Re: Prove that hydrogen atoms exist in the universe

From: Patrick Reany (reany_at_asu.edu)
Date: 08/12/04 

Date: 12 Aug 2004 06:58:20 -0700

Gerry Quinn <gerryq@DELETETHISindigo.ie> wrote in message news:<MPG.1b844c43943e26fc989875@news.indigo.ie>...
> In article <844a1b64.0408101117.4f1c2035@posting.google.com>,
> reany@asu.edu says...
> > Gerry Quinn <gerryq@DELETETHISindigo.ie> wrote in message news:<MPG.1b82ce118b261749989869@news.indigo.ie>...
> > >
> > > > Since science claims that hydrogen atoms exist, it should be willing
> > > > to give a sound, rational argument to support that claim.
> > >
> > > We can calculate that an isolated proton-electron system is stable,
> >
> > What do you mean by a "proton-electron system"? By what criteria would
> > you claim such a system as "stable"?
>
> I'm just going by the usual meanings. I see no point in starting some
> more or less infinitely regressive thread in which you pointlessly
> challenge the meaning of every term I use. You asked about hydrogen,
> and I answered. You can work out the answers to the above questions,
> which are of much the same form, by yourself.

Your pointless is my pointed. You miss the fact that what I am
questioning is precisely the "usual meaning."

>
>
> > > and
> > > demonstrate via astrophysical arguments that it is commonplace.
> >
> > By certain chemical arguments I can "prove" the existence of
> > phlogiston too. By certain mechanical arguments I can "prove" that the
> > sun orbits the earth. By certain astrophysical arguments I can "prove"
> > that an absolute acceleration space exists (Newton).
>
> That's very interesting. By what arguments do you prove the existence
> of phlogiston?

I put the term "proof" in quotes. I was being facetious to some
degree, yet, people can accept any standard of "proof" they want. Just
looking at posts on this NG demonstrate that. Proofs around here are
rarely rational or persuasive, but that doesn't stop people, for
example, from believing in ether. The point is that a lot of educated
people used to believe that they had a "proof" of phlogiston, just
like a lot of educated people today think that they have a scientific
proof of atoms.

[snip]
>
> > Exactly how far away can this electron and proton be from each other
> > until this hydrogen atom "system" is no longer a hydrogen atom?
>
> We usually refer to 'Rydberg atoms' when we are close to the ionisation
> limit. It's an interesting study in itself.

Philosophically, too. Let's refer to your defining distance, the
Rydberg distance, as R. Let the distance between the electron-proton
pair be given as d(e,p). Then are you saying that whenever d(e,p) > R,
the hydrogen atom no longer exists? We can also ask if whenever d(e,p)
<= R the proton-electron pair always consitutes a hydrogen atom.

>
> > It's similar to the "sorites paradox". It goes like this for example:
> >
> > The paradox is that no one grain of sand on the collection can make
> > the difference between the collection being or not being a heap. What
> > is the solution? It's not to be found in commonsense and there is no
> > "rational" answer! The solution is to act like God and fix n
> > arbitrarily, by fiat. Fact building by consensus and arbitration.
>
> I am familiar with the sorites paradox, and your reasoning is invalid.
> Nobody makes an arbitrary decision by fiat on how many grains is a heap.

Yet YOU made an arbitrary fixing of the hydrogen atom to exist
whenever d(e,p) <= R.

> I've never heard of such a thing being done. Instead, we use the term
> 'heap' when we consider it appropriate, and remain aware of the limits
> of language. We know the word 'heap' is vague, but that this vagueness
> does not contaminate the reality of our sandpile.

There is no damn invalid reasoning on my part. I have gone to quite a
bit of trouble simply to prove that the term "heap" IS vague. The
point is that we frequently use vague terms as though they are NOT
vague, without even realizing we do so. The notion of an atom is a
vague term; the notion of "it's raining" is vague. The notion that the
universe comes prepackaged into bits called atoms is a pure human
invention.

If we arbitrarily choose the minimum number of drops of water per
second per acre to be 1000, then there is no rational reason why it
couldn't also be set at 1001 or 999. The point being that the
condition that it is really, truly, objectively raining ouside is
vague.

>
> > Where is absolute truth there? And if not there, where? Maybe the
> > whole notion of a heap of sand is arbitrary. Maybe the whole notion of
> > an atom is arbitrary too, except for its utility to the invention of
> > theories that work. Fuzzy sets at work here, which includes the set of
> > "nonmaterial physical boundaries in space" to ostensibly physical
> > material things, such as hydrogen atoms. See
> > http://www.ee.vt.edu/~dadone/fuzzyIntro/intro_to_fuzzy_sets.pdf
>
> I've never heard of any physical theory that invokes the notion of a
> fuzzy set.

Sure you have: atomic theory, just to name one. Physics should say a
lot more about it at the introductory level.

http://aurora.phys.utk.edu/p641/21stcent.html

http://www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/marchives/fuzzy-mail96/0702.html

> And what on earth are these "non-material physical
> boundaries in space" you are hypothesising?

Here's a boundary made of nothing material though it "exist" in
physical space and time: Let's go back to our hydrogen atom, Radius =
R. Think of it as an imaginary sphere centered at the proton.

>
> > Tell us how you know when it's raining. What's the minimum number N of
> > rain drops per second per square acre? Why isn't N-1 rain drops per
> > second per square acre also called "rain"? Just because?
>
> I looked up just an hour ago because I heard sounds I associate with
> rain, and indeed it was raining heavily. Had it been raining less
> heavily I mightn't have noticed. For the record, I don't use or have a
> definition of rain based on drops per second per unit area. So
> obviously I don't determine whether it is raining by making such a
> measuremnent.

The point is that whatever minimum number you might choose to define
rain would be arbitrary. In other words, you have used a vague term as
though it is not vague, without even knowing that you were doing so.

>
> > The epistemology of physics has to come to terms with the vagueness of
> > human terms in the language of physics used to represent arbitrary
> > human conceptualizations of the physical realm. The only solution to
> > me is a pragmatic one. It's true that in QM vagueness has been dealt
> > with at the atomic-subatomic level, but all of physics has to follow
> > this lead.
>
> No, the epistemology of physics is not subject to the limitations of
> language.

I just gave you a clear example proving the opposite. Explain why the
justification of statements made in a language is NOT dependent on the
vagueness of terms used in the language. Let the statement S be: "I
know it's not raining outside." S is twice vulernable,
epistemologically speaking, to vagueness. First, the vaguness of where
to fix the minimum number of drops, and second, on measuring
accurately the number of drops per unit time per unit area. Just
change the standard by which one defines rain and the S's truth value
can go from true to false or from false to true.

> And QM is no vaguer than any other model.

I'd say that it is.

>
> > The hydrogen model is a damn good model whether hydrogen meaningfully
> > exists objectively or not. Does the universe give special names to all
> > possible subsets of itself? Which brings up another vagueness in the
> > language of physics, which is, What do really mean by saying that some
> > "physical object" objectively exists in the universe?
>
> The universe doesn't give names to the entities in it -

Then what justifies our giving names to special subsets of the
universe? If the point of science is supposedly to say true things
about the external world, then why do we justify inventing 'objects'
and naming them which the universe itself does not do?

Even the term "entities" is admitting to the existence of arbitrary
objective subsets of the universe. You see, we can't even begin to
discuss the universe at all unless we anthropomorphize it to include
entities.

> if it did there
> might me some relevance in your going on about the limitations of
> language, because those limitations would then be physical.

What's important is that the limitations are epistemological, not
physical per se. Although there are also limitations imposed on our
ability to decide the truth values of some statements about the
microscopic world even when our concepts seem clear. There are also
limits to accurately say that it is or isn't raining outside.

> The sorites
> paradox would cause problems every time sand piled up, as the universe
> would not know whether it had a heap or not. This may be considered
> proof that language paradoxes have no relevance to the subjects of
> physics.

Maybe the universe doesn't know about atoms. It's not my point to
prove that the universe does or doesn't know about atoms. My only
point is that we not insist that they are objective entities whose
objectivity is not dependent on human conceptualizations.

If you would quit confusing what "is" with our human-invented
conceptualizations of what "is" (i.e., the map is not the territory),
maybe you could follow my reasoning for a change. We don't literally
think in terms of real things; we think in terms of our concepts of
what "is" or what could be or what is just convenient to think in
terms of but aren't--things I refer to as "chimera," such as mass
continuums.

>
> I'm not sure what distinction you are making between hydrogen
> "existing" and "existing objectively" - could you elaborate?
>
> - Gerry Quinn

Simple, it is absurd to believe that a thing objectively exists though
its definition depends on an arbitrarily fixed parameter of some sort.
It's ludicrous to believe that hydrogen comes into existence as r goes
less than R and goes out of existence as r goes larger than R.

Patrick

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