Re: The Dimension of Time
- From: Ste <ste_rose0@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 1 Jan 2010 07:47:07 -0800 (PST)
On 31 Dec 2009, 19:59, PD <thedraperfam...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Dec 31, 4:20 am, Ste <ste_ro...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 30 Dec, 17:39, PD <thedraperfam...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Dec 30, 3:32 am, Ste <ste_ro...@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Either the processes occur symmetrically or they don't.
It's observed that they do not. There is no point in having a
"theoretical model" that says they are really symmetric after all..
But often what appears on casual observation to be "asymmetrical" by
virtue of its complexity, is in fact symmetrical. If a transformation
of energy today only has its re-transformation eons after humans have
ceased to exist, then that would largely explain why "observations"
over a few years appear asymmetrical.
OK, but now you are talking about something that is by definition
unfalsifiable, since you are positing something that will erase the
observed asymmetry long after humans have ceased to exist to observe
it.
Science is about understanding the laws of nature as they can be
confirmed by observations and measurements we CAN conduct.
Postulating something that is inconsistent with observations, because
you LIKE symmetry better than asymmetry, and then excusing the lack of
symmetry by saying that it is by nature unobservable, puts it in the
realm of religious faith and not science any longer.
When you can posit your notions in a manner that it produces
predictions that can be *tested* by reasonably accessible experiment,
then you will have returned to science.
I knew you'd say that. But the truth is that what I'm positing about a
symmetry of fundamental forces *is* a scientific theory, in that it
can theoretically be tested against the material world.
Where is the experimental test that distinguishes this theory from the
currently held thinking?
More to the point, why is current thinking more legitimate than this
theory, if by definition the observations are consistent with either
theory?
Indeed it
doesn't actually predict anything exotic - it says only that the
forces of the universe exist in harmony - and in fact wipes away many
of the exotic predictions or difficult questions of existing theories.
Well, first of all, I would say it at best does a swap of one exotic
prediction for another. For example, you claim that symmetry will only
be restored long after humans are dead and gone, and so the
experimental test of that appears to be inaccessible. This is not
exotic?
I would say it is not exotic in that it doesn't resort to anything but
the fundamental mechanisms that we are already able to observe. The
only way humans would be able to survive a full run of the whole
system would be to exist outside of that system, but of course the
real question then is why such an impossibly high burden of proof is
being placed on my hypothesis, while the same burden is not placed on
existing thinking.
Secondly, nature is no more exotic than what it really is. There is
nothing in current theories that should be taken as "difficult" to
swallow, as long as it matches what is seen in experiment or makes
predictions that can be tested in the foreseeable future.
Indeed there was nothing "difficult" about the geocentric model.
Except, of course, the model itself.
It's the same with my relativist interpretation of time.
I'm sorry, but your interpretation of time is not the relativist
interpretation of time. I've already mentioned some aspects of the
relativist interpretation (fast and future light cones, for example)
which you find hard to swallow. Your interpretation is your own and
needs to have a new label rather than appropriating one reserved for
something else.
Well I don't really want to get into a long argument simply about what
to call my interpretation. But there is nothing about the light cone
model that is time-relative. On the contrary, it implicitly requires
the classical model of time in order to understand, and the classical
model of time is not a relative model of time.
To reillustrate the difference, the classical model of time measures
events by reference to their distance from a common past event, not by
reference only to the time-separation between the two events being
compared. The classical model requires an absolute benchmark (the
birth of Jesus, for example), the relative model does not.
The light cone model does not work without classical time (and the
conversions required for different frames of reference).
Personally I would utilise a different model to describe what the
light cone model attempts to describe. I would simply draw a sphere of
radius r around some point in space, and the radius determines the
time interval required for events at the central point to be observed
at the periphery (or the other way around). That's a somewhat
different model, but it illustrates the same principle, and unlike the
light cone model, one can draw the whole "light-globe" model by
reference to the 3 dimensions that everyone is familiar with.
Of course, I'm happy to discuss the implications of this with you, but
I expect the discussion can be moved forward by you actually
discussing it, not by telling me that I don't understand and that I
need to learn more.
It's actually
conceptually simpler, and wipes away the exotic (and generally
paradoxical) predictions of wormholes, classical time travel,
singularities, etc.
What do you think is paradoxical about wormholes and singularities?
I should clarify that I refer to "singularities" in their meaningful
sense where the laws of physics apparently break down, not just in the
sense of "a lot of matter in a small space" - I know in recent years
though the meaningful sense has been largely tempered into the trivial
sense.
Wormholes are paradoxical simply because they suggest movement in
space can be achieved without a commensurate amount of acceleration
(and therefore without the expected level of energy input). Of course,
again, no doubt the concept will be tempered in due course to point
out that such a wormhole would require an equal or greater amount of
energy than traditional acceleration (thus robbing the concept of all
real meaning).
And relativity does not admit classical time travel, and I don't know
where you got the idea it did.
I never said relativity did - on the contrary, I've been repeatedly
being saying quite the opposite, as you can observe from my previous
posts.
I have said that existing interpretations of time, that which I am now
consistently referring to as "classical time", require a navigable
dimension of time in the sense that "going backwards" in time means
restoring the universe to a previous state (and, of necessity,
observed change implies that time is moving forward). Whereas my
relativistic time says that "going backwards" is what happens to the
astronaut in the twins paradox, and "going forwards" is what happened
to the homebody, even though by classical time both went forwards
(because neither returned to a previous state).
I'm sure you're sensible enough PD to see the radical differences
between those models, and regardless of what you think personally I'm
sure you'll accept that most physicists, when they think of time,
still necessarily think of time in classical terms, where the past and
future continue to exist in some material sense.
The geocentric model of the heavens, and the reason why people refused
to discard it despite a simpler model being available, should be
something taught in every science class. And the reason, as always, is
political. The geocentric model utterly discredited the idea of the
Earth being the jewel in the crown of God's creation - and if that was
false, then *what else* was false about the teachings of the Catholic
church?
Can you think of why fundamental asymmetry in the universe is very
important to liberal ideology today?
Oh dear, now you are wandering deep into Crank Zone.
Not at all. There is plenty of literature on the subject of how people
believe things for ideological reasons, and generally refuse to accept
anything that conflicts with their ideology. I quote from a book I'm
currently reading (dealing with the approach of historians to their
subject) "it is a serious error to suppose that unconsciousness of
ideology, or even a complete lack of interest in it, is the same as
absence of ideology".
What I would add though about entropy is that there is no evidence
that the entropy of the universe is increasing.
That's actually not the case. There is cosmological evidence that it
IS increasing. You didn't know this, I take it.
I know I'll find that this "evidence" can interpreted more than one
way.
That's the nice thing about experimental evidence. It's usually pretty
unambiguous.
Surely you can't be serious?
It's a common misconception among hacks and hobbyists that any
experimental data can be "interpreted" to support any model desired.
(And Ptolemy and Copernicus are used as the neophyte example.)
I don't agree that data can be interpreted to support *any* model, but
usually a number of models can be conceived to fit the data, at least
superficially. And anyway, as Einstein said, "it is the theory that
determines what you can observe" - by which of course he did not mean
the observation itself changes, only the interpretation of it.
And although I don't know what specific cosmological evidence you
refer to, I have of course heard a number of conclusions drawn from
what has been observed in the cosmos. I've heard for example that
matter at the edge of the universe is moving outwards at more than the
speed of light.
Relative to us, yes. Is there a problem?
Yes, insofar as matter is not supposed to be able to accelerate beyond
the speed of light. Or have I misunderstood, in that two objects
accelerating in diametrically opposite directions at .6c will appear
relative to each other to be accelerating at 1.2c? In that case one
can see that the maximum *apparent* speed of matter is 2c, but it's
actual speed can be limited to c.
I've heard that energy goes into black holes and never
comes out.
Aside from radiation, yes. Is there a problem?
Only insofar as the exception of radiation would disprove the
hypothesis that nothing ever comes out.
Etcetera. But let us assume for one moment that matter at
the edge of the universe is *not* moving outwards at more than the
speed of light, and let us assume that energy that goes into black
holes is *not* lost forever. What part of existing theory has to give
to allow those assumptions to be correct?
What evidence would support such a proposition?
The real scientific question, surely, is what observation is not
compatible with it? (Although I take your point that matter can appear
to be travelling at more than c without actually doing so.)
Note that the claim about the mass at the edge of the universe is
supported by DATA.
I know. That is why I mentioned it.
Note that there are gravitational objects that are absorbing huge
amounts of energy and mass and do not shine, as seen in direct
observation.
Agreed. The question, then, is how does the energy come out again? And
the answer is EMR. Matter goes in, EMR comes out.
What is the point of diddling with countersuppositions, when the
current suppositions are supported by experimental data?
The point is to advance our understanding and simplify our models. If
an impossibly high burden of proof is placed on every theory that
challenges the incumbent theory, then you become a prisoner of your
preconceptions, and commit yourself to adding epicycles forever.
Because of course whenever anyone implores science to adopt a
conceptually simpler model with aspects that cannot be observed except
in the fullness of time, the response comes back simply "our existing
model is adequate for what we already observe".
And then the question really is why people accept complex models that
have a tight fit with existing observations, rather than simple models
that fit what already has been observed, and which purport to fit all
that will ever be observed?
I hope you realise PD that the difference is not between "scientists"
and "non-scientists", it's between scientists who insist on only
adding to existing models, and scientists who insist on challenging
existing models.
Entropy is related to the
number of available microstates. The energy of a closed system can
remain completely constant and the entropy increase nonetheless.
I'm afraid I don't agree.
Then I suggest you take a course in thermodynamics to learn what the
*definition* of entropy is.
Let me start with the OED definition then: "A thermodynamic quantity
that represents numerically the extent to which a system’s thermal
energy is unavailable for conversion into mechanical work".
The first question is, "unavailable for conversion" by whom?
Unavailable for conversion by humans? Or unavailable for conversion by
the fundamental forces of nature?
Clearly there many fundamental phenomena
that can only exist in discrete states. An electron, for example,
apparently has a discrete level of charge. If you have a closed system
in which fundamental forces never tire or wear out, and in which there
is energy that can only take discrete forms, and in which states can
only change at a finite speed, then entropy can't increase - you get
an oscillation of states, or a rotation of states.
I didn't say there weren't closed systems where entropy didn't stay
constant.
Of course you didn't, because that would have contradicted the 2nd
law.
What is true is that in closed systems, entropy doesn't DECREASE.
And what is also true is that in many closed systems, entropy DOES
increase.
That is false, because you have *never observed a closed system*.
Like the kinetic balls toy - without friction, the mechanism would
never tire, because gravity never tires, and the momentum of the balls
would always be conserved. The only reason the mechanism does tire is
because it is not a closed system (and in any event the toy is not
designed to be in balance with all the fundamental forces of nature).
That's not entirely correct. I don't know what you think is going on
in that system that causes it to wind down.
A number of things cause that system to wind down (i.e. lose
momentum). Off the top of my head I would say mainly air resistance
(i.e. friction) - although I don't discount sound, heat, plastic
deformation, chemical change, etc. But I'm willing to be shocked, if
you have news for me.
So to summarise, it is the existence of discrete states, and finite
velocities, that can lead to observed change in closed systems without
any increase in entropy.
Thinking scientifically I suppose the problem with testing this
hypothesis is that a closed system is unmeasurable by those outside
it, and incomprehensible to those within it. In this way, closed
systems can theoretically exist, but are untestable.
That's also wrong.
There are two ways this can be done.
One is that the measuring device be INCLUDED in the system, and the
entropy change of that device is included in the closed system sum.
But even that requires the measuring device to be loaded with
information gleaned from outside the system itself. And then the
system must be opened, first to add the measurement device, and then
again to gather data from the measuring device.
The other way is to prepare a state and then close the system, let a
process operate, and then open the system and measure its final state.
This can be done in such a way that the end-effects can be accounted
for.
But then you didn't measure a closed system. You measured an open
system - the system was open at the start when the initial state was
set, at at the end when the measurement was taken. A "closed system"
that is not closed for all time is not in fact a "closed system" at
all.
I'm afraid your lack of experimental experience is impeding you.
On the contrary. Your lack of practical imagination is impeding you in
understanding just how difficult it is to measure a truly closed
system from either within, or without.
Science is not philosophy.
I think you'll find scientists have a philosophy. As I said at the
beginning, an unconsciousness of, or lack of concern with, ideology is
not the same as an absence of ideology.
Incidentally are you religious at all? I ask because your model above,
where a "closed system" is 'prepared and then closed', its 'internal
processes' are run, and then it is 'opened and measured', sounds a lot
like the process of biblical creation and final judgment. If that is a
view you have sympathy with, then it suffices to say I can fully
understand your views.
If you aren't religious, then I'd be more interested to hear why you
think a "closed system" that is not closed for all time, is a "closed
system" at all.
Epicycles only become necessary when
people insist entropy is always increasing.
Why is increasing entropy epicyclic?
For the reason first that the 2nd law does not say entropy must
increase over time. It says entropy in a closed system will either
remain constant, or increase.
Yes, I didn't dispute that.
Secondly, the law of conservation says
that energy remains constant.
Yes, I didn't dispute that either.
I didn't mean to imply that you did dispute these. I was just setting
my cards out on the table again.
Why is increasing entropy epicyclic again?
Increasing entropy isn't the epicycle. Increasing entropy is the false
assumption. It is the false assumption that necessitates epicycles in
the *whole body of theory*, in order that there can be functional
movement around the false assumption.
If the universe is an open system,
I didn't say the universe was open.
I never said you did, I'm just attempting to give due consideration to
all obvious variables in this question.
I just said that the universe is
not the only closed system for the purposes of experimental test.
I see. This is clearly one point on which we disagree. I am not aware
of any such experimental closed system. At the very least, this closed
system would have to exclude the forces of gravity and
electromagnetism (note I say "exclude", not "overcome" or
"disregard"). Secondly it would have to have been closed, and remain
closed, for all time. If no such experimental closed system has been
observed, then I'm confused about why you are using an untested and
unobserved concept to "prove" the existence of forward-flowing time.
then the 2nd law doesn't apply -
and therefore there is no basis on which to assert that entropy is
increasing in the universe. Also, if the universe is open, then the
question remains what exists outside of it, and at what level does the
system become closed (the hypothesis that the material world is
infinitely open is, obviously, a hypothesis that is not even
theoretically testable nor intuitively comprehensible).
Or, if the universe itself is a closed system[1], then the question is
whether energy must take discrete forms. If energy does not take
discrete forms, then the whole place will be just a homogenous, grey,
moderately-warm mush, for all eternity[2].
What? Why? Continuousness does not imply isotropy. Anisotropy does not
imply discreteness.
I think you'll find it does. But if you have some examples where there
is both continuous-variability and anisotropy, then perhaps we can
discuss them.
Another epicycle is the
forward flow of time - it forces us to deal with "time travel", "worm
holes", "cause preceding effect".
What is epicyclic abot any of these? I believe you are overlapping in
your mind "epicyclic" and "counterintuitive".
Now you put me on the spot, I suppose I'm suggesting that they are
indeed one and the same.
Then you have misunderstood the meaning of epicyclic.
No, I've explained before about the epicycles in the geocentric model,
and how astronomers became exasperated with the ever-increasing
complexity and counter-intuitiveness of the model (for example, some
stars did not orbit, but simply oscillated in the sky). Thus it is not
clear why you would say that I don't understand my own figurative
meaning.
Perhaps it's more the case that *you* didn't understand my figurative
meaning, possibly because you don't know a great deal about the
history of the geocentric model, so it isn't obvious to you why I'm
using "epicycles" to refer in a broad sense to "the parts of a whole
model that has such great complexity that it strains credulity and
defies intuitive understanding" - although I should add that the word
"epicyclic" has been used more than I would have chosen to use it here
simply because you have asked me a number of times why something is
epicyclic. That is perhaps my fault though for not realising earlier
that you didn't understand what I actually meant by the word.
Anything that can be rationally understood,
eventually becomes intuitive with practice.
I completely agree with that. And there is nothing counterintuitive
about relativity or gravitation or quantum mechanics that isn't
resolved with practice.
There is nothing counter-intuitive about gravity or relativity,
because it involves concepts we are familiar with in our daily lives.
As for quantum mechanics, I think what you mean is that there are some
people who know the theory very well. That is not practical intuition.
And since
the maths is supposed to be a *description* of the physical world, the
conclusion one must reach where modern physicists understand their
mathematical descriptions but not the physical world, is that their
descriptions do not actually describe the physical world (even in an
idealised way)!
The PHYSICAL models describe the physical world, and the mathematical
casting of the physical model is what allows physicists to make
testable predictions.
You can have a mathematical model with testable predictions, without a
physical model. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is an example of
this. It is non-deterministic, and it doesn't purport to explain why
the underlying mechanism cannot be determined. The gas laws are
another example where there is a statistical element, but unlike
Heisenberg's uncertainty we have an explanation for the underlying
mechanism of action of the gas laws.
Whether you believe it or not is not really relevant. What matters is
whether there is any *evidence* that it is fundamentally reversible.
This is where observation plays a key role and what separates physics
from philosophy.
Science does have a philosophy you know.
But it invokes things that philosophy does not, and this is the part
you ignore.
Such as?
Furthermore, let's get one thing straight: In a confrontation between
experimental observation and intuition, intuition must and always does
lose.
Not at all. For an educated man, the two should be one and the same..
Not necessarily! Nature is surprising. We develop mental models that
are best guesses as to how nature works, and then we TEST that model
to see if it really describes nature the way we think it does. But
more often than not, we find that nature is not what we thought it
was.
Precisely my view of the matter! Which is why I'm saying for an
*educated* man observation and intuition should be the same - there
should only be dissonance between the two for a short time when
something fundamentally new is observed. Of course, for the ignorant
man, observation will regularly contradict intuition.
And you are the one that is complaining about nonintuitive ideas like
wormholes, etc.
No, I'm complaining about ideas like wormholes (or singularities,
classical time, etc.) that *remain* counter-intuitive even after
exposure to the concept.
Even the twins paradox was immediately reconciled with my intuition
when I realised that the astronaut accelerates more - and yet, for
hours of searching for information, nowhere did I see such a simple
explanation offered, and instead I read all kinds of nonsense about
"changing reference frames".
I ended up falling back on my own practical intuition that the
asymmetry is because a rocket engine does not cause the Earth to
accelerate as much as the rocket, and only then did someone here say
"oh, yes, you can explain it based on acceleration, but it's easier to
explain with the reference frames". And my answer is that it isn't
easier at all - the reference frames solution may be a mathematical
simplification, but it breaks the link with the physical mechanism.
And once I made the link with acceleration, it became easy to
understand why changing your position in a gravitational field also
causes the same effect.
The physical sciences should not be about coming up with a
mathematical model and seeing if it fits. On the contrary, a mechanism
of action should be conceived first, and then the maths merely used to
describe it.
Please do not tell scientists how science should be done. Science is
DEFINED by the activity of scientists.
That's strange, I was led to believe earlier that you thought the
activity of scientists was defined by science, not the other way
around. If science is defined merely as "what scientists do", then
that is a bulletproof rejoinder to anyone who points out that what
scientists are regularly doing is not at all in accordance with the
commonly-apprehended principles of science.
The notion that has been
wrongfully dislodged in modern physics is that idea that mathematical
models have to be described in physical terms, where you can
understand the mechanism of action *mechanically*.
Oh, wait a second. If you mean that the universe and all its processes
should be reducible to the familiar, macroscopic, time-ordered
phenomena exposed to your senses, then I have to draw the line. The
universe is much richer than what we once understood with cogs and
particles and levers and fluids. Any attempt to reduce all of nature
to these rather quaint but limited notions is doomed to failure,
simply because nature is more interesting than that.
You'd be surprised how much this statement says about you. Science is
the investigation of how nature works as a deterministic system. But
you think a simple system is a cold system, and you prefer complex
adornments to simple efficiency. I can see why you like modern
physics!
that is, there are factors that are neglected in the treatment of any
real system.
My view is that the "neglected factors" should be in the
implementation, not the idealisation. If there are neglected
idealisations in the theory, then the theory is wrong. And while it
may be useful when simplicity is desirable for some practical
purposes, regard to "practical purposes" should not be a significant
consideration in *theoretical* physics.
I'm sorry, but the WHOLE POINT of physical models is to learn to what
degree an idealized model can be applied to this or that situation to
(adequately) predict the outcomes of those situations.
I'm afraid I disagree. I make a distinction between what in
engineering is called "tolerance", and what in graphic design might be
called "an idealised model". Tolerance is limited by technical ability
in the real world. Models are limited only by imagination. In other
words, the former problem exists because our engineers' don't have the
technology. The latter problem exists because our theoretical
physicists don't have the imagination (or, more likely, like the
heliocentric model, they are unable to consider the truth without also
rejecting a lot of ideological baggage).
I'm afraid you don't understand the reductionist methodology of
scientific modeling. Would you like a reference on the methodology of
science, something on the philosophy of science perhaps, so that you
stop making it up to suit you as you go along?
You couldn't make it up. If you want to discuss the "reductionist
methodology of scientific modelling", then do so. I've said my part on
this issue above, that there is a difference between a theory whose
accuracy is only limited by practical implementation, and a theory
whose accuracy is self-limiting - the latter theory is already beyond
its conceptual shelf-life (except, perhaps, where it suffices for
practical purposes).
OK, so what does this have to do with whether a theory of multiple
universes is unfalsifiable?
It seems there are experimental tests...
Oh?
Yes! This is what I pointed you to. The RESULTS of the tests are not
back yet, but this doesn't mean that it is unfalsifiABLE, it means
that it hasn't yet been falsified or confirmed. What we know is that
the results will tell us one way or the other.
It's like the search for the Higgs. We know where the Higgs should be,
if it's there. This means the Higgs theory is falsifiABLE. If it's
found where we expect it, then the theory is confirmed. If it's not
where we expect it, then the theory is falsified.
Indeed. I don't dispute the point about the Higgs. And if indeed there
is a test for multiple universes (and I'd be very interested to hear
how),
Do you need some Google pointers?
Since you're a hobbyist, I could suggest a book by a woman at Harvard
who wrote it for laypeople for just that purpose.
Yes, if you have some links then as I say I'd be interested to read
more on the issue.
No, I said time is a function of the human mind, not of the material
world.
Translate this, please, into experimentally confirmable predictions.
I think you have it backwards. The onus is not on me to show that you
can't navigate time, and that the past exists only in our memories.
The onus is on you to show that you can navigate time, and that the
past and future exist materially.
No, I'm sorry. The onus is on the person who presents a new model to
use that model to cite predictions that distinguish it from other
models. That is how science operates, and with good reason.
But how does that work when the new model makes *fewer* unverified
predictions in some respect than the existing model? My model about
relative time simply predicts that time is not navigable, and that
"travelling to the past" in the classical sense is as meaningless in
the physical world as "going to Hell" - in that it is not a place to
which one can navigate by resort to any physical process, if indeed
such a place exists materially at all.
and make the claim that it is BETTER than any model that acknowledges
asymmetry of time. But you also acknowledge that your comparison is
hampered by the fact that you don't even understand any model that
acknowledges asymmetry of time, and that moreover you don't even want
to know any more about any model that acknowledges asymmetry of time
because such a model would confound you.
I understand the asymmetric model of time perfectly. It's one I've
taken for granted all my life. Until a few weeks ago, when I suddenly
realised that relativity doesn't require it, and there is no test for
it.
You're right, relativity doesn't require it. That doesn't mean that it
isn't there ANYWAY.
Oooh!
The theory of electromagnetism doesn't require curved spacetime,
either. But that doesn't mean that it's not curved ANYWAY.
The question is whether *any* coherent theory requires it. I haven't
heard any explanation yet for why the curvature of spacetime is
distinguishable from forces acting acting on matter in the classical
way in Euclidean space.
Because they make different predictions of observable phenomena! You
aren't aware of these?
Indeed I'm not aware of any observable phenomena that cannot be
trivially described in 3 dimensions. Even the effects of SR can be
readily understood in 3 dimensions. Of course I'm willing to be
corrected.
On the contrary, cause and effect doesn't imply time ordering.
No and therein lies the contradiction! How on Earth did anyone ever
conceive of a model where the effect precedes the cause in time?
It's simple. Change state A and that is associated with the
observation that state B changes. If B precedes A in time, then this
does not alter the statement that A causes B.
But this fails to address the real issue, which is that if an
observation is conditional on a future cause, then that either
presupposes that the cause has already happened
No, it does NOT.
(thus violating the
idea that the effect came first in time), or it must be the case that
time self-corrects, and therefore erases your memory of the past (and
therefore you would not remember the effect even if it had in fact
happened).
I'm afraid you're not seeing what I'm saying. Please reread.
Or a third option is that the existence of the effect
compels the cause to happen, in order to maintain consistency - but in
that event you may as well refer to the effect by its real name:
"cause".
In any event, I've yet to hear of any experiment that has demonstrated
an effect preceding the cause - and I would genuinely be interested to
discuss such experiments, if indeed any exist.
Well, as it turns out, you may be interested in quantum eraser
experiments. You can google that.
I've studied it again now scrupulously and I don't find anything
shocking about it (even though the last page I read -
http://www.bottomlayer.com/bottom/kim-scully/kim-scully-web.htm - said
as a layman I ought to be).
Surely the outcome of the QE experiment is easily understandable if
you conceive of there being a sort of EM field (i.e. a potential
force, that "charges" space) which is distinct from the photon (i.e.
an energy packet causing observable change of state) itself? I know
that sounds like going back to the luminiferous aether, but it's
surely more physically credible that "action at a distance" or "a
particle in two places at once".
You may also be interested in learning about the Feynman diagrams that
include non-strict-time-ordering that are required to correctly
predict the anomalous magnetic moment of the muon.
I'm afraid I couldn't make heads nor tails of the concept.
.
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