Re: Models. predictions, physicallity, and observations

From: AllYou! (idaman_at_conversent.net)
Date: 03/04/05 

Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2005 08:17:52 -0500

"jem" <xxx@xxx.xxx> wrote in message news:LpEVd.92183$bu.70873@fed1read06...
> AllYou! wrote:
>
> > "jem" <xxx@xxx.xxx> wrote in message news:zx_Ud.89657$bu.65695@fed1read06...
> >
> >>AllYou! wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>>"jem" <xxx@xxx.xxx> wrote in message news:h7%Td.89049$bu.32479@fed1read06...
> >>
> >>
> >>>>I wasn't suggesting that the *concepts* of "space" and "time" are
> >>>>trivial, only that their definitions are trivial in comparison with a
> >>>>definition like "intellectual process".
> >>
> >>>I know what you meant, and it's still my position that whether or not they are to be
> >>>considered physical is not trivial.
> >>
> >>During the last 100 years Physics has abandoned the attempt to describe
> >>Nature as anything more than the phenomena Nature produces. Entities
> >>like "space", which are omponents of models created to imitate Nature.
> >>aren't presumed to exist outside the models (i.e. don't warrant
> >>characterization as physical).
> >
> >
> > And this is where I think a principle has gone too far. As I think I stated here
already,
> > I believe in the concept that we cannot know what reality is. I think all we can do
is
> > build a model of what we perceive we observe, and this model consists of various
theories.
>
> For our purposes we can treat theory and model as synonymous. Ignoring
> the subtle distinction isn't likely to cause any problems.

OK.

>
> > Theories are predictions of what we'll observe under specific circumstances, and the
> > relative reliability of a theory is the degree to which it's been tested, and the
extent
> > to which we've concluded the results of those tests are consistent with the
predictions.
> > This means that some parts of the model can be deemed to be highly reliable, while
others
> > not as much. And there is also no universal acceptance of just one model. In effect,
> > each of us has his own model, and our conclusion as to the reliability of it is
influenced
> > by the extent to which it's consistent with others.
>
> Well it's not like there are hundreds of competing viable models, more
> like a handful.

OK.

>
> > So we have these models which are variously reliable, and all we can do is assume that
the
> > reliability of its various parts equates to the probability that it accurately
represents
> > nature. So in this respect, I agree with what you've said. However, where I
> disagree, is
> > that we should therefore lose the distinction between what is physical and what is
nothing
> > more than a mere concept. Remember that this model is supposed to represent
something.
> > To claim that because it's just a model, and because we can never know the *real*
nature
> > of Nature, it doesn't matter whether we build the model of concepts or not. This is
> > silly.
>
> This issue is addressed at length in what follows.
>
> > The foundation of the model, that which keeps it together and which serves as the
basis
> > being able to compare it to others, is the observable world. That is the only anchor
> > which keeps the model from freely assuming any form from moment to moment, or from
mind to
> > mind. We don't know if what we observe is real or not.
>
> Yes, re. observable world as anchor, but what's observed *is* what's
> real - nothing that's not observable (in principle) can be considered
> real, and everything that is observable must be considered real.

I don't believe that our difference on this issue is relevant to that about which we most
disagree, however, to the extent that it's of any interest, I maintain that there is no
way for a person to know if what they observe is real. Newton believed his laws related
to the real world, but as we now believe, they were only an approximation. The world of
natural phenomena was the same then as it is now (I think), so either he knew what reality
was then, or he did not. And if he was wrong, what's to say we're not wrong?

Moreover, how do you know that you senses are not betraying you? How do you know that
your existence is not akin to the scenarios presented in so many si-fi movies recently,
like the matrix?

I've considered your argument, but I'm afraid that this is a philosophical issue upon
which we've reached an impasse. There is only one reality, and we'll only know what it is
whenever we know that we've uncovered every secret which nature hides from us. Until
then, all we have is our perceptions of what we observe.

> > In fact, we don't even know for
> > sure if we've observed what we think we've observed.
>
> Provision is made to ensure that observations are "reliable" by
> requiring measurement processes to be repeatable.

Agreed.

>
> However, the only thing that could
> > make this lack of confidence worse is to simply intermix that which we perceive that
we've
> > observed with that which we freely invent in out minds.
>
> Yes, that's not a good thing to do, but you're an offender in this
> regard. You don't clearly distinguish between Nature and models created
> to imitate Nature.

I beg to differ. I've given detailed explanations here over the last few months that I
believe that all we can do is to build models based upon what we observe. I clearly
understand the difference to which you refer, and ask you to show otherwise. What is it
that I've said in this thread which lead you to that conclusion?

However, I think you and others consistently refuse to draw the distinction between what
we observe and mere concepts and dismiss any insistence for that distinction as a
philosophical issue. I maintain that it's fundamental to the pursuit of science.

> Let's also not forget the goal of
> > science which is to understand that which we perceive affects us.
>
> And the mature interpretation of "understanding" coincides with
> "predictability".

Nothing I've said is inconsistant with that..

>
> >>>>Sort of, but I don't think the "reality" of what's observed is generally
> >>>>questioned - probably the most popular view in Science these days is
> >>>>that observations are the *only* reality.
> >>
> >>>In ordered to avoid any philosophical debate, I'll go along with that.
> >>
> >>When discussing the role of Science - philosophical issues are unavoidable.
> >>
> >>
> >>>>And what exactly is the dividing line between external and internal
> >>>>influences?
> >>
> >>>Physicality. By external, I meant external to the mind.
> >>
> >>You've just replaced one vague concept with another (i.e. mind).
> >
> >
> > OK, I'll follow your lead down this road. That which is capable of stimulating the
> > senses, or that which is capable of effecting that which can stimulate the senses, is
> > observable, and that which is observable is physical, and that which is physical is
> > external. We are passive recipients of these stimuli.
> >
> > So the dividing line between *mere* concepts (which I call internal) and that which is
> > physical (which I call external) is whether or not that entity is capable, directly or
> > indirectly, of stimulating the senses.
>
> The notion of "stimulating senses" is too vague. Whose senses?
> Stimulate how? E.g. dreams can stimulate senses, but I don't think you
> mean to include dreams on your list of physical things.
>
> Physics deals with this issue more concretely by considering as physical
> (i.e. the things of interest to Physics) only the (repeatable)
> measurements that can be obtained (in principle) by instruments created
> to react to the environment.

And I maintain that's too vague. You've not closed the loop. Measurements of what? It
is not sufficient to declare something a physical by simply declaring that an instrument
reacts to something without ever demonstrating the physicality of that something. We're
caught in a chicken and egg argument. What came first, the thing, or the measurement of
it? Well in this case, the only reason to perform a measurement is to quantify something.
Why quantify it? Because we're curious about it. And how did that happen? Because we
sensed it in the first place. We observed it, we're curious about it, we measure it.

Here's another try. If physics is a field of study, then what do we study? Do we just
decide to perform random measurements and then see how all of that data fits together? Or
do we study that which we've observed in order to understand it better?

> >>>>If you subscribe to the idea that observations are the only reality,
> >>>>then "reliability of the model" is synonymous with "accuracy with which
> >>>>the model represents reality".
> >>
> >>>I don't want to get into semantics, I just don't want what I post here to be quoted
> >
> > back
> >
> >>>to me when I later state my true position. It's my position that we can never know
> >>>reality.
> >>
> >>So what do you mean by "reality"? If something is unknowable in
> >>principle, in what sense could it be considered an aspect of reality?
> >>That's why the prevailing view in Physics is that "measurable phenomena"
> >>and "reality" are synonymous.
> >
> >
> > See the above.
>
> "Knowing" isn't addressed above.

The issue of reality was addressed above. You're asking about aspects of reality, and I
reject that a discussion of reality is relevant to anything of science. Concepts such as
truth, knowledge, and reality are not matters of science. They all imply an absolute, and
humans are incapable of absoluteness.

> >> How do you know that you're not hypnotized? How do you know this
> >>isn't all just
> >>
> >>>a scheme to get you to believe a certain reality? Without getting into any of that,
> >
> > I'm
> >
> >>>simply saying that to decide is something is accurate, we need a basis of comparison,
> >
> > and
> >
> >>>if we have reality with which to compare our model, then why do we need the model?
> >>
> >>Science is concerned only with what's measurable. If your hypothesized
> >>hypnosis is detectable then it's part of reality. If not, it's not.
> >
> >
> > I don't think that we're far off here, it's more a matter of how we're expressing it.
I'm
> > not willing to go as far as to say anything WRT reality because no matter what you say
> > about it, I could always ask the question, *how do you know*? I've concluded that
there
> > is a reality out there, but that the best I can do is build a model which I believe
best
> > represents it, and I make that assessment based upon the degree to which the model is
> > reliable. But the only way I can ascertain its reliability is from whatever I
observe,
> > and I cannot observe space or time.
>
> You observe what you observe, period. You build models (ie.
> hypothetical Natures), which contain *defined* entities like "space" and
> "time", in an attempt to produce a model whose hypothetical observables
> correspond to the actual observables of Nature. And you realize that
> even though you may be able to match up the observables, you can't infer
> that the entities of your models are also entities of Nature.

That's too vague also. We can infer that the entities of our model are also entities of
Nature as long as we assure that these entities are the results of observations. We
define the entities in our model based upon observations, and we should not assume that
entities which are nothing more than mere concepts can affect anything.

> >>>It's not a bone of contention of mine, but just for the record, I subscribe to the
> >
> > notion
> >
> >>>that we have no way of *knowing* *reality*, however, we can build a model which is
> >>>reliable in terms of its predictability. IOW, we assess the reliability of the
> >>>predictions. Again, I only made these comments as a backdrop to my overall point.
> >>
> >>Again the assumption Science makes is that there is no more to reality
> >>than the phenomena. Any aspect that has no associated phenomena is
> >>unknowable in principle, so what sense would it make to consider it an
> >>aspect of reality?
> >
> >
> > I know nothing of reality. I've only concluded that neither space nor time is
observable.
>
> You changed the subject. You said you have no way of knowing reality.
> I asked you how something you're incapable of knowing can be considered
> an element of reality. That's what you should respond to.

I can't answer how something can be an element of something I know nothing about. I'm
giving you my reason why we cannot consider that anything is an element of reality,
because we know nothing of reality. We can only assume that which is observable rises
from Nature, but we must also recognize that this is an assumption.

>
> Re, the new subject:
>
> Clearly the readings of measuring instruments are observable. A clock
> is a measuring instrument. Time is the reading of a clock. Ergo, time
> is observable.

This is the heart of the matter. You seem to be saying that a clock measures time again,
yet elsewhere, you've denied this. If a clock is a measuring instrument, then what does
it measure? And if your answer is time, then how does that square with your other
statement:

"The above quote from me is intended only to imply that "time" is not something which
*has* measureable properties, but that rather that it *is* a measureable property of a
clock."

So is time a property of a clock, or is time what a clock measures?

> Space too, in the sense that space is frequently used as a synonym for
> distance.

Too vague.

>
> >>>>How can we "delude" ourselves? We build mechanisms to tell us what's
> >>>>going to happen, and either it happens or it doesn't. In one case our
> >>>>mechanism is right (so far), and in the other case it's wrong.
> >>
> >>>It can be wrong in the explanations. Here's an example: I say that splat rays from
Mars
> >>>will cause this rock to hit the Earth when I release it. I release it. It hits the
> >>>ground. Have I demonstrated anything as to why the rock hit the ground? Did I
> >>>demonstrate the existence and/or the effects of spalt rays just because I wove an
> >>>explanation into the prediction?
> >>
> >>Science doesn't try to *explain* phenomena, only predict them. When
> >>it's said for example that "gravity" or "curved spactime" causes the
> >>rock and the Earth to come together, that's strictly a description of
> >>the behavior of entities within models, and the "cause" is logical in
> >>nature (i.e. is an inference based on some underlying assumptions), not
> >>physical.
> >>
> >>If you were to create a model that "explained" falling rocks using spalt
> >>rays, that would be fine. Of course, in order for it to be a viable
> >>model *all* the corresponding predictions based on spalt rays would need
> >>to agree with what's observed.
> >
> >
> > And here's the heart of the matter. Here's where I very much want to dive in and
explore
> > more. But I warn you now so that you've got the choice........I'm a hard sell. I
will
> > not modify my position just because I'm *told* that I'm wrong. I believe what I
believe
> > and you believe what you believe.
> >
> > As to your statement, lets' take time dilation. Is it your position that time
dilates,
> > and this is what causes a clock to *lose time* after having gone on a trip? If so,
then
> > how is this different than my spat ray example? The process which the clock
facilitates
> > slowed for some reason, but all you've shown is a prediction that it would under
specific
> > circumstances, and that the prediction was reliable. Where is the model of time?
Where
> > is the theory which allows for a test of the observability of time? Where have you
> > demonstrated that time in anything more than a mathematical construct?
>
> OK, my turn to offer a warning. I've told you before, regarding this
> "time dilation" issue, that you can't lock on to the English language
> descriptions as if they were etched in stone. Such descriptions
> represent attempts to translate the mathematics of the models into
> terse, common language statements. As such they're bound to be somewhat
> incomplete and/or inaccurate. Bear that in mind.
>
> To address your above questions, the "model of time" is the Lorentz
> Transformation (suitably extended if accelerated motion is involved),
> and the "time" that's referred to in the transformation equations is
> compared to the "time" that's indicated by observed clocks. It's as
> simple as that.

Not good enough. You've done nothing but assert time. This ties into the arguments I've
made above WRT the chicken and egg, so I'll let that rest as my response to this.

> BTW (and we've gone around on this before too), in the SR model, the
> "process which a (standard) clock facilitates" is not slowed. In fact,
> (standard) clocks are presumed to be completely unaffected by movement.

So the twin will age less, the atomic clock with have lost time, but the standard clock
will not have lost time? either I misunderstood your comment, or you've got to explain
this inconsistancy.

> >>>To say that we can predict how a clock will function, and that time is what a clock
> >
> > says
> >
> >>>it is, demonstrates nothing as the physicality, or as you would say, the reality of
> >
> > time.
> >
> >>>All we know is that what we observed of whatever process we've defined as a clock
> >
> > behaved
> >
> >>>as we predicted.
> >>
> >>You're looking at this issue from the wrong angle. Consider devices
> >>called thermometers that make measurements (i.e. produce numbers). The
> >>name "temperature" has been assigned to those measurements.
> >>"Temperature" isn't something that's presumed to exist, which
> >>thermometers have been created to measure. If it were it would make
> >>sense to ask the question "how do you know that thermometers measure
> >>temperature?", but it should be obvious that, if "temperature" is simply
> >>a name for the measurements, such a question isn't meaningful.
> >
> >
> >>It's the same with clocks and time. "Time" isn't something that's
> >>presumed to exist, which devices must be created to measure. There are
> >>devices called clocks (constructed in a prescribed manner) which make
> >>measurements, and "time" is just the name that's given to those
> >>measurements.
> >
> >
> > Two issues: Temperature is a measure of a quantity of heat. To say that an object
has a
> > temerature of x is to give a precide measurement of a quantity of heat, and heat is
> > physical. So are you saying that time is a measurment of something? If so, what? Of
> > what qunatity is time giving an indication? What is being quantified?
>
> You have to recognize the distinction between the "real world" and
> models of it. When temperature is described in terms of heat (or
> average kinetic energy of a collection of microscopic particles), that
> description applies to the entities of a model. Temperature in the
> "real world" is simply the reading that appears on a thermometer when
> it's exposed to the environment.

I've got that. However, you've not addressed the inconsistencies of your statements. Is
time the measurement of something? If so, what? You're the one who came up with the
analogy of temperature, but it seems to fall apart here. If I'm wrong, please enlighten
me. What does time quantify?

> > Secondly, how does this analogy relate to concepts such as time dilation?
>
> The analogy wasn't intended to relate to "time dilation".

I'll get back to this.

>
> >>>>So you don't like the answer "spacetime curvature causes clocks to lose
> >>>>time"? Why not? It's logical. Suppose a clock would register a
> >>>>certain elapsed time in a flat spacetime model, and suppose the elapsed
> >>>>time registered is reduced when the only change to the model is the
> >>>>introduction of a curved spacetime, doesn't it follow that the lost time
> >>>>is attributable to the curvature?
> >>
> >>>Not if the curvature is just an intellectual concept. IOW, let's say we construct a
> >
> > graph
> >
> >>>(i.e., a mathematical concept born in the mind) which is used to assist us with
> >>>quantification and predictions and the like, and then in order to assure that the
> >
> > graph
> >
> >>>remains valid, we *curve* it to remain consistent with predictions and observable
> >
> > results.
> >
> >>>Is it then valid to say that the results are caused by the curved graph?
> >>
> >>No. "Graph" is not an element of the model like e.g. "curved spacetime"
> >>is. A graph is a representation of a particular relationship between
> >>quantifiable entities - it doesn't make sense to talk about it having an
> >>effect on the entities.
> >
> >
> > Exactly. It's not valid to say that the curvature of the graph caused anything. So
how
> > does the curvature of spacetime, which is also just a mathematical construct, caused
> > anything?
>
> No again. My point was that "graph" and "spacetime" aren't equivalent
> structures within the models. Because "spacetime" is an entitiy of the
> model, it makes sense that it could affect other elements of the model.
> However "graphs" are not entities of the model (they're descriptions
> of relationships between quantitative entities), so they can't have an
> affect on the model's elements.

I'll refer to the arguments I've made above instead of having the same debate twice, just
with different words.

> >> That's
> >>
> >>>backwards. The results are caused by something, but not a concept. The problem I
> >
> > have is
> >
> >>>that now that we've fooled ourselves into thinking we've actually answered a
question,
> >
> > we
> >
> >>>move on. We forget the question. What *caused* the clock to *lose time*?
> >>
> >>There's no "fooling" going on. The "causes" of the lost time are the
> >>assumptions that logically lead to that result in the models that have
> >>been created to imitate clock behavior. Such causes aren't unique - the
> >>same model can be configured in a variety of ways, each of which will
> >>provide a different "explanation". However, explanation isn't the goal
> >>- prediction is.
> >
> >
> > I don't have much of a problem with any of that. If you'll recall, my argument has
always
> > been that time is just a concept, and as such, is not physical. However, I do take
issue
> > that explanation isn't the goal of science. We create theories (i.e., predictions)
and we
> > test them. Then reliable theories result in speculative explanations which become the
> > next theory. IOW, we do all of this in oder to understand that which affects us, and
> > inherent in understanding is explanation. The prediction that the moon will appear
larger
> > in the early evening than it will late a t night is madfe and verified. This leads to
the
> > question as to why it does that, and an explanation which becomes the next theory.
>
> Well, obviously "Science" doesn't have a goal. The people who do
> science have goals which, just as obviously, aren't all the same. I
> described what I believe to be the prevelant view at present (goal =
> prediction).
>
> The "why questions" have answers only within models. In fact,
> essentially all discussion in Physics concerns the entities of models.
> The only time the "real world" comes into play is when it's necessary to
> "collect a sample" for comparison against what's been anticipated by a
> model.

I've got the whole model thing. In fact, I've described it here plenty of times. We
agree on that. But I don't see that I've said anything which is inconstant with that
notion, or which is negated by it. IMO, to say that the pursuit of science has no goal
leads to the very errors which I argue we're committing. We may as well build models of
fantasies and cartoons if science has no goal, and those who believe that it has no goal
are doing just that.

How do you suppose we began this endeavor? We crawled out from under the rocks, saw the
sun, and set about the task of figuring out what it was. We attempted to predict if night
would come, and if day would return. We attempted to predict where we could find food.
We attempted to predict when it would be cold, and when it would be hot. We attempted to
predict where a stone would land if we threw it. On and on. We built a model of what we
observed by creating theories. Nothing has changed from then until now except that we've
built a much more sophisticated and reliable model. But the goal is that same. We
attempt to build an ever broader model of an ever widening set of observables, and we do
so because we want to better understand the phenomena which affect us.

> > Post the question as to why a clock will appear to have lost time after having gone on
a
> > trip, and see what you get for answers.
>
> The answer is "because it does". It just happens to be what happens.

I can at least live with that one. But many of your compadres here with give time
dialtion as the reason, and it is to those assertions I reply.

> Models get created for the purpose of imitating the behavior that Nature
> happens to make happen, but although the behavior of the entities in
> models (e.g. lost time) can be explained, those explanations don't carry
> over into Nature, regardless of how "reliable" the models happen to be.

I know.

>
> >>>Time is a mathematical concept.
> >>
> >>Only in the sense that "time" can be the interpretation of a variable in
> >>some mathematical theory. Of course, every measurement can be
> >>considered a "mathematical concept" in this sense.
> >>
> >>
> >>>>But Science doesn't misunderstand what space and time are - they're
> >>>>precisly defined in the models that use them (in the language of
> >>>>mathematics of course). The confusion is yours.
> >>
> >>>Maybe, but tell me how time is different than splat rays. Show me how time is
> >
> > physical
> >
> >>>such that it can't be confused as I've explained above.
> >>
> >>"Time" is a measurement - it's the physical representation that appears
> >>on a measuring device known as a clock. "Splat rays" are an
> >>"explanation" for measurements.
> >>
> >>
> >>>>You say there's a *clear* distinction between physical and conceptual.
> >>>>So what is it? It should be a rule that will permit the unambiguous
> >>>>classification of anything into one category or the other (or "none of
> >>>>the above").
> >>
> >>>That which is capable of affecting us (e.g., stimulating our senses), either directly
> >
> > or
> >
> >>>indirectly, is physical. As I explained, that was the whole goal of physics to begin
> >>>with.
> >>
> >>"Things that can stimulate senses" is all-inclusive. Everything that
> >>can be referred to has the potential to stimulate senses.
> >
> >
> > That definition is the line between what is physical and what is not. I can refer to
> > mathematics, but that isn't physical. I can refer to Mickey Mouse, but that's an
> > abstraction. I can refer to lying, but that's a concept. Only that which stimulates
our
> > senses is physical.
>
> Each of your examples is capable of stimulating the senses. In fact,
> "recognition" isn't possible in the absence of sense stimulation, so the
> only things that don't stimulate senses are those things that we're
> oblivious of, and the "things" that *everyone* is oblivious of can't be
> considered to be elements of reality.

I don't buy it. A cartoon only stimulates the senses to the extent that it affects us
intellectually, and then the emotions which ensue affect us physically. But without the
intellectual aspect of it, there would have been no effect whatsoever. Physics isn't
concerned with cartoons (yet) because of the recognition that the cartoon (not the means
of conveying it) is just a concept. It cannot affect our bodies exept to the extent that
it affects our intellect first. And there's also the recognition that there's no sense in
studying them because they were born of the imagination of the mind. It is those types of
entities which we must assure that do not weave their way into the model.
>
> >>>>Sorry, but you don't get to redefine the terms.
> >>
> >>>I, just like anyone else, get to challenge conventional wisdom of current
definitions.
> >>
> >>There's no "wisdom" associated with definitions (other than "semantical
> >>wisdom"). Definitions sre simply word substitutions.
> >>
> >>
> >>>>The generally accepted
> >>>>definition of "counting" doesn't infer that the counter has to be aware
> >>>>of the underlying "meaning" of the process. If you want to draw such a
> >>>>distinction then you can invent your own word. E.g. "splatting" is the
> >>>>process whereby humans quantify with understanding and machines quantify
> >>>>without understanding.
> >>
> >>>But I didn't redefine anything. *Counting* is quantification, and the whole notion
of
> >
> > a
> >
> >>>quantity is a concept born in the human mind.
> >>
> >>Yes, "counting" can be considered a quantification, but whether or not
> >>only human minds are capable of performing it is what we're trying to
> >>ascertain - so don't presume it.
>
> > I haven't presumed anything with the possible exception of limiting concepts to
*human*
> > minds. Maybe I should eliminate that qualification. But machines don't have minds
and so
> > are incapable of conceptualization. Do you agree with that?
>
> No, but it's not relevant. "Conceptualization" has no applicability
> here. All that's of interest is quantification i.e. identifying the
> number of items in an collection. This act alone is what's implied by
> the word "counting".

Not so. Counting is more than mere identification. Counting is quantification. If
counting were just identification, then all we'd have to do is put unique labels on each
person who went through the turnstile. Those labels would identify the people. But just
because they have labels which look like *1, 2, 3* instead of *a, b, c* or *&, $, %*
doesn't mean that we've counted them. All it means is that we've identified them. That
part of it can be done by machine and is not an intellectual process. However, to advance
this process to quantification, which is how we first used the term in our *debate*,
requires the intellectual process of matching the concepts like *many* and *few* and
*large* and *small* as well as ordering the symbols in order to *determine* something
about the quantity. If counting was mere identification, then you'd have no issue with
using symbols like .......$,&,@,$,>,M,A,(,=........for that process, yet as you can see,
this would not achieve the goal.
>
> >>If a non-human "mind" can produce quantifications that are identical to
> >>those produced by humans, then it necessarily follows that the ability
> >>to count (i.e. quantify) isn't limited to human minds.
>
> > I'm not getting my point across. There's a difference between what we euphemistically
> > refer to as *keeping count* and actual counting.
>
> No there's not. Apparently you imagine one, but you're mistaken.
> Counting is quantification, pure and simple - the association of a
> positive integer (or a series of them) with a collection. That's the
> whole of it.

You just made my point. Those integers are not mere symbols. They denote a qunatity
which the mind must conceptualize.

>
> This issue arose between us because you
> > tried to demonstrate that time was physical because clocks could count, and the
operation
> > of a clock was physical. My response was that although the operation of a clock is
> > physical, the quantification which is attributed to the symbols produced by the clock
was
> > an intellectual one. So I guess that leaves us with whether or not quantification is
an
> > intellectual process. Do you *think* it is?
>
> That's what the experiment I proposed is designed to ascertain.
> Quantification is a process which only humans are capable of - unless of
> course, there exists a non-human, which is also capable of performing it.

And machines are not capable of quantification for the reasons I've stated.

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