Re: troll (assumed) responses

From: Herb Schaltegger (herbschaltegger_at_spamtrap.invalid)
Date: 06/09/04 

Date: Tue, 08 Jun 2004 20:20:43 -0500

In article <4821518f.0406081548.55b26f29@posting.google.com>,
 hpywife927@yahoo.com (LaDonna Wyss) wrote:

> Well, this sounds like an intelligent post. I have twelve years with
> your interest in space history. Unfortunately I lost my ability to
> "shoot the breeze" when I read NASA's official account of the Apollo
> One fire on December 5, 2002. Have you read it? If so, surely you
> see how their arguments have more holes than a sieve. If for some
> reason you need them to be pointed out to you, here are a few problems
> (by far not all). This is just a partial list of the things that got
> my attention from the report NASA has on their Internet site:
> 1) The O2 surges. NASA says they could not identify a source of the
> surges, so they attributed them to "crew movement."

Says you.

"Any significant crew movement results in minor motion of the Command
Module. This motion is detected by the Guidance and Navigation System
and is indicative of crew movement; however, the type of movement cannot
be determined. Data from this system indicate a slight movement at
23:30:24 GMT with more intense activity beginning at 23:30:39 GMT. More
movement begins at 23:31:00 GMT and continues until loss of data
transmission during the fire.

"Increases of oxygen flow rate to the crew suits also indicate movement.
All suits have some small leakage. This leakage rate varies with crew
positions. Earlier in the Plugs-Out Test, the crew reported that a
particular movement, the nature of which was unspecified, provided
increased flow rate. This is also confirmed from the flow rate data
records. The flow rate shows a gradual rise at 23:30:24 GMT which
reaches the limit of the sensor at 23:30:59 GMT."

> However, Ed
> reported on the voice transcript they were happening "pretty well
> cyclic, and the last was about 13 minutes ago." Additionally, each
> surge (there were at least ten) maxed the O2 flow to capacity, and
> triggered the C&W on multiple occasions; said C&W having a 15-second
> built-in delay to prevent routine flow variations from triggering the
> alarm. Finally, if NASA wishes to sell a "flash fire, ‘fueled' by
> oxygen", shouldn't it go to a little more trouble to get to the bottom
> of repeated surges in the O2?

NASA doesn't have to "sell" a flash fire, lady. The condition of the
vehicle and crew remains following the fire, combined with the known
atmospheric composition of 100% oxygen, sells itself.

> 2) Gus not hitting the dump valve because of the "wall of flames"
> preventing him from doing so. Aside from the evidence that shows the
> fire initially sat in the LEB for eight seconds (the surge tank
> pressure did not drop until 12.4 seconds into the fire), Gus had his
> faceplate open from 6:30.85 THROUGH the first call of fire, which came
> from Gus (source: Bell Labs Voice Tape Analysis.) If this thing
> flamed up as quickly as NASA claims, I don't know about you,
> Commander, but I would have immediately closed MY faceplate, and I
> certainly would NOT have taken the time to say, "Break" followed by a
> ONE POINT SEVEN SECOND PAUSE, followed by "We've got a fire in the
> cockpit." (Again, Bell Labs Voice Tape Analysis.)

What makes you so certain his faceplate was open when he made the call
of "fire in the cockpit"?

"The Command Pilot was lying supine on the aft bulkhead or floor of the
Command Module, with his helmet visor closed and locked and with his
head beneath the Pilot's head rest and his feet on his own couch."

> Additionally, if
> Gus did not hit the dump valve, Ed was wasting his time trying to open
> the hatch, wasn't he? Yet Ed was found in front of the hatch, which
> means he WAS working on opening it. Finally, knowing Gus, a rabid
> grizzly bear would not have kept him from hitting that relief. (And
> if you need more proof, read the 102 pages of witness statements in
> the Congressional Record from technicians who all swore they heard the
> sound of that relief.)

Do you understand the ideal gas laws? What was the mode and methods of
operation of the cabin pressure relief valve? What was its design and
maximum flow rates?

"Although operation of this valve, located on a shelf above the left
hand equipment bay, is the first step in established emergency egress
procedures, such action would have been to no avail because the venting
capacity was insufficient to prevent the rapid build-up of pressure due
to the fire. It is estimated that opening the valve would have delayed
Command Module rupture by less than one second."

Furthermore:

"With a slightly higher pressure inside the Command Module than outside,
opening the inner hatch is impossible because of the resulting force on
the hatch. Thus the inability of the pressure relief system to cope with
pressure increase due to the fire made opening of the inner hatch
impossible until after cabin rupture, and after rupture the intense and
widespread fire together with rapidly increasing carbon monoxide
concentrations further prevented egress."

> 3) What happened after the fire made me see red. When technicians
> finally removed the hatch, Babbitt looked inside the CM, could not
> POSSIBLY have been able to see ANYTHING, and went hysterical. He
> decided the crew was dead, reported that fact to everyone, and
> according to NASA, everyone just took his word for it. According to
> NASA, the doctors arrived at the White Room at 6:45 and determined
> "the crew could not have survived the heat, smoke, and thermal burns."
> From the White Room? What I have noticed is that not one person has
> taken a pulse, no one has gotten out a stethoscope. They have LOOKED
> at three men in space suits and called it. EXCEPT for the fireman who
> used a technique I've never heard of but which intrigues me: By
> pulling on Ed White's leg, he was able to determine that Ed, Gus, AND
> Roger were ALL THREE DEAD!!! Fascinating. But the HORRIBLE truth,
> Commander, is this: According to the medical and security logs, as
> well as the statements of the doctors, nurses, firefighters, and
> security personnel on scene, when the doctors arrived at the base of
> the tower circa 6:37 they were ordered NOT to go to the Command
> Module. They in fact did NOT arrive until 7:02, THIRTY-ONE minutes
> after the fire.

What part of the following don't you understand?

"Throughout this period, other pad personnel were fighting secondary
fires on level A-8. There was considerable fear that the launch escape
tower, mounted above the Command Module, would be ignited by the fires
below and destroy much of the launch complex."

* * *
 
"Immediately after the firemen arrived, the Pad Leader on duty was
relieved to allow treatment for smoke inhalation. He had first reported
over the headset that he could not describe the situation in the Command
Module. In this manner he attempted to convey the fact that the crew was
dead to the Test Conductor without informing the many people monitoring
the communication channels. Upon reaching the ground the Pad Leader told
the doctors that the crew was dead. The three doctors proceeded to the
White Room and arrived there shortly after the arrival of the firemen.
The doctors estimate their arrival to have been at 23:45 GMT. The second
Pad Leader reported that medical support was available at approximately
23:43 GMT. The three doctors entered the White Room and determined that
the crew had not survived the heat, smoke, and thermal burns. The
doctors were not equipped with breathing apparatus, and the Command
Module still contained fumes and smoke. It was determined that nothing
could be gained by immediate removal of the crew. The firemen were
directed to stop removal efforts.

"When the Command Module had been adequately ventilated, the doctors
returned to the White Room with equipment for crew removal. It became
apparent that extensive fusion of suit material to melted nylon from the
spacecraft would make removal very difficult. For this reason it was
decided to discontinue efforts at removal in the interest of accident
investigation and to photograph the Command Module with the crew in
place before evidence was disarranged."

> 4) Finally, and again, I'm only scratching the surface of what I've
> learned in the past eighteen months, the list of so-called
> "anomalies." NASA lists six, although it turns out there were many
> more which were far more serious than the ones they list. The first
> thing I noticed about this list of "anomalies" is they all occur on
> the same bus, AC Bus 2, but NASA says they are all unrelated to each
> other. This portion of their report reads as follows: "We had this
> problem, but it had nothing to do with the fire. We had that problem,
> but it had nothing to do with the fire. We had this problem over
> here, we don't know WHAT that was, but we're SURE it had nothing to do
> with the fire. And, oh, BY THE WAY, we don't know WHAT caused the
> fire!"

That's not how it reads at all:

"1. FINDING:

       There was a momentary power failure at 23:30:55 GMT.
       Evidence of several arcs was found in the post-fire investigation.
       No single ignition source of the fire was conclusively identified.

 DETERMINATION:

 The most probable initiator was an electrical arc in the sector between
-Y and +Z spacecraft axes. The exact location best fitting the total
available information is near the floor in the lower forward section of
the left-hand equipment bay where Environmental Control System (ECS)
instrumentation power wiring leads into the area between the
Environmental Control Unit (ECU) and the oxygen panel. No evidence was
discovered that suggested sabotage."

Furthermore:

"10. FINDING:

 Deficiencies existed in Command Module design, workmanship and quality
control, such as:
       Components of the Environmental Control System installed in
Command Module 012 had a history of many removals and of technical
difficulties including regulator failures, line failures and
Environmental Control Unit failures. The design and installation
features of the Environmental Control Unit makes removal or repair
difficult.
       Coolant leakage at solder joints has been a chronic problem.
       The coolant is both corrosive and combustible.
       Deficiencies in design, manufacture, installation, rework and
            quality control existed in the electrical wiring.
       No vibration test was made of a complete flight-configured
            spacecraft.
       Spacecraft design and operating procedures currently require the
            disconnecting of electrical connections while powered.
       No design features for fire protection were incorporated."

Specifically in regard to AC Bus 2, the report reads:

"(2) AC Bus 2 Voltage Anomaly

 A momentary increase in AC Bus 2 voltage on all three phases was noted
at approximately 9 seconds before the report of fire, and at the same
time telemetry data from equipment powered from AC Bus 2 showed
abnormalities. These were:

   1. Dropout of C-band decoder and transmitter outputs for 1.7
          seconds.
   2. Momentary dropout of VHF-FM transmitter.
   3. Fluctuation of rotation controller null outputs.
   4. Gas chromatograph telemetry signal transient.

 Other equipment connected to AC Bus 2 at this time had no data
monitoring capability that would detect effects of power transients.

 The power distribution system was in the standard configuration at the
time of the anomaly. DC bus A was receiving power from the ground DC "A"
power supply. This power supply in turn powered AC Bus 1 through
inventor no. 1. Similarly DC Bus B received power from the DC "B" power
supply and powered AC bus 2 through inverter no. 2.

 A possible explanation for dropout of the C-band decoder and
transmitter, the interruption of the VHF-FM transmitter and rise in AC
Bus 2 voltage follows. The post-landing bus supplies power through a
single conductor and circuit breaker to the power relay holding coils
for both the C-band beacon and the VHF-FM transmitter. Temporary loss of
voltage to the relay holding coils by unknown cause, would temporarily
interrupt power to the C-band decoder and VHF-FM transmitter. The
resulting transient to the voltage level on AC Bus 2 could account for
other measured phenomena.

 The most probable cause of the AC Bus 2 transient and associated
indications was a momentary short or interruption of DC Bus B. Analysis
and subsequent testing correlate with this conclusion as follows:

 (a) AC Bus Transient

 This high voltage indication can be interpreted as evidence of a
momentary drop of DC voltage input to the inverter which results in a
drop in AC output and a subsequent overshoot upon recovery. First
indication of a disturbance was noted during apparent recovery. The
voltage decrease was not seen because the channel was sampled only 10
times a second.

 (b) C-band Beacon Dropout

 The 1.7 second dropout observed is the minimum recovery time of the
protective circuit internal to the beacon. A momentary interruption of
AC Bus 2 power for a period as short as 10 milliseconds would cause the
C-band beacon dropout. These results were verified by special tests on a
C-band beacon similar to the one used in Spacecraft 012. The most
probable cause of the beacon dropout was a momentary loss of AC input
power to the beacon particularly since the transponder dropout was
coincident with a transient on the AC Bus 2 and the beacon performed
normally after recovery from the dropout unit loss of data.

 (c) VHF-FM Transmitter Signal Dropout

 The RF carrier dropout was observed by all monitoring ground stations
and the duration of the dropout was approximately 20 milliseconds. The
recorded data wave train from the VHF-FM transmitter also indicated
dropout. A dropout of this nature has been duplicated by several special
tests with a similar transmitter under similar conditions. Because the
VHF transmitter recovered, the most probable cause of the dropout was a
momentary interruption of the AC input power.

 (d) Rotation Controller Null Output Transients

 Momentary transients were noted on each of the three control axes. The
rotation controller, whose output was reading slightly off null just
prior to the anomaly (the controller was pinned), was supplied by phase
A of AC Bus 2. Transient voltages on the phase A Bus would most likely
be detected on the controller output. Special tests have shown that the
null output transients experienced can be duplicated by a momentary
interruption of AC Bus 2 phase power.

 (e) Gas Chromatograph Telemetry Signal Transient

 As previously discussed this transient could result from a change in
the electromagnetic field. Such a change in the electromagnetic field
could also be the result of electric arcing."

So, LaDonna, if you actually understood anything technical rather than
parroting the big words someone has been feeding you, you'd realize just
how wrong your conclusions are. 

-- 
Herb Schaltegger, B.S., J.D.
Reformed Aerospace Engineer
Columbia Loss FAQ:
<http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html>
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