Re: The free invention of ontologies we put into our theories
From: AllYou! (idaman_at_conversent.net)
Date: 03/04/05
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Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2005 14:00:53 -0500
<reany@asu.edu> wrote in message
news:1109962260.376563.208610@l41g2000cwc.googlegroups.com...
>
> AllYou! wrote:
> > <reany@asu.edu> wrote in message
> > news:1109939378.714769.199650@z14g2000cwz.googlegroups.com...
> > >
> > > AllYou! wrote:
> > > > <reany@asu.edu> wrote in message
> > > > news:1109898766.686528.155970@l41g2000cwc.googlegroups.com...
> > > > >
> > > > > AllYou! wrote:
> > > > > > "Daniel Weston" <daniel009@webtv.net> wrote in message
> > > > > > news:29834-42273001-106@storefull-3135.bay.webtv.net...
> > > > > > > AllYou: If you are comfortable with Reany's, "We can never
> > > know
> > > > > deep
> > > > > > > reality", be my guest. When you figure out how deep is his
> > > "deep"
> > > > > let
> > > > > > > us know.
> > > > > > > Is there in that statement an implication that we can know
> less
> > > > > than
> > > > > > > "deep" reality?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I agree with his statement except that I believe that the
> > > qualifier
> > > > > *deep* is superfluous.
> > > > > > There's is only one reality. It has no layers of depth.
> > > > >
> > > > > I choose to split reality into phenomena (appearances) and
> noumena
> > > > > (deep reality -- everything else), because we can experience
> > > > > pheneomena, which makes it something to talk about in physics.
> > > >
> > > > you mean that you experience free inventions of the mind. There
> is
> > > nothing else according
> > > > to you.
> > >
> > > In as much as the things that induce us to have experiences, like
> sugar
> > > on the tongue, do not force us to have any particular response that
> > > that action, yes, they are free invetions. The mind freely invents
> the
> > > sensation of sweet to attach to sugar on the tongue -- at least for
> > > most of us.
> >
> > The concept of *sweet* is an invention (not freely invented) of the
> mind, but the
> > association of that sensation with the concept is the observation and
> is neither free nor
> > invented. But would you say that tasting something sweet is an
> experience or a free
> > invention of the mind?
> >
> > >
> > > Roses are not red or any other color. Color is not in photons or
> light
> > > waves. Color is in the mind.
> >
> > But the association of those stimuli with the concept is an
> observation and not a free
> > invention. But would you say that seeing red is an experience or a
> free invention of the
> > mind?
>
> I haven't said anything about stimuli. The intent of Galileo's
> distinction between primary and secondary qualities was to distinguish
> between properties which were intrinsic to an object and those that are
> not. Stimuli has nothing to do with it. I'm not interested in the
> stimuli-experience relationship.
Of course not. To discuss it would lead to the exposure of your argument as failed.
However, how would you claim to experience the sight of a red rose? Do you deny that your
senses must be so stimulated?
> Redness is not an objective property of any rose.
It is of a red rose.
> Sweetness is not an objective property of sugar.
It is.
> Ordor is not an objective property of hydrogen sulfide.
That's in the nose of the beholder.
> Sound is not an objective property of sonic energy.
It is.
> Pain is not an objective property of thorns.
Depending on the person and the thorn, it is.
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