1-3 12 (1 982) (quoting
Consolidated Canal Co. v. Mesa Canal Co., 177 U.S. 296,302 (1900)).
Instead, an injunction "should issue only where the intervention of a
court of equity 'is essential in order effectually to protect ...
rights against injuries otherwise irremediable."' Id. at 3 12 (quoting
Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453,456 (1919)). "[TJhe principles of
equity ... militate heavily against the grant of an injunction except
in the most extraordinary circumstances." Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
379 (1976). Because an injunction is an exercise of equitable
authority, courts "must sensitively assess all the equities of the
situation, including the public interest." Million Youth March, Inc. v.
Sajr, 155 F. 3d 124, 125 (2nd Cir. 1998). See Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.
2d 207,213 (2"d Cir. 1986) (Second Circuit has "cautioned . . . not to
use a sledgehammer where a more delicate instrument will suffice . . .
..")

We long have recognized that the separation of powers "is one of the
fundamental
principles of the American and Connecticut constitutional systems."
Stolbert v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586,598 (1978), appeal dismissedsub
nom., 454 U.S. 958 (1981). See Board of Education v. Naugatuck, 257
Conn. 409,424 (2001). As expressed by Chief Justice Warren Burger in
his concurring opinion, "the essential purpose of the separation of
powers is to allow for independent functioning of each coequal branch
of government within its assigned sphere of responsibility, free from
risk of control, interference, or intimidation by other branches."
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,760-761 (1982).

The plaintiff apparently asks for this Court to order that the
assistant attorney general
who prosecuted the plaintiffs child welfare case and certain former
state officials be criminally prosecuted. Prosecutorial authorities
enjoy broad discretion. State v. Kinchen, 243 Conn. 690 (1998). It is
beyond the appropriate scope of this court's authority to direct
Connecticut prosecutorial authorities to prosecute the named
individuals. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is at the very
core of the executive function and is presumptively unreviewable. See
State v. Smith, 178 F. 3d 22 (1'' Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
910 (1999); State v. Kinchen, 243 Conn. 690 (1998).

The plaintiff requests, inter alia, that this court establish a
research facility, disband a
state agency (DCF), and order that all statutes related to DCF be
stricken. FN 7 These sweeping demands are matters that are committed
to the discretion of the executive branch of state government. Even if
the plaintiff could establish a basis for liability and even if the
proposed relief had some relationship with the alleged harm done to the
plaintiff, it is respectfully submitted that this court should refrain
from granting the requested relief.

CONCLUSION:

For the reasons stated above, the defendant respectfully moves for
dismissal of this
action.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT
DEFENDANT
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL
ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: IS1
John Tucker
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
State of Connecticut
Federal Bar No. ct 04576
110 Sherman Street
Hartford, CT 06105
E-mail: John.Tucker@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Tel: (860) 808-5480
Fax: (860) 808-5595
LOCAL ASSOCIATE COUNSEL
James E. Lee
Assistant Attorney General
D epartment of the Attorney General
State of Rhode Island
R.I. Bar No. 4305
150 South Main Street
Providence, RI 02903
Tel: 274-4400
Fax: 222-2995
Case 1:05-cv-00328-T-DLM Document 21 Filed 11/15/2005 Page 15 of 17
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed in accordance
with Rule 5(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on this 15th day of November,
2005, first class postage
prepaid to:
Ms. Kathleen M. Dickson
23 Garden Street
Pawcatuck, CT 06379
(Plaintiff)
John E. Tucker
Assistant Attorney General



626 CRIMES Title 53
operators. Throwing or shooting at trains, engines, motor units,
railroad cars; injury or destruction. Binding, or administering drugs
with intent to commit crime.
Sections 53-1 1 to 53-19, inclusive, are repealed.
(1949 Rev., S. 83524358,8360,8520; 1961, P.A. 210; 1969, P.A. 144, S.
1; 327; 828, S. 214; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 129.)
See Sec. 53-202 re machine guns.
See Sec. 53a-7 re effect of intoxication.
See Secs. 53a-lll,53a-112 re arson.
See Sec. 53a-134 re first degree robbery.
See chapter 952, parts IV and V re homicide and assault and related
offenses, respectively.
Sec. 53-20. Cruelty to persons. Any person who tortures, torments,
cruelly or
unlawfully punishes or wilfully or negligently deprives any person of
necessary food, clothing, shelter or proper physical care; and any
person who, having the control and custody of any child under the age
of sixteen years, in any capacity whatsoever, maltreats, tortures,
overworks, cruelly or unlawfully punishes or wilfully or negligently
deprives such child of necessary food, clothing, or shelter shall be
fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than
one year or both.

(1949 Rev., S. 8368.)

Formerly trial justice could take final jurisdiction of offense against
section. 115 C. 600. The word "unlawfully" does not connote "inhuman or
barbarous treatment", but should be construed within the rule of
statutory construction that a general word, following a particular
enumeration, is intended to apply only to matters of the same general
character. 165

C. 288,293.
Cited. 26 CS 316. Cited. 37 CS 664,665,670.
Cited. 4 COM. Cir. Ct. 571. Evidence that defendant, mother of
premature twin babies, failed to obtain medical aid or other care for
them was sufficient to support jury's verdict holding her guilty of
crime of cruelty to persons upon death of one and severe illness of
other child. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 698.
Sec. 53-21. Injury or risk of injury to, or impairing morals of,
children. Sale of children. (a) Any person who (1) wilfully or
unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years
to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is
endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the
morals of such child are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely
to impair the health or morals of any such child, or (2) has contact
with the intimate parts, as defined in section 53a-65, of a child under
the age of sixteen years or subjects a child under sixteen years of age
to contact with the intimate parts of such person, in a sexual and
indecent manner
likely to impair the health or morals of such child, or (3) permanently
transfers the legal or physical custody of a child under the age of
sixteen years to another person for money or other valuable
consideration or acquires or receives the legal or physical custody of
a child under the age of sixteen years from another person upon payment
of money or other valuable consideration to such other person or a
third person, except in connection with an adoption proceeding that
complies with the provisions of chapter 803, shall be guilty of a class
C felony for a violation of subdivision (1) or (3) of this subsection
and a class B felony for a violation of subdivision (2) of this
subsection.
(b) The act of a parent or agent leaving an infant thnty days or
younger with a
designated employee pursuant to section 17a-58 shall not constitute a
violation of this section.
(1949 Rev., S. 8369; P.A. 95-142, S. 1; P.A. 97-147, S. 1; P.A. 00-207,
S. 6; P.A. 02-138, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 95-142 designated existing provisions as Subdiv. (1) and
amended said Subdiv. to make technical changes, added Subdiv. (2) re
contact with the intimate parts of a child or subjecting a child to
contact with the intimate parts of the actor, in a sexual and indecent
manner likely to impair the health or morals of the child, and
specified that a person who commits the proscribed acts "shall be
guilty of a class C felony" rather than "shall be fined not more than
five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years or both";
P.A. 97-147 added Subdiv. (3) re permanently transferring, or
acquiring or receiving, the legal or physical custody of a child for
money or other valuable consideration; P.A. 00-207

[FN 1 An amended complaint generally supercedes the original complaint
and renders it of no legal effect unless the amended complaint
specifically refers to and adopts or incorporates by reference the
earlier pleading. King v. Dogan, 3 1 F. 3d 344 (5" Cir. 1994); Lubin v.
Chicago]

[FN 2 The contours of sovereign immunity do not change depending on
whether the doctrine is invoked in federal or state court. Alden v.
Maine, supra, 527 U.S. at 713.]



[FN 3 With reference to the ADA, see discussion, infra. ]
[FN 4 In any event, the state, like a municipality, cannot form the
required rnens rea. See F'rooks v. Town of Cortlandt, 997 F. Supp 438
,456-457 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), Aff d, 182 F. 3d 899 ( 2nd Cir. 1999); Brewer
v. Village of Old Field, 3 1 1 F. Supp. 2d 390,398-400 (E.D.N.Y.
2004).]


[FN 5 The plaintiffs complaint is devoid of any basis to assert
general jurisdiction, the standards for which are considerably more
stringent than specific jurisdiction. See Donatelli v. Nat'l Hockey
League, 893 F.2d 459,462-63 (1st Cir.1990).]


[Fn 6 The Supreme Court has held that a Title I claim for money
damages is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Board of Trustees v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). See also Buchanan v. Maine, 366 F. Supp.
2d 169 (D. Maine 2005) (claim for damages under Title I1 claim barred).
As noted above, it is not clear whether the plaintiff has pleaded an
ADA claim or merely alluded to the statute. Furthermore, if the
plaintiff intended to plead the ADA as a cause of action, it is unclear
under what title she wishes to proceed. Because this court lacks
personal jurisdiction over the defendant and for the other reasons
stated above there is no need, at this time, to address whether
sovereign immunity is a bar to the ADA claim if, in fact, that claim is
being asserted. ]

[FN 7 The plaintiff references the fact that custody of her children
was awarded to her ex-husband. To the extent, if at all, that the
plaintiff seeks to collaterally attack the state court judgment, such a
challenge is barred. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);
District of Columbia Court ofAppeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).]




>
>
>
>
> MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS
>
>
> Defendant has motioned to dismiss complaint, when the judge has not
> ruled on the appointment of counsel, nor has the judge ruled on the
> issue of AAG John Tucker not being qualified to represent the State
> because he is a potential witness, and Mr. Tucker has claimed the
> Plaintiffs complaint is rambling.
>
>
> Plaintiff delineated numerically the items of complaint, demonstrated
> the civil rights violations, and demonstrated the lack of competency of
>
> any state of Connecticut's experts.
>
>
> Plaintiff has already demonstrated that she is disabled from Lyme
> disease, and that Lyme is a permanent brain infection. No legal
> precedent exists which specifies that the Americans With Disabilities
> Act is limited to physical access to the courts, only.
>
>
> Therefore for two obvious reasons related to her disabilities, which
> are illness signs and memory problems, Plaintiff requests counsel.
>
>
> Case 1:05-cv-00328-T-DLM Document 23 Filed 11/21/2005 Page 1 of 8
>
>
> The United States Department of Justice is losing Civil Rights Division
>
> attorneys, as they have complained that there has been a serious
> reduction in civil rights cases investigated under the criminal
> administration of George W. Bush (Geneva Convention war and prisoner
> treatment violations, ie, chemical weapons and torture, and the
> fraudulent case for attacking Iraq). This explains why none of the
> extremely numerous complaints made by the Plaintiff Dickson to the
> USDOJ about the criminal behavior of CT and Yale staff were addressed.
>
>
> The State of CT is entirely corrupt, and the US Attorney Kevin O'Comor
> is involved in the John G. Rowland criminal enterprise as previously
> mentioned, ie.,
> DCF is involved in the Rowland crimes.
> Yale is involved in the Rowland crimes.
> Yale is involved in DCF's crimes.
> DCF is involved in Yale's crimes.
> O'Comor had to recuse himself from the investigation of the Rowland
> crimes.
> Yale is involved in the State of CT's crimes.
> Yale is involved in the Bush Family crimes.
> Yale is involved in the Bush Administration crimes.
> Yale is in Connecticut.
>
>
> This is a civil rights class action, and the federal government in CT
> is compromised by 1) Yale brain expertise (forensic psychiatry) having
> a negative number value since they can't even read their own
> publications, and 2) Mr. O'Connor has not stepped down, and 3) the
> Chief Justice of
>
>
> Case 1:05-cv-00328-T-DLM Document 23 Filed 11/21/2005 Page 2 of 8
>
>
> the Second Circuit (In New York, For CT appeals) is John M. Walker, is
> related to the Bush family and is a Yale alumnus and law lecturer.
>
>
> In Addition:
>
>
> The Walker-Bush family has been involved in crime, namely the Eggs Bank
>
> crime;
> Yale University is involved in the crime of LymeRIX and the current
> fraudulent blood testing for Lyme disease;
>
>
> The Bush Walker family sold William Weld an investment firm;
>
>
> William Weld's brother is David Weld (deceased) who was the manager of
> the criminal enterprise called the American Lyme Disease Foundation, in
>
> Somers NY;
>
>
> George W. Bush's uncle, Jonathan Bush, who lives in CT and was involved
>
> in the Riggs' bank scandal, has his own investment firm called JBush &
> Co. Jonathan Bush and John M. Walker live near each other and attend
> the same church in Killingworth, CT. Jonathan Bush also fronted George
> W. Bush $100,000 for George W. Bush first failed oil company and is a
> former chair of the New York Republican Finance Committee;
>
>
> Jonathan Bush is an advisor or on the Board of the Yale Hospitals.
>
>
> Prescott Bush was a member of the Yale Corporation;
>
>
> Case 1:05-cv-00328-T-DLM Document 23 Filed 11/21/2005 Page 3 of 8
>
>
> Prescott Bush was involved in WWII financial crimes relating to
> assistance to the enemy;
>
>
> Both the president George W. Bush and his father George H. W. Bush are
> Yale graduates.
>
>
> Therefore on the above mentioned and previously mentioned matters of
> crime in and around Connecticut and New York, resolved or unresolved,
> the Plaintiff hardly expects anyone would see it reasonable to
> prosecute this entanglement in the state of Connecticut. Few CT judges
> were appointed by Democrats, and the Chief State's Attorney and US
> Attorney are both Republicans, who are heavily involved in various
> crimes at the state level and at the federal level.
>
>
> The Republican controlled legislative branch of federal government and
> the Republican controlled US Department of Justice have involved the
> United States in war crimes, by approving George W. Bush the right to
> attack another country without provocation or threat, to create a new
> entity called a "terrorist" as a replacement for what the Geneva
> Convention calls an enemy combatant, to torture people, use chemical
> weapons, and to defiaud the UN over the terms of the threat presented
> by Saddam Hussein.
>
>
> Therefore the Defendant may be correct in asserting that nowhere in
> these United States, can the civil and human rights crimes committed by
>
> State of CT and Yale employees and associates be prosecuted, especially
>
> since the Plaintiff Dickson has a gag order not to criticize the
> government as terms for release for crimes she did not commit.
>
>
> Case 1:05-cv-00328-T-DLM Document 23 Filed 11/21/2005 Page 4 of 8
>
>
> Let the judge rule. The Plaintiff will meanwhile take these complaints
> to the UN, the
> International Criminal Court, and the World Health Organization. The
> USA is a rogue and violent nation; the US citizens have no rights;
> there is arbitrary and false detainment of its own citizens; and
> arbitrary criminalization of fiee speech and democracy.
>
>
> The President of the United States feels his war is against his US
> critics, while pretending to be an exporter of democracy, at the
> present moment, in Asia. The justice system and the country, the United
>
> States of America, is a living, breathing, Star Wars movie. The Emperor
>
> is Paul Wolfowitz, Darth Vader is *** Cheney, the Mossad owns the CIA
> and Homeland Security, and the World Trade Center was pre-planted with
> explosives before the alleged A1 Quaeda airplanes hit, and were
> destroyed by controlled demolition. Larry Silverstein, who rented the
> properties
> just 6 weeks before the 911 1/01 attack, collected twice fiom Swiss Re,
>
> the insurer, yet no plane hit WTC building 7- which was not even
> adjacent to WTC-1 and WTC-2. The temperatures reached by burning jet
> fuel are not high enough to melt the lower support beams, allowing the
> buildings to fall into their foot print. Heat dissipates. Burning jet
> fuel 70 stories up, will not cause a building to collapse in 7-10
> seconds. Especially WTC Building 7. Someone with access to the WTC
> buildings knew the attack was coming and rather than warn us,
> exaggerated the event and is responsible for all of the deaths and the
> fraudulent war in Iraq.
>
>
> The United States is a terrorist nation and condones Mossad activity
> because it suits their Arab oil theft ends, and the ends of Paul
> Wolfowitz at the World Bank, which is to capture the property, Iraq, to
>
> settle our national debt. Regardless, the USA is guilty of several and
> serious international war crimes and is not in touch with reality.
>
>
> Case 1:05-cv-00328-T-DLM Document 23 Filed 11/21/2005 Page 5 of 8
>
>
> 05-328-T COMPLAINT, FU FEDERAL COURT
>
>
> MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL ON THE GROUNDS OF WELL-KNOWN CT CORRUPTION,
> INTIMIDATION OF CT LAWYERS BY THE CT CHIEF STATE'S ATTORNEY'S OFFICE,
> AND UNDER THE AMERICANS WlTH DISABILITIES ACT WHICH THE JUDGFE HAS
> FAILED TO ADDRESS IN THE PAST.
> -
> Judge

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