Re: NASA Astronaut on Columbia Repair (and others)

Wow dale, henry, neil, pat, scott, and greg, oh yeah I cant forget
about george, now that the goon roll call has been taken, and all you
close buddies seem be here and acting as a usenet trolling group. And
I guess your school yard mentality has not changed but never the less
you all are acting like a clan of trolls, as anybody can see your on
topic stuff when you care to sound intellectual, and you're trash
here attempting to taint this topic.
Not the right thread, as the original post was pertaining to an
astronauts statements, so keep your off topic split personality
trolling rants to you're opinion based gossip columns where they
belong.

http://www.stpns.net/view_article.html?articleId=21543251064362304

Gutierrez said the fault lies in two words - engineering arrogance.

"NASA engineers were confident that they did everything right,"
Gutierrez said. "They were so sure everything would work as planned
they didn't think an escape system was necessary. The fact is, if
there had been an escape system on Columbia and Challenger, the crews
could have survived."

Actually the design shortcomings of the shuttle system had been known
for along time before the challenger tragedy, (ie no crew escape system
for more than a small percentage of the crew if in place, and only
usable for a small percentage of the flight) and therefore it is the
responsibility of managers and engineers to operate the space shuttle
system safely within it's known parameters, (ie launching on jan 28
1986 was a managerial decision to launch in the coldest wheather
despite engineers recommendations not to launch, and inspite of
evidence of srb "o-ring" burnthrough on the previous launch
sts-61c).


The purpose of establishing the independent technical authority within
nasa is so that "All programs should have the benefit of an
independent engineering authority to ensure that technical standards
are being met" according to the diaz report to the caib and that a
flights readiness is independently verified. Now implementing the
recommendations contained in the diaz report to the caib, in
conjunction with a full quantitative risk assessment of the shuttle
system would provide nasa managers the communication structure,
information, and technology to manage and understand the technical
input from engineers up and down the decision making process in
determining flight readiness. Providing an independent authority in
backing minority opinions who are opposed to declaring a flight is
ready, should help improve communications and speed up the process for
flight readiness determination as managers will have assistance in
correlating the minority opinion with things such as previously granted
waivers.. The establishment of the independent technical authority is
a definite step in a positive direction for nasa, as they are currently
implementing a partial quantitative risk assessment (qra), but a full
shuttle system qra will assist nasa engineers and managers in operating
the shuttle safely within it's capabilities throughout the fleets
retirement process.

Diaz report to the caib page and pertinent factors
Diaz report to the caib page a-9
Caib report recomnedations
Engineering Authority that is responsible for technical requirements
and all waivers tto them, and will build a disciplined, systematic
approach to identifying, analyzing, and controlling hazards throughout
the life cycle of the Shuttle System. The independent technical
authority does the following as a minimum:
· Develop and maintain technical standards for all Space Shuttle
Program projects and elements
· Be the sole waiver-granting authority for all technical standards
· Conduct trend and risk analysis at the sub-system, system, and
enterprise levels
· Own the failure mode, effects analysis and hazard reporting systems
· Conduct integrated hazard analysis
· Decide what is and is not an anomalous event
· Independently verify launch readiness
· Approve the provisions of the recertification program called for in
Recommendation R9.1-1
The Technical Engineering Authority should be funded directly from NASA
Headquarters, and should have no connection to or responsibility for
schedule or program cost.

Diaz summary discussion
All programs should have the benefit of an independent engineering
authority to ensure that technical standards are being met. No programs
should have the ability to waive technical standards or compromise a
standard without the review and approval of an appropriate engineering
authority. All projects and programs should conduct risk analysis
consistent with Agency policy regarding risk management. All Centers
should have the capability in either their engineering or Safety and
Mission Assurance (SMA) organizations to perform and or review failure
modes and effects analysis, and hazard analysis. For manned and
unmanned flights and launches, Centers should establish flight,
mission, or launch readiness certification processes that include
verification by the independent engineering and SMA organizations.
Independence is defined as both organizational (outside the operations,
project or program structure) as well as financial (funding allocation
decisions made or approved) at the first organizational level that owns
both the operation, project or program and the center engineering and
SMA"


tom

Pat Flannery wrote:
Greg D. Moore (Strider) wrote:


Under his breath one could hear the rising cry of "Grond, Grond, Grond!"

Finally, doing 98, he crashed through the gate....




The horrible thing about the car was how quiet and completely detached
from the road driving it was.
You just turned the wheel, and outside the windshield the view changed.
You kept getting the feeling that if you did hit something, the
windshield would suddenly go black, and the words "Game Over - Deposit
Another Fifty Cents" would appear.
That thing's hood was about the size and weight of my Festiva.
Here's a picture of one of them BTW:
http://www.autoaubaine.com/auto-pics/15311/1.jpg
Mine was white, like Moby ***. And just about as friendly.
It looked like this:
http://memimage.cardomain.net/member_images/1/web/625000-625999/625589_5.jpg
It came with a free Ford 8-track demo tape, and somehow that was the
ideal thing to get with this particular vehicle.
We bought it used, and that 8-track demo tape was still with it, unplayed.
You know what happened to the classic Thunderbird?
It got hooked on Quaaludes, that's what happened to the classic Thunderbird.
Then it let itself go, tuned into a 8-track tape, and dropped out.
The Captain And Tennille used to sing sad songs about when this happened
to cars.

Pat



Pat







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