Re: Epistemology 102

From: patty (pattyNO_at_SPAMicyberspace.net)
Date: 01/03/05 

Date: Mon, 03 Jan 2005 17:35:42 GMT

Lester Zick wrote:
> Epistemology 102
> --------
>
> (Scientific Truth)
>
> Last semester, boys and girls, we saw that positivism implies certain
> things in relation to empirical knowledge. We found that science as
> practiced in modern empiricist form relies on self contradiction for
> its one standard of falsification and has no other test for truth.
>
> This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
> defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
> observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
> opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
> They are also required to explain what they would deny because
> empirical observations in general could mean anything.
>
> Further we found that positivism effectively substitutes some standard
> of utility for science other than truth. We proposed one measure of
> utility in the form of a reciprocal product of the number of mutually
> non self contradictory theories needed to comprehend any historical
> circumstances, times the average complexity of those theories, U=1/NC.
> However, we now find that there are problems with any such measure.
>
> For example, the measure is itself reasonably clear. Yet complexity is
> not really all that easy to measure. We can see when something is more
> complex than something else. But we cannot easily see what the degree
> of complexity is for any theory.
>
> Even beyond this, however, any criterion of utility itself represents
> an empirical observation subject to identical considerations of
> utility as well. Which means that anyone can claim other standards of
> utility and we would have no way to judge among them definitively.
>
> The way this works in practice is that various forms of empiricism
> simply claim they are judging utility according to different data.
> No one denies the general idea of utility; they just say that their
> science addresses things in different ways.
>
> For example, classical mechanics primary foundation rested on
> f=ma and various derivatives. Then came along various relativistic
> and quantum effects said to rest on other unspecified mechanical
> foundations. Or consider the different approaches to behavioral
> sciences which just claim different standards of utility because their
> approaches to the subject are different and judge different data. And
> we have no unambiguous way to judge the standards in themselves.
>
> --------
>
> We also note in passing that positivism's approach to science rests on
> the somewhat suspicious foundation of a general inability to prove the
> truth of any empirical observation. However, when we ask what is meant
> by an empirical observation, we are met with blank stares and fingers
> pointing in various directions plus some middle fingers pointing up.
> The most promising consensus suggests that empirical observations are
> merely those which are not or cannot be proven tautologically.
>
> However I would like to add that even though not proven tautologically
> empirical observations must be subject to tautological proof or they
> cannot be true whatever else they may be. The reason is tautologies
> are themselves always true. That is, if we take any tautology of the
> form t:[subject][not subject] the truth must be found with one or the
> other part of the tautology. Consequently, if empirical observations
> could not form parts of tautologies, they would lie outside something
> which is always true and thus could not themselves be true.
>

... or no complete theory or empirical observations is always true ...
which assumption most of us gladly accept.

> Based on this insight, we conclude that empirical observations are
> merely the positive part of any tautology whether or not the tautology
> itself is used to prove the truth of the empirical observation. And in
> this regard we find that there is no fundamental distinction between
> empirical observations and those observations, such as mathematical,
> geometric, or logical which are subject to proof as true or false.
>
> --------
>
> Now, all this is fairly straightforward.We have empirical observations
> in mathematics and the so-called tautological sciences just as we have
> in the so-called empirical or experimental sciences.The distinction is
> a positivistic reliance on ambiguous criteria of utility for empirical
> sciences as opposed to the tautological regression of empirical
> observations to axioms for the so-called tautological sciences such as
> math, logic, etc. However, it must be noted that in the tautological
> sciences there is no further regression or tautological reduction of
> empirical observations beyond axioms and axioms themselves must be
> justified by appeals to intuitive correctness in a manner analogous to
> justification for all empirical observations in empirical science.
>
> Now, however, let's see if there isn't some way to unite tautological
> and empirical sciences on a common foundation through regression to
> some criterion of truth in general. We begin by noting a common basis
> for tautological regression or reduction in both kinds of science, the
> ordinary or particular tautology t:[subject][not subject] to which all
> empirical observations must be subject or they cannot be true.
>
> Further we note that alternatives to t:[subject][not subject] must
> always be false, that t:[subject][not subject][subject not subject]
> completes or perfects all possibilities in particular tautologies for
> true and false. Now we need only ask what is it in tautologies which
> can be proven to reduce to truth and falsity regardless of subject?
>
> --------
>
> We begin with the empirical observation [not] and find tautological
> regression leads directly to [not not]. We find that T:[not][not not]
> is not further reducible or regressible because it already contains
> its own self contradiction and we infer from this that [not] is always
> true and [not not] always false such that T:[not][not not] applies to
> all tautologies based on empirical observations regardless of subject.
>
> Therefore [not] is true of all empirical observations and forms the
> mechanical basis for all empirical observations of whatever nature
> which can be true and [not not] the mechanical basis for all empirical
> observations which are false.
>
> But what does the empirical observation [not] mean exactly?
>
> --------
>
> There are a couple of ways to address this question. I characterize
> [not] as differences and [not not] as different from differences. We
> could note that [not] might also be described as negation or some
> equivalent, but the difficulty is that none of these characterizations
> adds much more to the meaning of [not] than mere amplification.
>
> The difficulty is that we cannot further define [not] because [not] is
> the mechanical basis of definition. And if we apply [not] to the
> definition of [not] the result is self contradiction. We can apply
> [not] between other results of [not] but we cannot gain further
> insight to the nature of [not] itself through tautological reduction.
>
> --------
>
> The other part of the puzzle are the implications of [not] and what it
> means in practice. Now the interesting thing here is that [not] has
> every implication because it forms the basis in mechanical terms of
> everything that can be true. But the other interesting aspect is that
> I don't have to know what the implications of [not] are or have to be
> in order to know that [not] is necessarily true of everything. That is
> necessarily true because [not not] is necessarily self contradictory.
>
> As a practical matter it is possible to observe that [not] can apply
> to the results of other [not]'s without self contradiction. In other
> words, we cannot have different from differences but we can have
> differences between differences, differences between differences
> between differences, etc. as far as mechanical limitations allow
> because there is no necessary self contradiction involved.
>
> --------
>
> (Conclusion)
>
> In summary we have differences in general as the mechanical basis for
> everything that can be true and we have the potential for differences
> between differences etc. as the mechanical basis for sentience and all
> other forms of empirical observations which can be true. But we have
> very little comprehension of what such things mean in practice.
>
> By way of a very loose analogy, let's suppose we might visualize [not]
> or differences compounded in terms of one another as a three
> dimensional tautological grid. And as long as we remain on it we can
> transit the grid with every confidence that what we conclude is true
> and not false. However, the moment we slip off the grid of differences
> and differences between differences etc. we fall into the necessity of
> self contradiction. So the only problem is transiting the grid and not
> whether what we do is true or false as long as we remain on the grid.
>
> Regards - Lester

Yeah, that's usually called "a complete theory": "An abstract logical
theory in which all true statements have formal proofs within the
theory." <http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=complete%20theory>
When we fall off such a grid, we do indeed fall into the necessity of
self contradiction. The problem is that we don't know of any of those
grids which always match empirical observation.

patty

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