Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science

From: Albert (albertwagner_at_cox.net)
Date: 02/15/05 

Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2005 19:11:37 -0600

Lester Zick wrote:
> On Mon, 14 Feb 2005 11:34:06 -0600, Albert <albertwagner@cox.net> in
> comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>>Tony Orlow (aeo6) wrote:
>>
>>>Albert said:
>>>
>>>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>On Fri, 11 Feb 2005 12:14:50 -0500, "robert j. kolker"
>>>>><nowhere@nowhere.net> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>So all of a sudden mathematics is all about reality? Just because you
>>>>>>>add the undefined qualifications abstract and applied? Hooey! Talk
>>>>>>>about special pleading. And you wonder why I call them mathematikers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Read what I wrote. Applied mathematics has some added stuff that makes
>>>>>>it connect with physical reality. Pure mathematics does not.
>>>>>
>>>>>Neither does pure bull*** unless you can define the added stuff
>>>>>universally which, given your proclivities, is about as likely as the
>>>>>second coming.
>>>>
>>>>I would say the 'added stuff' is nothing more than a proper
>>>>mapping of axioms, which are accepted and true, to empirical
>>>>evidence, which is apparently true, i.e. the conversion of a
>>>>valid argument to a sound argument.
>>>
>>>That makes sense to me. The problem is deciding which rules we consider
>>>to be "apparently true" given empirical evidence.
>>
>>I intended the meaning that *all* empirical evidence is just
>>apparently true. (a typo: I also intended 'accepted and true' to
>>be 'accepted *as* true')
>>
>>>We do want our arguments to be sound.
>>
>>Yes, as sound as possible with us in this world. Empirical
>>evidence is simply the best we have to work with currently.
>
> Unfortunately, Albert, empiricism doesn't yield truth. It only yields
> falsity.

It yields particulars that may be interpreted as truth or falsity
  depending on the proposition.

> And qualifying the concept of truth as apparent or accepted
> doesn't change the issue.

Which issue is that?

> Appearance or acceptance can only be of
> falsity in the context of empiricism.

I think I know what you are trying to say. But I believe it to
be useless. We must daily make decisions based on inadequate data.

> A problematic mathematical
> conjecture could appear or be accepted as true. But empirically
> unfalsified evidence cannot appear or be accepted as true.

What the hell is 'empirically unfalsified evidence'?
Theories can be falsified. But how is an observed phenomenon
falsified? We may not be able to interpret it correctly, but
having once existed it cannot be falsified. We just don't know
what the truth of it is.
>
> Let me see if I can explain it this way. Mathematikers take systems
> they maintain are not about reality and apply them empirically to
> reality then claim the lack of falsification proves something about
> the truth of their empirical conclusions. Then when they realize they
> are dealing with empirical conclusions, they try to ameliorate their
> claims to truth by making them provisional. It doesn't work.

Not being a mathematician, and not having done what you claim
that they do, I cannot comment 

-- 
"Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the 
range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally 
impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it."
     -- George Orwell as Syme in "1984"