Re: What was the biggest problem for each of the 2 destroyed US space shuttles?

From: Jay Windley (webmaster_at_clavius.org)
Date: 09/13/04 

Date: Mon, 13 Sep 2004 17:18:37 -0600

"Derek Lyons" <fairwater@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:41472551.3618851@supernews.seanet.com...
|
| His thesis attempts (not without success) to show *why* the
| engineers were ignored when they executed an abrupt about face
| one the eve of Challenger's launch.

Yes. At least someone is listening. *Why* were the engineers ignored? The
witch-hunt method of finding the one or two persons believed to be
villainously responsible, and eliminating them, has a meager chance of
success of eliminating the true problems. Unless we understand why the
engineers and managers did what they did, we stand to lose another orbiter
and crew by playing out the same systemic scenario with a different cast of
engineers and managers.

(Whoops, that already happened.)

The Rodgers Commission is not the sum of all possible analysis on the
Challenger accident. In fact, it's not even the sum of all governmental
investigation. The House committee's investigation reach significantly
different conclusions on other points, such as the level and nature of
communication by those involved with the SRB O-ring problem. I think those
opinions are also worth paying attention to.

Scenarios that paint engineers as slipstick-wielding heroes and managers as
amoral schedule-grubbers just don't ring true to me. That's not how people
behave in real life. I believe that all involved generally want to do the
right thing, and so when something like this happens it's an indication of
different ideas about what the "right thing" is supposed to be. There
should be consensus. When there is instead conflict, we need to look at the
point of conflict but also at the road that led to it. It doesn't have to
be about blame, althought it might end up that way. 

-- 
                                          |
The universe is not required to conform   |  Jay Windley
to the expectations of the ignorant.      |  webmaster @ clavius.org

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