Re: Aether is the empty space in which the Universe sits
From: Peter Kinane (pkinane_at_iol.ie)
Date: 07/16/04
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Date: 16 Jul 2004 04:58:13 -0700
"tadchem" <tadchemNOSPAM@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:PuGdnfCLD-fT0Gnd4p2dnA@comcast.com...
>
> "Bill Hobba" <bhobba@rubbish.net.au> wrote in message
> news:uZNIc.92063$sj4.54872@news-server.bigpond.net.au...
>
> <snip repost>
>
> > Tom it is usually not difficult to see when an argument turns away from
> > science and ventures into philosophy. Take for example the notion of
> time.
> > To do physics you simply need to assume time is what is read by clocks.
>
> in non-relativistic conditions, that may be taken as an operational
> definition of time, albeit a rather crude one.
>
> > It
> > is a fact that one can do science with such a simple notion - that this
is
> > true is beyond question. But such is not satisfying to philosophers and
> > they mount all sorts of arguments such as there must be some underlying
> > reality where time exists independent of clocks or that reality is what
> > instruments tell us and that is all there is or similar philosophical
> stuff.
>
> http://insti.physics.sunysb.edu/~siegel/quack.html
> Scroll down to the comment "My theory makes more sense" and the comment
that
> follows (not quite to the middle of the page).
>
> > But such is irrelevant to science as can be seen by looking at exactly
how
> > each philosophical position will affect experimental results. Since
there
> > is none is not relevant to science. Thus if something is bad philosophy
> it
> > does not follow it is bad physics because providing it has no
experimental
> > consequences then it is irrelevant to physics. Eg some consider that
> > Euclidan geomtry exists a-priori (I belive Kant held that view). Others
> > like Russell claim this is bad philosphy because it is "a theory of
> > mathematical reasoning according to which the inference is never
strictly
> > logical, but always requires...'intuition'. The whole trend of modern
> > mathematics...has been against this Kantian theory." But physics does
not
> > really care if it is bad philosphy or not. A theories correspondence
with
> > expriment is all that coutns.
>
> Philosophy, I have been told, is about the Search for Truth.
Of course there are different philosophy systems and it depends which
you
are referring to. And, as you say below, new ones come. So, you may be
interested in the following (three criteria of the rigour of value):
>
> I have seen many philosophies come (and some go), and the only means I
have
> seen for deciding the Truth of a proposition (such that the proof and the
> proposition are not subject to change, refinement, alteration, disproof,
> political correction, reinterpretation, or whatever) is objective (read
> "empirical") validation.
So, you, shall we say, have found, know or are aware of the "Truth" of
some
propositions? And "Truth" is "empirical (excuse me if I avoid the "o"
word)
validation of a proposition"; "Truth is an empirically validated
proposition
(such that the empirical validation (of the proposition) are not
subject to change, refinement, alteration, disproof, political
correction,
reinterpretation, or whatever)"?
And you are making that your philosophical "Truth", and it rests on
the
term- -concept "empirical", and you move on below to two systems of
physics
"Truth"?
>
> One of the consequences of Goedel's Undecideability Theorem is that there
is
> no closed logical system (read "propositional calculus") within which the
> truth of all statements is decideable. [Russell also had problems with
> Goedel.]
>
> The tool for decideability of statements in physics ("experiment") lies
> *outside* the system within which the statements are formulated.
So, number one "physics Truth" is the testing of "statements or system
by
experiment *outside*"? And it rests on the concept of "experiment
*outside*"
(with the statement experiment *outside* the system within which the
statements are formulated being solid ground)?
>
> Personally I consider mathematics (such as Euclidean geometry) to also be
a
> tool. It is a construct within a closed logical system and is only
> validated through the accuracy of the results it produces when applied to
> the observable world.
"No. 2 physics Truth is mathematics (such as Euclidean geometry),
validated
by applying it to the observable world"? And it rests on the concept
the
observable world?
>
> Whether Euclidean geometry 'exists' a priori depends on one's definition
of
> 'existence.'
Oh yes, the matter of the definition of, or the concept, "existence"
(and of
"empirical" and of "experiment *outside*" and of "observable").
Certainly the universe feels no compulsion to heed the axioms
> thereof, as evidenced by the fact that the decidedly non-Euclidean concept
> of spatial curvature (Euclidean geometry applies only to 'flat' space)
does
> a most excellent job of describing gravitation without invoking 'spooky'
> action-at-a-distance principles, novel particles with puzzling properties,
> or mysterious forces that cause inertial paths to curve.
So, where does this leave your No. 2 physics Truth?
Where does it leave the matter of the definition of, or the concept,
"existence" (and of "empirical" and of "*outside*" and of
"observable")?
In a non-Euclidean
> universe, the orbits of the planets and their moons are "straight lines"
in
> the sense of *inertial* paths.
>
> But then I'm preaching to the choir, am I not?
>
>
> Tom Davidson
> <empiricist>
> Richmond, VA
My position: Let's call a model or system a concept. In
comparing- -cohering a concept (such as, above, a philosophical
proposition,
statements in physics, and mathematics) with, as above, "existence"
and
"empirical" and "experiment *outside*" and "observable" - all rather
primal
categorical type value - in effect, one is comparing- -cohering the
concept
with a system or model or concept. _And_ one should not, unlike many
of the
people round here, stop there. The resulting coherence can only be
valued -
repeat can only be valued - by going on and comparing it with (the
coherence
of) other systems- -models- -concepts - if there are such.
If there are no alternatives against which the resulting coherence-
-Truth
can come into relation it has no value; it does not effect as a
perceived
system of whatever coherence.
My three criteria of the rigour of value are coherence, coherence and
coherence.
But, unfortunately, our culture tells us to think in terms of "Truth",
not
of "coherence".
To be trapped in the "Truth" philosophical framework is to be left
with, how
should I say, models which are a sub-set of what I would regard as a
potentially greater model, but which are perceived as top level. One
is left
with "existence" or "empirical" or "experiment *outside*" or
"observable",
as one's highest level criterion- -model and against which one is
checking
the correspondence of some modelling of the principles of that
unperceived
system, and saying this works, and this is all that matters. (It is
easy for
the modelled principles to be 'true'). Worse still, because the
criterion is
rather primal and categorical, it precludes the concept of alternative
formulations in relation to which it could be evaluated - as one
already has
categorical "Truth", no matter how empty- -magical. It precludes
openness
and alertness to suggestions of anything else.
Indeed, because of conventional philosophy, when a new system like
Effectuationism is dangled in front of people's noses it is wasted on
them.
I guess it is understandable after 2,400 years of "Truth".
There is a great deal of sense in having nothing to do with
conventional
philosophy - other than to make the Effectuationism system look good.
But
one can't move on from it until one values it through bringing it into
relationship with another system.
(That "o" word ...).
-- Peter Kinane http://www.effectuationism.com/
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