Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science

From: Lester Zick (lesterDELzick_at_worldnet.att.net)
Date: 02/15/05 

Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2005 16:25:46 GMT

On Mon, 14 Feb 2005 19:11:37 -0600, Albert <albertwagner@cox.net> in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>Lester Zick wrote:
>> On Mon, 14 Feb 2005 11:34:06 -0600, Albert <albertwagner@cox.net> in
>> comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>
>>>Tony Orlow (aeo6) wrote:
>>>
>>>>Albert said:
>>>>
>>>>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>On Fri, 11 Feb 2005 12:14:50 -0500, "robert j. kolker"
>>>>>><nowhere@nowhere.net> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>So all of a sudden mathematics is all about reality? Just because you
>>>>>>>>add the undefined qualifications abstract and applied? Hooey! Talk
>>>>>>>>about special pleading. And you wonder why I call them mathematikers.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>Read what I wrote. Applied mathematics has some added stuff that makes
>>>>>>>it connect with physical reality. Pure mathematics does not.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Neither does pure bull*** unless you can define the added stuff
>>>>>>universally which, given your proclivities, is about as likely as the
>>>>>>second coming.
>>>>>
>>>>>I would say the 'added stuff' is nothing more than a proper
>>>>>mapping of axioms, which are accepted and true, to empirical
>>>>>evidence, which is apparently true, i.e. the conversion of a
>>>>>valid argument to a sound argument.
>>>>
>>>>That makes sense to me. The problem is deciding which rules we consider
>>>>to be "apparently true" given empirical evidence.
>>>
>>>I intended the meaning that *all* empirical evidence is just
>>>apparently true. (a typo: I also intended 'accepted and true' to
>>>be 'accepted *as* true')
>>>
>>>>We do want our arguments to be sound.
>>>
>>>Yes, as sound as possible with us in this world. Empirical
>>>evidence is simply the best we have to work with currently.
>>
>> Unfortunately, Albert, empiricism doesn't yield truth. It only yields
>> falsity.
>
>It yields particulars that may be interpreted as truth or falsity
> depending on the proposition.

How can particulars be interpreted as true? Or false, for that matter?
Falsity is only established by contradiction. But truth can only be
established for particulars in relation to generals. That's the only
interpretation possible.

> > And qualifying the concept of truth as apparent or accepted
> > doesn't change the issue.
>
>Which issue is that?

Use of the term "apparent truth". Empiricism doesn't establish truth;
it only establishes falsity. So there can be no apparent truth, only
apparent falsity.

>> Appearance or acceptance can only be of
>> falsity in the context of empiricism.
>
>I think I know what you are trying to say. But I believe it to
>be useless. We must daily make decisions based on inadequate data.

Never suggested otherwise. It's useful for the evaluation of
empiricism which as a philosophy of science doesn't relate to daily
decisions we have to make despite our ignorance.

>> A problematic mathematical
>> conjecture could appear or be accepted as true. But empirically
>> unfalsified evidence cannot appear or be accepted as true.
>
>What the hell is 'empirically unfalsified evidence'?

It's what empiricism produces. The only possible result of a lack of
falsification.

>Theories can be falsified. But how is an observed phenomenon
>falsified? We may not be able to interpret it correctly, but
>having once existed it cannot be falsified. We just don't know
>what the truth of it is.

And we can never know the truth of an observation, perceptual or
conceptual empirically. All we can know is the lack of contradiction.
Empiricism doesn't produce theories. Nor does it show how theories are
produced or perceptions perceived. It only maintains that perceptions
are true no matter how they are perceived. Which is certainly false as
perception is no more inherently valid than theories underlying
perception.
 
>> Let me see if I can explain it this way. Mathematikers take systems
>> they maintain are not about reality and apply them empirically to
>> reality then claim the lack of falsification proves something about
>> the truth of their empirical conclusions. Then when they realize they
>> are dealing with empirical conclusions, they try to ameliorate their
>> claims to truth by making them provisional. It doesn't work.
>
>Not being a mathematician, and not having done what you claim
>that they do, I cannot comment

My claim is that empricists substitute a claim of apparent truth for
truth when empiricism has nothing to do with truth but only falsity.

Regards - Lester

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