Re: Cranks on the endangered species list

On Dec 10, 9:24 am, GSS <gurcharn_san...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Dec 9, 10:32 pm, PD <TheDraperFam...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:



I agree with you that dissent is healthy and that constant re-
examination is and should continue to be a perpetual practice in
science. However, doing that does not automatically impart quality,
nor does it automatically rate attention. There are certain metrics
for the quality of scientific work which have *nothing* to do with
whether the prevailing model is supported or not. Unless those metrics
are met, there is no reason to offer warranty against being ignored..

PD

Does your notion of the 'metrics for the quality of scientific work'
include the following?

Yes and no. Details following.

(a) A quality work in Physics must provide causal linkage between
different phenomena attempted to be represented through an appropriate
mathematical model. For example, for GR to be a 'quality scientific
work' it must provide a causal linkage between the physical entity of
mass-energy content (in a certain region of space) and the *metric* of
spacetime manifold which is a mathematical abstract entity. What is
the causal link between a physical entity and an abstract notion. More
specifically, what is the physical causal  mechanism through which the
mass influences the metric of spacetime?

It depends on what you mean by "causal mechanism". If you mean causal
mechanism something chosen from a pick list of *conventional*
mechanisms, like little massive particles interacting with other
little massive particles or a material fluid impinging on objects,
then I disagree. The repertoire of causal mechanisms inherited from
classical physics is woefully deficient for the wide variety of
phenomena from modern physics. And indeed it is woefully deficient to
describe even classical phenomena. As long ago as 1687, the fact that
gravity did not have an apparent way to reach across space from one
massive body to another body other than "spooky action at a distance"
was bemoaned. However, this does not mean that nature OWES us an
explanation in terms of particles banging on particles or fluids,
especially if those mechanisms are conspicuously absent.

In nutshell you mean to say that either you don't know of any such
causal mechanism or perhaps nature doesn't allow you to know that. So
you will prefer to believe that no such physical causal mechanism is
required through which mass influences the metric of spacetime.

Do you also believe in magic?

Magic is just another word for a phenomenon that does not fit into the
categories of explanations that you can tally off in your head. That's
exactly what a magician does -- he gives the appearance of doing
something that you believe must be accounted for by physical cause A
or B, when in fact the magician is invoking a physical cause C.

And in fact, I do include in my list of causal mechanisms the
relationship between a property of an object and properties of the
space around it. This is not magic. It is just a causal mechanism that
is different than little material particles banging on other material
particles or little material particles being influenced by a field.
You don't want to admit a new category. I'm not so resistant.




(b)A quality work in Physics must provide logical explanation for the
physical phenomenon attempted to be represented through an appropriate
mathematical model. For example, for SR to be a 'quality scientific
work' it must provide a logical explanation as to why the second
postulate is assumed to be valid?

No, I strongly disagree that the presumptions built into a model must
be defensibly plausible as a prerequisite for comparison to data. And
in fact, a number of highly successful theories have postulated
certain assumptions that are wildly implausible according to current
understanding. In science what is done is to *suspend* disbelief in
those implausible premises provisionally, until the model can be
developed to the point where it makes specific predictions that are
distinct from competing models can be compared to experimental
measurement. If a model succeeds in its predictions, then no matter
how implausible the premises are, science then *continues* to suspend
disbelief in those premises, because they do show obvious success
after all. It is natural, however, for physicists to re-examine *why*
they thought those premises were so implausible in the first place,
and in the course of that they do uncover hidden assumptions that turn
out to be unwarranted.

Restricting the comments to the second postulate, the presumptions
involved *must* be 'defensibly plausible' to provide a logically sound
foundation to the model.

I disagree.

In this regard let me show you a devastating
logical contradiction in the second postulate of SR.

Quoting Albert Einstein, from his 1905 paper, “If at the point A of
space there is a clock, an observer at A can determine the time values
of events in the immediate proximity of A. If there is at the point B
of space another clock in all respects resembling the one at A, it is
possible for an observer at B to determine the time values of events
in the immediate neighborhood of B. But it is not possible without
further assumption to compare, in respect of time, an event at A with
an event at B. We have so far defined only an ‘A time’ and a ‘B time’.
We have not defined a common ‘time’ for A and B, for the latter cannot
be defined at all unless we *establish by definition* that the ‘time’
required by light to travel from A to B equals the ‘time’ it requires
to travel from B to A.” This arbitrary definition of ‘common time’
constitutes the fundamental mistake of Einstein, which ultimately
leads to the invalidation of the second postulate of SR.

To demonstrate this mistake, let us assume that point A and B in space
represents two Pioneer type spacecrafts in the outer region of the
solar system. Let the separation distance AB, as measured in BCRF, be
6x10^12 m  which remains constant over a period of time. Let us
construct an inertial coordinate system K with its origin at A.
Obviously B will be stationary in K. Let us further assume that a
spacecraft tracking station measures the velocity of A and B as v_a =
v_b = 3x10^5 m/s in BCRF, along direction AB. A signal pulse
transmitted from A towards B will reach B in about  20020 seconds
whereas a return signal pulse transmitted from B towards A will reach
A in about  19980 seconds.

That's a remarkable assertion. Wherefrom did you pull it?

The uplink and downlink signal propagation
times can be equal only if both spacecrafts A and B are at rest in
BCRF. This shows that Einstein’s fundamental assumption of equating
the uplink and downlink signal propagation times between A and B
inherently implies that both A and B are assumed to be at rest in the
BCRF of the solar system. Since Einstein subsequently extended his
notion of common time between A and B, to cover all IRF in relative
uniform motion within the BCRF, it obviously implies that all such IRF
in relative uniform motion are assumed to be at rest in BCRF. And this
simple contradiction logically shatters the facade of the second
postulate of SR.

Are you in favor of totally dispensing with 'logic' in Physics?



(d) A quality work in Physics must provide sufficient information
concerning a physical phenomenon so as to enable mental visualization
of the same. For example the standard model of particle physics
provides an excellent mathematical representation of numerous micro
particles (including photons and electrons) and their mutual
interactions, but does not provide sufficient information to enable us
mentally visualize the shape size or structure of any of these
particles. Should we regard the standard model of particle physics as
the 'quality scientific work'?

No, I strongly disagree with this, too. Mental visualization is
constrained by our visual and tactile senses, which are tuned to a
small and unrepresentative slice of reality. Our mental grasp of the
universe has proceeded at a pace far quicker than our sensory
faculties or our brains (attuned to those faculties) can evolve, and
as a result we struggle to pigeonhole something of class F into one of
the categories, A, B, or C that our mental visual models span.

The problem with mental visual models is that they carry baggage. When
we say electrons are "like" particles, then we are correct that in
some ways they are, but we are incorrect in other ways, and the
statement that they are like particles does not draw that line between
what is right and what is wrong. So if we visualize electrons as
particles, then we invariably make mistakes, because we drag in an
attribute to particles that is NOT APPROPRIATE for electrons.

The value of mathematics in physics is that it *minimally* describes a
model without unnecessary and inappropriate baggage. It contains
*exactly* what is needed in the model and nothing more. Very often, it
is impossible for our minds t make an accurate mental visual model
without resorting to mental analogies (it's "like" these things) that
end up bringing in the incorrect garbage.

Here too you imply that firstly our mental faculty is not sufficiently
developed to be capable of visualizing the shape, size or structure of
any of the micro particles.

Yes, indeed. For example, you assume that particles *have* size and
shape and structure. There is no evidence of that. Every instance of a
physical object that has volume is also a composite object. Our
universe consists of things that are composite and things that are not
composite. There is absolutely no reason to assume that properties
that are common to composites are also common to elementals, nor is
there reason to assume that all objects are composites and therefore
have those properties.

Secondly the mathematical descriptions in
Physics are so strong that we just don't need the crutches of 'mental
visualization'.

Well, I am sorry, I just cannot agree with your viewpoint. To me it
appears to be a typical case of "grapes are sour". The fact is that
the standard model of particle physics doesn't provide sufficient
information regarding the shape, size or internal structure of any of
the micro particles so as to enable our mental visualization of the
same.

So in sum, I'd say "No" to all three of your characterizations of
quality in physics. They do not work well, and for this reason they
are dispensed with in physics, and appropriately so.

PD

Do you rule out the possibility that the above characterizations 'do
not work well' because we pretend to *know all* whereas in fact we
know very little of Nature?

Oh, I know for certain that we do not *know all*. There is quite a bit
that we know nothing about whatsoever -- and that's where the useful
work is. However, in areas where things are more established -- like
special relativity -- it doesn't seem to be fertile ground for
extensive revisiting, even if it does not meet your own requirements
for what you think a physical model should be (which are not shared by
scientists by and large).


GSS

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