Re: Epistemology 102

From: Milan (mtklima_at_yahoo.com)
Date: 01/04/05 

Date: Tue, 4 Jan 2005 00:56:48 -0000

"Lester Zick" <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:41d9c6fa.36109700@netnews.att.net...
> On Mon, 3 Jan 2005 20:55:07 -0000, "Milan" <mtklima@yahoo.com> in
> comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
> >
> >"Lester Zick" <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
> >news:41d96416.25258564@netnews.att.net...
> >>
> >> Epistemology 102
> >> --------
> >>
> >> (Scientific Truth)
> >>
> >> Last semester, boys and girls, we saw that positivism implies certain
> >> things in relation to empirical knowledge. We found that science as
> >> practiced in modern empiricist form relies on self contradiction for
> >> its one standard of falsification and has no other test for truth.
> >
> >It relies on checking the predictions of a theory with the actual
> >observations.
>
> I believe that's what I just said.

I believe your pedantic jargon is not the one usually employed in philosophy
of science. I was just trying to clarify the point.

> >> This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
> >> defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
> >> observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
> >> opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
> >> They are also required to explain what they would deny because
> >> empirical observations in general could mean anything.
> >
> >If nobody can replicate an observation then the observation tends to be
> >discredited and fall into oblivion.
>
> I believe that's what I just said.

You believe wrong. Nobody is "reduced to disproving observations". If they
cant replicate them after a number of attempts they just move on.

> >> Further we found that positivism effectively substitutes some standard
> >> of utility for science other than truth.
> >
> >First you talk about positivism, then about empiricism, now positivism
> >again. It's not clear what you are talking about.
>
> Positivism is the progenitor of empiricism. Basically they amount to
> the same thing, which unfortunately isn't a hill of beans.

LOL. Empiricism can be traced to Locke and Hume. Positivism emerges in the
1920s with the Vienna Circle etc.

> >>We proposed one measure of
> >> utility in the form of a reciprocal product of the number of mutually
> >> non self contradictory theories needed to comprehend any historical
> >> circumstances, times the average complexity of those theories, U=1/NC.
> >> However, we now find that there are problems with any such measure.
> >>
> >> For example, the measure is itself reasonably clear. Yet complexity is
> >> not really all that easy to measure. We can see when something is more
> >> complex than something else. But we cannot easily see what the degree
> >> of complexity is for any theory.
> >>
> >> Even beyond this, however, any criterion of utility itself represents
> >> an empirical observation subject to identical considerations of
> >> utility as well. Which means that anyone can claim other standards of
> >> utility and we would have no way to judge among them definitively.
> >>
> >> The way this works in practice is that various forms of empiricism
> >> simply claim they are judging utility according to different data.
> >> No one denies the general idea of utility; they just say that their
> >> science addresses things in different ways.
> >
> >By "utility" you mean verifiable? It is not clear what you mean by
> >"utility".
>
> No, I don't mean verifiable because in positivism/empiricism
> observations can't be verified; they can only be invalidated through
> self contradiction. Now, if you want to know what I mean by utility, I
> suggest you review Epistemology 101 where it was clearly explained.

The positivists with AJ Ayer et al introduced the verifiability principle.
It was Popper who came up with falsificationism. You are confused. Your
Epistemology 101 posts are a mish-mash of ignorance and confusion. Nothing
is clearly explained there.

> >> For example, classical mechanics primary foundation rested on
> >> f=ma and various derivatives. Then came along various relativistic
> >> and quantum effects said to rest on other unspecified mechanical
> >> foundations. Or consider the different approaches to behavioral
> >> sciences which just claim different standards of utility because their
> >> approaches to the subject are different and judge different data. And
> >> we have no unambiguous way to judge the standards in themselves.
> >>
> >> --------
> >>
> >> We also note in passing that positivism's approach to science rests on
> >> the somewhat suspicious foundation of a general inability to prove the
> >> truth of any empirical observation. However, when we ask what is meant
> >> by an empirical observation, we are met with blank stares and fingers
> >> pointing in various directions plus some middle fingers pointing up.
> >> The most promising consensus suggests that empirical observations are
> >> merely those which are not or cannot be proven tautologically.
> >
> >They are observations about the world. Such as "there is a cat in the
> >garden", or "water boils at 100C". You are confusing blank stares with
eyes
> >rolling.
>
> Certainly I'm not confusing your blank stares with anything but
> ignorance. I love your definition of empirical observations as
> observations about the world. So insightful. Your analogies with a
> cat in the garden or the boiling point of water are especially helpful
> as well. No doubt Webster's will be in touch.

I was just trying to help. You obviously have no idea what you are talking
about.

> >> However I would like to add that even though not proven tautologically
> >> empirical observations must be subject to tautological proof or they
> >> cannot be true whatever else they may be. The reason is tautologies
> >> are themselves always true. That is, if we take any tautology of the
> >> form t:[subject][not subject] the truth must be found with one or the
> >> other part of the tautology. Consequently, if empirical observations
> >> could not form parts of tautologies, they would lie outside something
> >> which is always true and thus could not themselves be true.
> >
> >Some things are true sometimes. For instance the statement "there is a
cat
> >in the garden" may be true now, but not when the cat leaves the garden.
>
> So, the statement that "some things are true sometimes", is that an
> emprical observation? My brain is beginning to hurt.

Your brain is numb. I doubt it hurts.

> >> Based on this insight, we conclude that empirical observations are
> >> merely the positive part of any tautology whether or not the tautology
> >> itself is used to prove the truth of the empirical observation. And in
> >> this regard we find that there is no fundamental distinction between
> >> empirical observations and those observations, such as mathematical,
> >> geometric, or logical which are subject to proof as true or false.
> >>
> >
> >You may find that; quite a few people disagree.
>
> I find that when asked to explain what they think, quite a few people
> don't know what they think.

Fortunately they have you to enlighten them.

> > --------
> >>
> >> Now, all this is fairly straightforward.We have empirical observations
> >> in mathematics and the so-called tautological sciences just as we have
> >> in the so-called empirical or experimental sciences.
> >
> >We dont have empirical observations in mathematics. Unless you refer to
> >statements such as "Nigel wrote an integral on the blackboard".
>
> This is hardly a statement in mathematics, sport. It's an empirical
> observation. It's mathematical mystics like you who give bull***
> artists a bad name. Take a couple more stupid pills and call me in the
> morning. Or rather don't call me in the morning.

Why dont you stick your bull*** up your ass instead of spewing all over
this ng, you retard?

regards
Milan

> Regards - Lester

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