Re: path-dependence: a philosophical issue concerning time

On Dec 1, 6:56 am, Haines Brown <bro...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
I raised a question on Markov processes for which I didn't receive much
help, and so let me approach my concern from a different angle.

Mathematical fields such as Markov process, ergodic theory,
etc. describe or model the successive states of a system as they exist
in time. This represents successive states along a time line that are
all presumed to be real for the observer.

However, today there is serious doubt that there is a time dimension
(Mellor, Real Time II, for example), but rather time is merely an
extrinsic property of systems. At any moment in time (which can only be
the present because the phrase is being indexed in the present), the
past no longer exists and the future has yet to come. So the past and
the future must be represented as aspects of the present and not
hypostatized as real entities. This point may be troubling in physics,
but it's almost a commonplace in historiography, where historians tend
to seek how-explanations (constraints on possibilities conveyed by
narrative) rather than why-explanations (causality).

Assuming for the moment that only the present exists at present is true,
then how can there be a path dependence? Does that imply a determination
by what does not exist? True, if we were to represent a sequence of
states in memory, we can see that each successive state influenced the
next, and so construct a trajectory in thought. But what is the relation
of such a thought object to the world?

In what sense can this trajectory really be a causal force if the past
no longer exists in the present? A sensible conclusion might be that the
effect of that past can only be a net effect or outcome that exists in
the present. In historiography, the past is refered to as "traces" that
exist in the present. Even persistence can be causally explained
(although causal theories of persistence are contentious) and not
the effect of something transcendental.

This would seem to imply that in terms of objective reality (assuming
this notion to be valid) there can be no path dependence. If there's no
path dependence, then it would seem to make no sense (outside
mathematical modeling and human memory) to use the term path
independence either, since all processes would be path independent
because the past is forgotten and there is no real path in relation to
the present, but only as an imagined reconstruction of the past.

I suppose a simple example of path dependence would help, and in fact
the definition of this request is itself interesting. That is, can
anyone offer an example where information concerning a trajectory of
past states well separated from the present informs a present system
_and is not_ already implicit the definition of the present system? Does
this definition of an example show that a presumption of path
dependence to be a kind of idealism?

--

Haines Brown, KB1GRM

I think Occam's razor helps here. The issue of the "reality" of the
past is reduced to a question of the "simplicity" of the required
assumptions. Understanding it correctly implies a mature recognition
of the fact that all objective existence is posited and contingent on
observation and therefore not fundamental or absolute and not
existential but essential and constantly in the possibility of being
disproved. It must also include a mature realization of the vast
stability of the essent and the degree to which it has allowed
scientific theorizing which at its heart is predictive and therefore
temporal as well as its limitations. Scientific theory is _in fact_
true and therefore, by virtue of its "factual" "contingent" connection
through experiment to reality in the mode of "having always been true
whenever we have checked" and therefore "really" true. However its
predictive power is not absolute and the possibility of future failure
to confirm the theories are an important part of appreciating their
meaning and understanding their limitation. This must include as much
a realization of the massive degree to which the theories are in fact
confirmed and the degree to which they are predictive. One must also
be aware of the advanced scientific notions of time which do not
correspond to our naive convictions. However, always, the theories are
predictive and therefore temporal. A non- predictive scientific theory
is unscientific as it does not allow confirmation through future
experiment. (It is interesting whether a theory that claims to explain
past events only and admits no possibility of future confirmation, to
include future review of the past experimental basis would be called
scientific. I vote no.) One must also recognize the possibility of,
and the reality of, more absolute experiences of existence to even
include the possibility of communication(ion) with(in) existence and
other experiences of time. All of these together allows one to think
in a non-contradictory way about being and removes the "non-
inuitiveness" of advanced scientific theories even ones in which a
naive concept of time is no longer is relevant.

Check this out:

http://www.ma.utexas.edu/mp_arc/c/08/08-62.pdf

as well as her latter posts.

.

Relevant Pages

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    (sci.physics)
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