Re: Models. predictions, physicallity, and observations

From: AllYou! (idaman_at_conversent.net)
Date: 02/28/05


Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2005 07:46:20 -0500


"jem" <xxx@xxx.xxx> wrote in message news:h7%Td.89049$bu.32479@fed1read06...
> AllYou! wrote:
>
> > "jem" <xxx@xxx.xxx> wrote in message news:YPFTd.88915$bu.34080@fed1read06...
> >
> >>AllYou! wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>>"jem" <xxx@xxx.xxx> wrote in message news:1emTd.88484$bu.19063@fed1read06...
> >>
>
> >>>>So let's see if any sense can be made from the "logical description of
> >>>>counting" that you've produced above. You say,
> >>>>"Counting is the intellectual process of ordering and/or quantifying.
> >>>>(e.g., We quantify the size of a collection by *counting* its members)".
> >>>>However, you haven't said what an "intellectual process" is.
> >>
> >>>Shall I also define what *is* is? Is that where you're going? An intellectual
> >
> > process is
> >
> >>>that which takes place as mere throught. The process of thinking through a concept
> >
> > using
> >
> >>>reason and logic. As such, it's totally non-physical.
> >>
> >>Slow way down. The concepts of "time" and "space" , which you've spent
> >>many hours discussing here, are trivialities in comparison to the
> >>enigmatic "intellectual process" (BTW let's shorten that to IP).
> >>
> >>As a matter of fact though, the IP idea isn't entirely new to Physics.
> >>Wigner and others suggested it as the mechanism that explained the
> >>"collapse of the wave function" in the early days of Quantum Mechanics.
> >> However, the idea had/has lots of problems associated with it. E.g.
> >>are only humans capable of effecting IPs? Is every human capable of IP
> >>from birth to death? What is it that makes a human capable of IP, but a
> >>cat or a cucumber, not? If you go this route, these are questions
> >>(along with many others of similar nature) that you'll need to provide
> >>answers for. Start with these three.
> >
> >
> > I'll back up even further. The whole reason I have trouble with the notion of time
and
> > space, and regard them as more than trivialities is that they've become the
explanation
> > for the behavior of natural phenomena.
>
> I wasn't suggesting that the *concepts* of "space" and "time" are
> trivial, only that their definitions are trivial in comparison with a
> definition like "intellectual process".

I know what you meant, and it's still my position that whether or not they are to be
considered physical is not trivial.

> So I'll back up even further. IMO, the goal of
> > science is an attempt to build a model of that which we observe. Notice, I'm not
bring
> > reality into this discussion because the debate over whether what we observe is real
is
> > not for this forum. But to the extent that we're affected by external influences, we
have
> > a desire to understand what caused those influences as well as to predict them.
>
> Sort of, but I don't think the "reality" of what's observed is generally
> questioned - probably the most popular view in Science these days is
> that observations are the *only* reality.

In ordered to avoid any philosophical debate, I'll go along with that.

> And what exactly is the dividing line between external and internal
> influences?

Physicality. By external, I meant external to the mind.

> > To this end, although it's beyond our capability to know if any of that is real, we
do, in
> > fact, attempt to build the most reliable model possible. We have no idea how
accurately
> > it represents reality, but the consistency with which the predictions contained in the
> > model are validated directly relates to the reliability of the model.
>
> If you subscribe to the idea that observations are the only reality,
> then "reliability of the model" is synonymous with "accuracy with which
> the model represents reality".

I don't want to get into semantics, I just don't want what I post here to be quoted back
to me when I later state my true position. It's my position that we can never know
reality. How do you know that you're not hypnotized? How do you know this isn't all just
a scheme to get you to believe a certain reality? Without getting into any of that, I'm
simply saying that to decide is something is accurate, we need a basis of comparison, and
if we have reality with which to compare our model, then why do we need the model?

It's not a bone of contention of mine, but just for the record, I subscribe to the notion
that we have no way of *knowing* *reality*, however, we can build a model which is
reliable in terms of its predictability. IOW, we assess the reliability of the
predictions. Again, I only made these comments as a backdrop to my overall point.

> > Anyway, the key here is the goal. The goal isn't simply to build models for the sake
of
> > it. This isn't just the grand human hobby. There's a real point to it all. So if
the
> > model is to have any value at all, it's much more than a trivial matter as to maintain
the
> > distinction between what is physical (e.g., that which is capable of affecting us,
either
> > directly or indirectly), and that which is just a fabrication of the human mind. Once
we
> > blur that distinction, we may find ourselves using these fabrications to plug voids in
our
> > model thereby deluding ourselves into believing that we've answered questions which we
> > have not.
>
> How can we "delude" ourselves? We build mechanisms to tell us what's
> going to happen, and either it happens or it doesn't. In one case our
> mechanism is right (so far), and in the other case it's wrong.

It can be wrong in the explanations. Here's an example: I say that splat rays from Mars
will cause this rock to hit the Earth when I release it. I release it. It hits the
ground. Have I demonstrated anything as to why the rock hit the ground? Did I
demonstrate the existence and/or the effects of spalt rays just because I wove an
explanation into the prediction?

To say that we can predict how a clock will function, and that time is what a clock says
it is, demonstrates nothing as the physicality, or as you would say, the reality of time.
All we know is that what we observed of whatever process we've defined as a clock behaved
as we predicted.

> > So there it is. That's my point. Accept it, reject it, destroy it, or challenge it.
> > It's all the same to me, and either of those choices is perfectly valid and
acceptable.
> > Now when it comes to time and space, I believe that too many people who think they're
in
> > the know, believe that the curvature of spacetime is the reason, or the
> explanation, for
> > the phenomena which we observe. For instance, what is it that caused a clock to have
lost
> > *time* as a result of having gone on a trip at relativistic speeds? Well, too often
the
> > answer is the curvature of spacetime or that spacetime was in some other way
responsible
> > and that's the answer. But if spacetime is just a mathematical concept, then we've
got
> > the cause and effect backward. Spacetime is curved because of some natural
phenomenon,
> > and not the reason for the change in some natural phenomenon.
>
> So you don't like the answer "spacetime curvature causes clocks to lose
> time"? Why not? It's logical. Suppose a clock would register a
> certain elapsed time in a flat spacetime model, and suppose the elapsed
> time registered is reduced when the only change to the model is the
> introduction of a curved spacetime, doesn't it follow that the lost time
> is attributable to the curvature?

Not if the curvature is just an intellectual concept. IOW, let's say we construct a graph
(i.e., a mathematical concept born in the mind) which is used to assist us with
quantification and predictions and the like, and then in order to assure that the graph
remains valid, we *curve* it to remain consistent with predictions and observable results.
Is it then valid to say that the results are caused by the curved graph? That's
backwards. The results are caused by something, but not a concept. The problem I have is
that now that we've fooled ourselves into thinking we've actually answered a question, we
move on. We forget the question. What *caused* the clock to *lose time*?

Time is a mathematical concept.

> > And so to answer your questions, I believe that these basic misunderstandings about
what
> > space and time are have lead to some of these questions to begin with.
>
> But Science doesn't misunderstand what space and time are - they're
> precisly defined in the models that use them (in the language of
> mathematics of course). The confusion is yours.

Maybe, but tell me how time is different than splat rays. Show me how time is physical
such that it can't be confused as I've explained above.

> I think there's a
> > clear distinction between that which is physical and that which is conceptual, and
this
> > refusal to simply keep track of which is which, as witnessed right here in the NG,
leads
> > to many of these so-called mysteries. However, I don't think IP is limited to humans,
but
> > I do think that other life forms are capable of a much less sophisticated version of
it.
>
> You say there's a *clear* distinction between physical and conceptual.
> So what is it? It should be a rule that will permit the unambiguous
> classification of anything into one category or the other (or "none of
> the above").

That which is capable of affecting us (e.g., stimulating our senses), either directly or
indirectly, is physical. As I explained, that was the whole goal of physics to begin
with.

> >>>>Can
> >>>>"ordering and/or quantifying" be accomplished by a non-intellectual
> >>>>process? If so, would that be an example of "ordering and/or
> >>>>quantifying" that doesn't represent counting?
> >>
> >>>No, ordering and quantifying cannot be accomplished by a non-intellectual process.
> >
> > For
> >
> >>>instance, objects may appear to be organized in a particular order, let's say by
size,
> >
> > but
> >
> >>>the recognition of an order to the collection is done conceptually. Those objects
> >
> > simply
> >
> >>>have spatial relationships to one another. The recognition that they may appear from
> >
> > left
> >
> >>>to right in order by size is an intellectual process wherein we match our observation
> >
> > of
> >
> >>>those objects with the concept of a pattern or order.
> >>
> >>>>A clock quantifies the number of occurrences of a repetitive process.
> >>>>Is that not counting? If not, why not?
> >>
> >>>A clock, like any other physical object, quantifies nothing. The term *quantify* is
> >>>nothing but an intellectual concept. To quantify is to compare, and comparing is an
> >>>intellectual process.
> >>
> >>In the 1950's, Alan Turing proposed a famous experiment to test whether
> >>or not IP is unique to humans. In brief, the "Turing Test" suggests
> >>that if there's something about IP that's unique to humans, then it
> >>should be possible to distinguish, simply through the process of
> >>questioning, between a human and e.g. a computer program that's been
> >>designed to answer questions as a human would.
> >>
> >>So let's do a similar experiment to determine whether or not counting is
> >>something that only humans, say, are capable of. This should be easy to
> >>do - we'll simply take a collection of objects or occurrences and ask
> >>the question "How many?" of both a human and a machine that's been
> >>designed to answer that question. Then we'll try to distinguish, based
> >>on the answers given, which is the human and which is the machine. If
> >>we're able to distinguish them, then the differences in answers may
> >>provide some additional insight into the counting process, but if we
> >>can't distinguish them (after a suitable number of repetitions), then
> >>we'll have to concede that the hypothesis that "machines can't count" is
> >>untenable. Does that sound like a fair test?
>
> > Sure does, however, we've got to define what an answer is. IOW, I have no doubt that
a
> > turnstile at the subway can employ a mechanism which turns a series of dials which
have
> > figures painted on them. But the real question becomes *is that counting?* I claim
it is
> > not. The figure on the dial *means* something to us of which the machine is unaware.
In
> > normal vernacular, we say that the machine *kept count*, however, this is very
imprecise.
> > The very notion of *meaning* is reserved for the intellect, and without the ability to
> > conceptualize the meaning of the figure on the dial of the mechanism on the machine,
there
> > is no counting. There's just the figure on the dial of the mechanism on the machine.
>
> Sorry, but you don't get to redefine the terms.

I, just like anyone else, get to challenge conventional wisdom of current definitions.

> The generally accepted
> definition of "counting" doesn't infer that the counter has to be aware
> of the underlying "meaning" of the process. If you want to draw such a
> distinction then you can invent your own word. E.g. "splatting" is the
> process whereby humans quantify with understanding and machines quantify
> without understanding.

But I didn't redefine anything. *Counting* is quantification, and the whole notion of a
quantity is a concept born in the human mind.



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