Re: Cerberus and Quine

From: Paul Holbach (paulholbachSPAMBAN_at_freenet.de)
Date: 02/24/05 

Date: 23 Feb 2005 16:57:50 -0800

> examachine@gmail.com wrote:
> > Paul Holbach wrote:

> Thank you for another one of your insightful messages. This has been
> one of the finest discussions I've ever been involved in (even if we
> don't agree at the end of the day)

You´re welcome! :-)
I´ve been enjoying it too.

> > Whatever entities there may be,
> > different entities are different due to
> > having different properties,
> > and not due to existing in different
> > senses of "exist"!
> >
> > Is that really so hard to see ...?

> No, Paul, it's definitely not hard to see, but you have to be a
> Platonist to say that!

No, you definitely don´t have to be a platonist in order to be
justified in deeming this true!

> Only a Platonist would readily grant that "sum of histories" or
> space-time is an object.

No, platonists are not per se ontologically naive!

> To the nominalist that I am, these are merely
> abstractions (of a very extreme kind!), not entities.

But if you say that eg spacetime is an abstraction, it
follows--according to simple logic--that there is something which is an
abstraction. Thus, your abstractions are entities too, since even
"nonentities" would turn out to be entities, and so there are no
nonentities.
Your standpoint is not ontologically innocent!

The point is that you seem to refuse to believe in abstract entities
and, at the same time, you seem to believe in abstractions, which are
abstract entities themselves!

> You say that a possibility is unlike a chair,
> but both are objects, but
> different kinds of objects, that exist in their own right.
> I am hoping
> that you see that only a Platonist would
> always grant that. For the
> Platonist, a "possibility" might be just as real as a chair.

As far as modal concepts are concerned I´m not sure whether it´s
really reasonable to believe in the existence of "modes of being" as
some philosophers do.
I tend to be an anti-realist concerning possibilities and necessities.

Once again, platonism with regard to SOME things does not entail
platonism with regard to ALL things! Many different 'platonisms' are
possible!
To take an example by Quine, we certainly ought not to believe in the
existence of "sakes" when we use phrases such "for the sake of ...".

> For orbit, it's even more clear for the nominalist. The orbit, as an
> object, does not exist. As a theoretical entity, it does. It's
> explanatory, it's informative, but it's not an object.

I´m not sure whether you regard the concepts /object/ and /entity/ as
co-extensional, or whether you strictly regard /object/ as a hyponym of
/entity/.
It depends on the particular ontological categorization scheme you
prefer.

Anyway, the concept /theoretical entity/ is vague, for to me it often
seems to mean something odd like /entity which is neither existent nor
nonexistent/.
I suspect that many scientists love to use the phrase "theoretical
entity" because it seemingly releases them from any outspoken
ontological commitment.

This is what I denounce as "ontological cowardice"! ;-)

I´m well aware that making ontological decisions is a chancy business;
but who promised that metaphysics is the right thing for the
faint-hearted?! ;-)

Regards
PH

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Cerberus and Quine
    ... > abstractions, ... platonism with regard to SOME things does not entail ... existence of "sakes" when we use phrases such "for the sake of ...". ...
    (comp.theory)
  • Re: Cerberus and Quine
    ... > abstractions, ... platonism with regard to SOME things does not entail ... existence of "sakes" when we use phrases such "for the sake of ...". ...
    (sci.math)
  • Re: Cerberus and Quine
    ... > abstractions, ... platonism with regard to SOME things does not entail ... existence of "sakes" when we use phrases such "for the sake of ...". ...
    (sci.logic)