Re: To what do the laws of physics apply?

From: Mark Fergerson (nunya_at_biz.ness)
Date: 01/07/05 

Date: Fri, 07 Jan 2005 16:01:56 -0700

Mike Helland wrote:

> Mark Fergerson wrote:
>
>>Mike Helland wrote:
>>
>> > Mark Fergerson wrote:
>> >
>> >> Mike Helland wrote:
>> >>
>> >> > Let's start with two simple postulates:
>> >> >
>> >> > 1. There is the subjective reality of our conscious
>> >> experience and the
>> >> > objective reality external to our minds.
>> >>
>> >> That assumes that our minds are _separate_ from the
>> >> objective reality, but they cannot be otherwise we could not
>> >> perceive the objective reality.
>>
>> > But our perceptions are subjective reality. That's the
>>whole point of
>> > the postulate.
>>
>> The postulate ignores the fact that the allegedly
>>separate realities are directly linked, and the
>>characteristics of that linkage.

> The "realities" you are refering to the conscious/subjective and the
> external/objective, correct?

   Yes. But it was you that posited them as distinct, not
me. I use the terms solely for a common basis of discussion,
and hope to show you why they are not as distinct as you
appear to think.

> Can you explain the link between them?

   I have; the sensory channels for data input, and the
motor channels for output (closing the feedback loop).
That's as close as I can come until we nail down who's doing
the observing.

> Personaly, I would say the link is observation. What links the observed
> reality, to the external reality is the act of observation, which
> exists neither in the observed nor the external.
>
> Does that sound agreeable?

   Right up until the last part; ISTM you are drawing lines
based on philosophical distinctions, rather than anything
objectively (or subjectively) verifiable.

   I fail to see why you isolate "the act of observation"
the way you do; earlier you appeared to believe that all
observation went on strictly within the mind, somewhere
"above" the wetware.

   ISTM an "act" cannot be localized that way, particularly
observation. There is a thing being observed and an
observer, and whatever medium presents data about the thing
being observed to the observer. The medium (nervous system,
sensorium) has definite objectively observable properties
which would at first blush appear to place it in the
"external" part of reality, but its operation is subject to
influences from the rest of the internal hardware (and our
state of mind at the moment) which would similarly appear to
place it in the "internal" part of reality. Since these two
partitionings are in direct conflict, one or both must be wrong.

   The same argument applies to the output channel; there is
the thing being acted upon, the "actor" initiating the
action, and a medium that allows the impulse to actualize.
  The impulse gets out into the "external" world through the
medium of the motor nervous system (and its "end organs",
the bones and muscles, etc.). Now I seriously doubt you'll
claim that your motor nerves, muscles, bones, etc. are not
part of external reality since others can readily observe
them and agree on their properties absent your
participation. At the same time they're under your direct
personal control, and many aspects of their operation
directly affect your idea of what "external" reality is,
frinst stereognosis.

>> I should also add that "mind" is undefined. We need to
>>work on that. For me, "mind" is the emergent, interactive
>>aggregate of all the cognitive functions of the various
>>cerebral cortexes.

> We understand what a brain is, right? No need to define that, beyond
> the computing organ in our skulls?

   Close enough.

> Well, with our brains we seem to observe all sorts of things. The sky,
> the ground, other people, this computer screen.

   Yep. But who is "we"?

> The brain also observes itself.

   If it knows that's what it's doing, as opposed to say
"hearing voices". That knowledge is fairly recent.

> The brain's observation of itself is the mind.

   When you say "itself", what exactly do you mean, the
various ongoing recursive and interactive data-processing
operations? If so, fine.

> That's very close to what you said, but a little more meaningful, in my
> opinion. What do you think?

   Perhaps the brain's observation of its functions, as
opposed to its physical structure. I make that distinction
because awareness of the fact that the brain has separate
sections dedicated to various sub-processes is fairly recent.

>> > You are correct.
>> >
>> > But I do not see why that means our theories have
>>significance beyond
>> > our observations.
>>
>> The communication channel is two-way, not one way. Also,
>>each direction is multiplexed _and_ the two directions are
>>interconnected. Not only that, there are individual
>>differences among the great mass of humanity.
>>
>> If it were not two-way, we could not make correct
>>predictions about what changes in the incoming part of it
>>will do to the incoming data; we can and do.

> I don't see the logic in this.

   We could not predict how to make glasses to correct our
vision as a gross example. We would not know to turn our
heads to see what's causing a sound whose source is not
visible. We would not know to squint in bright light. We
would be unable to stand upright.

> Let's use an analogy, for example, gambling. A good poker player can
> watch players at a table, though not participating himself, and predict
> what the winning hand will be. The poker player is merely analyzing
> what he observes and predicting what comes next, usually through the
> process of induction. He doesn't have any "two-way" communication with
> the deck, yet the good ones manage to make accurate predictions.

   The best he can do is extrapolate by analogy from his
previous, direct hands-on experience. He cannot predict
exactly what will happen because _he's not playing_, which
means that an essential part of _his_ poker model, namely
his style, is absent. Bluffing is very personal frinst.

> In the statement, "If it were not two-way, we could not make correct
> predictions about what changes in the incoming part of it will do to
> the incoming data" are you saying that such an approach to predicting
> what nature will do cannot be as simple as the approach to predicting
> poker hands?

   Not quite.

> If so, why? If not, what does that statement mean?

   It means what it says. I don't understand why you made
the poker analogy unless you're saying that your and my
mental models of external reality must be identical, though
not necessarily perfectly congruent with external reality.

>> We have assembled within our minds data sets that appear
>>to imply the existence of a coherent, consistent Universe.
>>The data sets are assembled not by our design, but by the
>>way our sensory cortexes (wetware) are hardwired to assemble
>>it, _and_ by the way assorted ganglia and the sensory organs
>>themselves selectively filter and present data to the cortexes.
>>
>> So in that sense, the internal reality begins at our
>>corneas, pinnae, and assorted other end-organs of our
>>sensory nervous systems. That plus all the rest, from
>>ganglia to neural chains through various sensory cortexes,
>>establishes our internal reality.

> I disagree. I'm not entirely sure there should be a "beginning" for our
> internal reality.
>
> Can you perhaps provide an argument for why there must be?

   No, you have to do that since you posited it as separate
from "external" reality. Where's the boundary? I say there
isn't any.

>> >> We _are_ "present inside the model itself".
>>
>> > If I build a model of the universe in my computer, and
>>I'm sitting next
>> > to the computer, observing the model from a monitor, it
>>seems to me
>> > that we are not inside the computer model.
>>
>> The computer in that case is merely an extension of your
>>own mind; you could have bypassed all the programming and
>>built the model in your own mind had you the mental capacity
>>without the computer's help.
>>
>> Does the computer model contain an accurate, complete
>>description of itself, running the model? If it doesn't,
>>then in what sense is its model accurate or complete?

> Since modeling the entire universe within the universe is prevent by
> the Incompleteness Theorem, let's keep our focus a little more
> practical, shall we?

   You posed the question. Knowing that the computer has
limits shows its fallacy. That's why I asked about "accuracy
and completeness". More to the point is the part you snipped
where I asked if its model included you programming it.

> Say we wanted to model a single hydrogen atom in a computer.
>
> If this is the case, would you now agree that we exist outside of the
> model?

   Does the model accurately say what happens when the atom
bonds to other atoms? Then it also predicts many things that
happen within human brains, therefore human minds. Otherwise
not.

>> > We are outside the computer model.
>>
>> If its model is really accurate and complete, no we aren't.

> Which is mathematically impossible, and obviously not what we're
> discussing.

   Then you shouldn't have brought it up. ;>)

   Mark L. Fergerson

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