Re: Apollo One, the FBI, and Scott Grissom
From: rk (stellare_at_NOSPAMPLEASE.erols.com)
Date: 06/07/04
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Date: 07 Jun 2004 04:56:18 GMT
LaDonna Wyss wrote:
> Actually, the metal bracket and the pitting are red herrings. If you
> really want the "meat" of the issue, remember the slide Borman showed
> on page 79 where he says it is the wire that is the most "likely"
> source of ignition? Notice he did not mention what that wire
> controlled. 30 pages later, when the congressmen asked if that wire
> controlled communications, Maxime Faget replied that no, it controlled
> the +yaw thrusters on the Service Module. Interesting because I've
> been saying for over a year that fire started at 6:09 in the Service
> Module when Gus tried to pulse that +yaw jet.
Question rk4: Name of document you are referring to with url if on-line.
Or paste in the text.
Question rk5: Supporting telemetry? E.g., show locations of temperature
sensors, how often sampled, and values from telemetry.
Question rk6: Show mechanism how a short to ground in the Command Module
causes a fire in the Service Module.
> The first time he fired
> it nothing happened; he had to fire it a second time. Three minutes
> later Roger points something out to him (the voice transcript is
> chopped up by NASA so it doesn't say WHAT he pointed out), but right
> after that all three crew members start playing musical face plates.
> They open their visors repeatedly up THROUGH the first call of "fire"
> (that call came from Gus; ECU data indicated his face plate was open
> until the end of the transmission--source, Bell Labs voice tape
> analysis to an accuracy of 100%.)
> You see, the short on that A/C roll switch caused problems on every
> system downstream of that short.
Question rk7: Name the systems downstreams of the short, the problems
encountered, and the explain the mechanisms for how the
short caused the problems.
> I would have to give you a lesson on
> how to fly the CSM to give you the exact significance of that short
> and the thruster in question, but basically during the Rotation
> Control portion of the Static Fire test there is only one maneuver
> during which Main B is closed (the circuit with the short in
> question): +yaw.
> I'm sure I'll get 5,000 responses/questions to this, so let me try and
> finish answering the current posts before the deluge begins. :-)
> LaDonna
It is your choice whether or not to answer questions or to spend your time on
other things. See Derek's comments.
-- rk, Just an OldEngineer "Dealing properly with very rare events is one of the attributes that distinguishes a design that is fit for safety-critical systems from one that is not." -- John Rushby in "A Comparison of Bus Architectures for Safety- Critical Embedded Systems," March 2003
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