Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
From: Lester Zick (lesterDELzick_at_worldnet.att.net)
Date: 02/28/05
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Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2005 22:41:34 GMT
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On Mon, 24 Jan 2005 16:58:09 GMT, lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net
(Lester Zick) in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
> Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
> ---------
> (Scientific Reduction)
>
>If asked what science is, most people would reply that science is
>empirical in nature and conducts experiments to falsify unsound
>hypotheses. Some might also vouchsafe that mathematics is a
>scientific discipline to the extent that unsound hypotheses can be
>falsified through contradictions with foundational axioms. But why
>do we need science at all and how is it used?
>
>Let's look at reality in general through unscientific eyes. What we
>see is a collation of events in historical terms. We see them succeed
>one another and opine that various events cause one another. There is
>no way to determine whether this is true in any fundamental sense,
>only that history documents that various sequences of events have in
>fact succeeded one another.
>
>So, what is science is expected to do? What is apparent to everyone is
>that we have one historical tapestry of events and science is expected
>to make sense of that tapestry. But how to do this? Basically science
>can only make sense of the tapestry by reducing the number and
>complexity of causes evident for events. Science must take the run of
>events evident to everyone and show which characteristics and
>properties govern the emergence of certain events as manifested in the
>characteristics and properties of other events.
>
>In so doing science regresses consideration of events to properties of
>events and shows how the emergence of one event is implied in the
>emergence of other events. And thereby science reduces the panoply
>of history to manifold considerations evident in all or most events.
>
>
> Methodology
> ---------
>
>Initially at least empirical sciences approach this reduction in the
>same way mathematics does through finite tautological regression.
>However, whereas mathematics regresses its observations through to
>consistency with foundational axioms, through the vagaries of history
>empirical sciences are left only with contradiction between empirical
>observations as the basis for its regressive foundation.
>
>Consequently empirical science has been left with no understanding of
>its own intellectual mechanics. It pretends to be different from logic
>and mathematics and claims no finite tautological regressions limit
>its empiricism. However, this is only partly true just as it is only
>partly true for mathematics and logic. None of the three have finite
>ending points that limit application of the respective disciplines.
>But all three have finite tautological regressions which define and
>limit their starting points, what I refer to as ur regressions.
>
>
> Ur Regressions for True, False, and Not
> --------------
>
>True, False, and Not are defined in reciprocal terms in the following
>way. For any empirical observation [subject] the proposition
>
>p:[subject][not subject] is always true. And the proposition
>
>p:[subject not subject] is always false. And the empirical observation
>
>P:[not] is always true because the proposition
>
>P:[not not] is always false.
>
> --------------
>
>These seem to be the only reducible definitions for true, false, and
>not. The problem is analogous to the definition of factorability in
>mathematics where given i=j*k we have for any number, i, two factors,
>j and k but only one equation, which means there is no general
>solution possible for factors of i lying between 1 and i.
>
> --------------
>
>In other words every empirical observation is regressable through
>tautologies or it cannot be true because tautologies in the formal
>sense are always true. Tautologies are not perfect, however, because
>even though they account for everything true they do not account for
>everything. In order to do that they would also have to account not
>only for everything true but everything false as well. And we find
>that perfecting ordinary tautologies requires the addition of some
>component which is always false. For example, for
>
>t:[subject][not subject]
>
>t:[subject][not subject][subject not subject]
>
>wherein the self contradictory alternative [subject not subject] is
>appended to an ordinary tautology to form a comprehensive or perfect
>tautology inclusive of all possibilities.
>
>However such a regression through to self contradiction is not
>possible in the case of one empirical observation [not] which forms
>an irreducible regression directly in tautuological terms:
>
>T:[not][not not]
>
>inclusive of all possibilities. From which we conclude [not] or
>contradiction forms the basis of all tautological regressions in
>general, which in fact is exactly consistent with the form of the
>tautology itself.
>
>Regards - Lester
Regards - Lester
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