Re: The free invention of ontologies we put into our theories

reany_at_asu.edu
Date: 03/04/05 

Date: 4 Mar 2005 10:51:00 -0800

AllYou! wrote:
> <reany@asu.edu> wrote in message
> news:1109939378.714769.199650@z14g2000cwz.googlegroups.com...
> >
> > AllYou! wrote:
> > > <reany@asu.edu> wrote in message
> > > news:1109898766.686528.155970@l41g2000cwc.googlegroups.com...
> > > >
> > > > AllYou! wrote:
> > > > > "Daniel Weston" <daniel009@webtv.net> wrote in message
> > > > > news:29834-42273001-106@storefull-3135.bay.webtv.net...
> > > > > > AllYou: If you are comfortable with Reany's, "We can never
> > know
> > > > deep
> > > > > > reality", be my guest. When you figure out how deep is his
> > "deep"
> > > > let
> > > > > > us know.
> > > > > > Is there in that statement an implication that we can know
less
> > > > than
> > > > > > "deep" reality?
> > > > >
> > > > > I agree with his statement except that I believe that the
> > qualifier
> > > > *deep* is superfluous.
> > > > > There's is only one reality. It has no layers of depth.
> > > >
> > > > I choose to split reality into phenomena (appearances) and
noumena
> > > > (deep reality -- everything else), because we can experience
> > > > pheneomena, which makes it something to talk about in physics.
> > >
> > > you mean that you experience free inventions of the mind. There
is
> > nothing else according
> > > to you.
> >
> > In as much as the things that induce us to have experiences, like
sugar
> > on the tongue, do not force us to have any particular response that
> > that action, yes, they are free invetions. The mind freely invents
the
> > sensation of sweet to attach to sugar on the tongue -- at least for
> > most of us.
>
> The concept of *sweet* is an invention (not freely invented) of the
mind, but the
> association of that sensation with the concept is the observation and
is neither free nor
> invented. But would you say that tasting something sweet is an
experience or a free
> invention of the mind?
>
> >
> > Roses are not red or any other color. Color is not in photons or
light
> > waves. Color is in the mind.
>
> But the association of those stimuli with the concept is an
observation and not a free
> invention. But would you say that seeing red is an experience or a
free invention of the
> mind?

I haven't said anything about stimuli. The intent of Galileo's
distinction between primary and secondary qualities was to distinguish
between properties which were intrinsic to an object and those that are
not. Stimuli has nothing to do with it. I'm not interested in the
stimuli-experience relationship.

Redness is not an objective property of any rose.
Sweetness is not an objective property of sugar.
Ordor is not an objective property of hydrogen sulfide.
Sound is not an objective property of sonic energy.
Pain is not an objective property of thorns.

Patrick

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