Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science

From: Lester Zick (lesterDELzick_at_worldnet.att.net)
Date: 02/14/05 

Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2005 20:47:16 GMT

On Mon, 14 Feb 2005 11:34:06 -0600, Albert <albertwagner@cox.net> in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>Tony Orlow (aeo6) wrote:
>> Albert said:
>>
>>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>>
>>>>On Fri, 11 Feb 2005 12:14:50 -0500, "robert j. kolker"
>>>><nowhere@nowhere.net> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>So all of a sudden mathematics is all about reality? Just because you
>>>>>>add the undefined qualifications abstract and applied? Hooey! Talk
>>>>>>about special pleading. And you wonder why I call them mathematikers.
>>>>>
>>>>>Read what I wrote. Applied mathematics has some added stuff that makes
>>>>>it connect with physical reality. Pure mathematics does not.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>Neither does pure bull*** unless you can define the added stuff
>>>>universally which, given your proclivities, is about as likely as the
>>>>second coming.
>>>
>>>I would say the 'added stuff' is nothing more than a proper
>>>mapping of axioms, which are accepted and true, to empirical
>>>evidence, which is apparently true, i.e. the conversion of a
>>>valid argument to a sound argument.
>>
>> That makes sense to me. The problem is deciding which rules we consider
>> to be "apparently true" given empirical evidence.
>
>I intended the meaning that *all* empirical evidence is just
>apparently true. (a typo: I also intended 'accepted and true' to
>be 'accepted *as* true')
>
>> We do want our arguments to be sound.
>
>Yes, as sound as possible with us in this world. Empirical
>evidence is simply the best we have to work with currently.

Unfortunately, Albert, empiricism doesn't yield truth. It only yields
falsity. And qualifying the concept of truth as apparent or accepted
doesn't change the issue. Appearance or acceptance can only be of
falsity in the context of empiricism. A problematic mathematical
conjecture could appear or be accepted as true. But empirically
unfalsified evidence cannot appear or be accepted as true.

Let me see if I can explain it this way. Mathematikers take systems
they maintain are not about reality and apply them empirically to
reality then claim the lack of falsification proves something about
the truth of their empirical conclusions. Then when they realize they
are dealing with empirical conclusions, they try to ameliorate their
claims to truth by making them provisional. It doesn't work.

Regards - Lester

Loading