Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
From: aeo6 (aeo6_at_cornell.edu)
Date: 03/01/05
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Date: Tue, 1 Mar 2005 13:04:52 -0500
Albert said:
> Tony Orlow (aeo6) wrote:
> > Albert said:
> >
> >>Tony Orlow (aeo6) wrote:
> >><snip>
> >>
> >>This post/reply had grown exceedingly long and has become
> >>confusing to me. I have snipped all but the final paragraph.
> >>
> >>
> >>>Your objection at this point is the equivalence between absolute
> >>>foreknowledge and predetermination, and the contradiction between that
> >>>foreknowledge and free will, because you make some distinction between
> >>>knowing for sure something will happen (absolute foreknowledge) and the
> >>>fact that it will surely actually happen (predetermination).
> >>
> >>This sentence does not accurately portray my objection to your
> >>proposition.
> >
> > The please elucidate me on exactly what your objection is, in
> > straightforward language, without resorting to more irrelevant
> > gendankenen.
> >
> >>>I don't see
> >>>how you can say God knows for sure what will happen in the future, and
> >>>at the same time that we have any ability to change the future from that
> >>>course, or that our choices aren't part of what God can actually
> >>>accurately foresee, which should be everything.
> >>
> >>Yes. I know you don't see it and I know of no better
> >>illustration of it than the time traveler thought experiment.
> >>You insist on inserting God into the argument, when God is an
> >>unnecessary concept in showing that foreknowledge is not
> >>identical to predetermination. That is *precisely* why the
> >>gedanken used a time traveler incapable of predetermining
> >>anything, rather than God. You agreed to this principle once
> >>before, yet changed your mind for reasons you have chosen not to
> >>share.
> >>
> >>
> >
> > Albert, you're twisting things again.
>
> No.
Yes.
>
> > What I agreed to was that your
> > gedanken exhibited no paradox or contradiction.
>
> Yes.
>
> > I also went on to say
> > that was because it wasn't the same situation.
>
> Same as what situation? It's an example of foreknowledge and
> free will existing in a non-contradictory way.
Same as the situation I posed originally, with the breakfast cereal,
remember? I swear, you act like a rat on an electric grid trying to find
that lever! Stay on topic or drop it.
ABSOLUTE foreknowledge, which is NEVER WRONG, is incompatible with free
will, which CANNOT BE ABSOLUTELY PREDICTED. You conveniently try to
leave out the absolute nature of the foreknowledge, which makes me think
that in your heart, your own freedom is more important than God's
omniscience.
>
> > I have said all this, so
> > don't say I haven't. But, I'll repeat it anyway.
> >
> > There is no foreknowedge in your example.
>
> Of course there is.
>
> > When I wrote the letter it was
> > about that time's past,
>
> Yes.
>
> > the Traveler doesn't know what is in it until I
> > open it,
>
> Of course he does. He put in it the envelope. But if that
> strikes you as ambiguous, then simply specify such literally in
> the gedanken.
>
> > and by the time I open it, the truth is in that time's past.
>
> Yes.
>
> > Whose foreknowledge are you talking about, the letter's?
>
> I was talking about the time traveler who watched you write the
> letter.
I swear you said at one point that I wrote the letter and the Traveler
didn't need to know the contents. So, in your explanation using my lie,
the Traveler would be in on the lie. Does God lie to himself? Maybe He's
in a state of denial regarding your intentions........
>
> > Besides, you
> > have already conceded that if you somehow classify this as
> > foreknowledge, it can still be wrong, possibly because I lied in the
> > letter, which makes the foreknowledge on the part of the letter far from
> > absolute.
>
> When composing the gedanken, it wasn't an assumption that you
> would lie. However, the time traveler knew you lied because what
> you ate for breakfast was in his past also. Your lie in no way
> alters the gedanken. At any rate, this phoney objection can
> easily be negated by specifying in the gedanken that you do not lie.
You are one squirmy wormy, aren't you? You used the lying as a squirm
out of explaining how the Traveler could be wrong. So, now you want to
squirm out of that? Out of the lying pan, back into the fire. How do you
explain it if the Traveler is wrong, WITHOUT my lying or his? How could
he be wrong, IF he's omniscient?
>
> > Therefore this "gedanken" is irrelevant to the question as to
> > whether absolute foreknowledge as attributed to God is compatible with
> > free will as attributed to man.
>
> No, it is not.
Yes, it is so.
>
> > To the extent that knowledge is
> > absolutely correct, it can never be wrong, whether it's knowledge about
> > the future or anything else. Foreknowledge that can be false is not
> > absolute and is consequently irrelevant to this argument.
>
> The foreknowledge of the time traveler is not false. Only your
> lie is false, just as now, only your continuing lies are false.
And, how does this lie apply to the original example with God and you?
Who is doing the lying that explains why your will is free?
I mean, I have a pretty good guess how a lie justifies free will,
but.....takes one to know one.
>
> =====================================================
> Free will and predetermination are mutually exclusive.
>
> You either have free will or you do not have
> freewill.
>
> If you have free will, then there is no predetermination:
> (a) without predetermination, foreknowledge cannot imply
> predetermination
Because you don't want it to? Thius is where you're wrong. Explain how
absolute foreknowledge of an event is different from the absolute fact
that it will happen, and how the absolute fact that something will
definitely happen is different from it being predetermined.
> (b) there can be no contradiction between
> free will and foreknowledge
>
> If you do not have free will, then all is predetermined:
> (a) with predetermination foreknowledge is irrelevant
> (b) there can be no contradiction between
> non-existent free will and irrelevant foreknowledge
>
>
-- Smiles, Tony
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