Full Text of "APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD", The Cortright Report
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REPORT OF APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD
The Honorable Thomas 0. Paine
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546
June 15, 1970
Dear Dr. Paine:
Pursuant to your directives of April 17 and April 21, 1970, I am
transmitting the final Report of the Apollo 13 Review Board.
Concurrent with this transmittal, I have recessed the Board, subject
to call.
We plan to reconvene later this year when most of the remaining
special
tests have been completed, in order to review the results of these
tests
to determine whether any modifications to our findings,
determinations, or
recommendations are necessary. In addition, we will stand ready to
reconvene at your request.
Sincerely yours,
Edgar M. Cortright
Preface
The Apollo 13 accident, which aborted man's third mission to
explore
the surface of the Moon, is a harsh reminder of the immense difficulty
of
this undertaking.
The total Apollo system of ground complexes, launch vehicle, and
spacecraft constitutes the most ambitious and demanding engineering
development ever undertaken by man. For these missions to succeed,
both
men and equipment must perform to near perfection. That this system
has
already resulted in two successful lunar surface explorations is a
tribute
to those men and women who conceived, designed, built, and flew it.
Perfection is not only difficult to achieve, but difficult to
maintain. The imperfection in Apollo 13 constituted a near disaster,
averted only by outstanding performance on the part of the crew and
the
ground control team which supported them.
The Apollo 13 Review Board was charged with the responsibilities
of
reviewing the circumstances surrounding the accident, of establishing
the
probable causes of the accident, of assessing the effectiveness of
flight
recovery actions, of reporting these findings, and of developing
recommendations for corrective or other actions. The Board has made
every
effort to carry out its assignment in a thorough, objective, and
impartial
manner. In doing so, the Board made effective use of the failure
analyses
and corrective action studies carried out by the Manned Spacecraft
Center
and was very impressed with the dedication and objectivity of this
effort.
The Board feels that the nature of the Apollo 13 equipment
failure
holds important lessons which, when applied to future missions, will
contribute to the safety and effectiveness of manned space flight.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
PREFACE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 - AUTHORITIES
Memorandum, April 17, 1970, from Administrator and
Deputy Administrator to Mr. Edgar M. Cortright
Memorandum, April 21, 1970, from Administrator and
Deputy Administrator to Mr. Edgar M. Cortright
Memorandum, April 20, 1970, from Administrator and
Deputy Administrator to Dr. Charles D. Harrington,
Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Memorandum, April 20, 1970, from Administrator to
Mr. Dale D. Myers, Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight
NASA Management Instruction 8621.1, Subject:
Mission Failure Investigation Policy and Procedures,
April 14, 1966
NASA Management Instruction 1156.14, Subject:
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, December 7, 1967 . . .
CHAPTER 2 - BOARD HISTORY AND PROCEDURES
Part 1. Summary of Board History and Procedures
Part 2. Biography of Board Members, Observers, and Panel Chairmen
Part 3. Board Organization and General Assignments for Board Panels
Part 4. Summary of Board Activities
CHAPTER 3 - DESCRIPTION OF APOLLO 13 SPACE VEHICLE AND
MISSION
Part 1. Apollo/Saturn V Space Vehicle
Part 2. Apollo 13 Mission Description
Chapter 4 - REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF APOLLO 13 ACCIDENT
Part 1. Introduction
Part 2. Oxygen Tank No. History
Part 3. Apollo 13 Flight
Part 4. Summary Analysis of the Accident
Part 5. Apollo 13 Recovery
CHAPTER 5 - FINDINGS, DETERMINATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Part 1. Introduction
Part 2. Assessment of Accident
Part 3. Supporting Considerations
Part 4. Recommendations
APPENDIX A - BASELINE DATA: APOLLO 13 FLIGHT SYSTEMS AND
OPERATIONS
APPENDIX B - REPORT OF MISSION EVENTS PANEL
APPENDIX C - REPORT OF MANUFACTURING AND TEST PANEL
APPENDIX D - REPORT OF DESIGN PANEL
APPENDIX E - REPORT OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT PANEL
APPENDIX F - SPECIAL TESTS AND ANALYSES
APPENDIX G - BOARD ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
APPENDIX H - BOARD RELEASES AND PRESS STATEMENTS
CHAPTER 1
AUTHORITIES
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON. D.C 20546
April 17, 1970
TO : Mr. Edgar M. Cortright
SUBJECT : Establishment of Apollo 13 Review Board
REFERENCES: (a) NMI 8621.1 - Mission Failure Investigation Policy
and Procedures
(b) NMI 1156.14 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
1. It is NASA policy as stated in Reference (a) "to investigate and
document the causes of all major mission failures which occur in the
conduct of its space and aeronautical activities and to take
appropriate
corrective actions as a result of the findings and recommendations."
2. Because of the serious nature of the accident of the Apollo 13
spacecraft which jeopardized human life and caused failure of the
Apollo
13 lunar mission, we hereby establish the Apollo 13 Review Board
(hereinafter referred to as the Board) and appoint you Chairman. The
members of the Board will be qualified senior individuals from NASA
and
other Government agencies. After consultation with you, we will:
(a) Appoint the members of the Board and make any subsequent
changes
necessary for the effective operation of the Board: and
(b) Arrange for timely release of information on the operations,
findings, and recommendations of the Board to the Congress, and,
through
the NASA Office of Public Affairs, to the public. The Board will
report
its findings and recommendations directly to us.
3. The Board will:
(a) Review the circumstances surrounding the accident to the
spacecraft which occurred during the flight of Apollo 13 and the
subsequent flight and ground actions taken to recover, in order to
establish the probable cause or causes of the accident and assess the
effectiveness of the recovery actions.
(b) Review all factors relating to the accident and recovery
actions
the Board determines to be significant and relevant, including
studies,
findings, recommendations, and other actions that have been or may be
undertaken by the program offices, field centers, and contractors
(c) Direct such further specific investigations as may be
necessary.
(d) Report as soon as possible its findings relating to the cause
or
causes of the accident and the effectiveness of the flight and ground
recovery actions.
(e) Develop recommendations for corrective or other actions,
based
upon its findings and determinations or conclusions derived
therefrom.
(f) Document its findings, determinations, and recommendations
and
submit a final report.
4. As Chairman of the Board you are delegated the following powers:
(a) To establish such procedures for the organization and
operation
of the Board as you find most effective; such procedures shall be part
of
the Board's records. The procedures shall be furnished the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel for its review and comment.
(b) To establish procedures to assure the execution of your
responsibilities in your absence.
(c) To designate such representatives, consultants, experts,
liaison
officers, observers, or other individuals as required to support the
activities of the Board. You shall define their duties and
responsibilities as part of the Board's records.
(d) To keep us advised periodically concerning the organization,
procedures, operations of the Board and its associated activities.
5. By separate action we are requesting the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel established by Reference (b) to review both the procedures and
findings of the Board and submit its independent report to us.
6. By separate action we are directing the Associate Administrator for
Manned Space Flight to:
(a) Assure that all elements of the Office of Manned Space Flight
cooperate fully with the Board and provide records, data, and
technical
support as requested.
(b) Undertake through the regular OMSF organization such reviews,
studies, and supporting actions as are required to develop
recommendations
to us on corrective measures to be taken prior to the Apollo 14
mission
with respect to hardware, operational procedures, and other aspects of
the
Apollo program.
7. All elements of NASA will cooperate with the Board and provide full
support within their areas of responsibility.
George M. Low
Deputy Administrator
T. O. Paine
Administrator
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20546
Office of the Administrator April 21, 1970
TO: Mr. Edgar M. Cortright
SUBJECT: Membership of Apollo 13 Review Board
Reference: Memorandum to you of April 17, subject: Establishment of
Apollo 13 Review Board
In accordance with paragraph 2(a) of Reference (a), the membership of
the
Apollo 13 Review Board is established as follows:
Members:
Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman (Director, Langley Research Center)
Mr. Robert F. Allnutt (Assistant to the Administrator, NASA Hqs.)
Mr. Neil Armstrong (Astronaut, Manned Spacecraft Center)
Dr. John F. Clark (Director, Goddard Space Flight Center)
Brig. General Walter R. Hedrick, Jr. (Director of Space, DCS/RED,
Hqs., USAF)
Mr. Vincent L. Johnson (Deputy Associate Administrator-Engineering,
Office of Space Science and Applications)
Mr. Milton Klein (Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion
Office)
Dr. Hans M. Mark, Director, Ames Research Center)
Counsel:
Mr. George Malley (Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center)
OMSF Technical Support:
Mr. Charles W. Mathews (Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of
Manned Space Flight)
Observers:
Mr. William A. Anders (Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics
and Space Council)
Dr. Charles D. Harrington (Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel)
Mr. I. I. Pinkel (Director, Aerospace Safety Research and
Data Institute, Lewis Research Center)
Congressional Liaison:
Mr. Gerald J. Mossinghoff (Office of Legislative Affairs, NASA Hqs.)
Public Affairs Liaison:
Mr. Brian Duff (Public Affairs Officer. Manned Spacecraft Center)
In accordance with applicable NASA instruction, you are authorized to
appoint such experts and additional consultants as are required for
the
effective operations of the Board.
George M. Low
Deputy Administrator
T. O. Paine
Administrator
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546
April 20, 1970
Office of the Administrator
T0 : Dr. Charles D. Harrington
Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
SUBJECT: Review of Procedures and Findings of Apollo 13 Review
Board
Attachment: (a) Memorandum dated April 17, 1970, to Mr. Edgar M.
Cortright,
Subject: Establishment of Apollo 13 Review Board
References: (a) Section 6, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Authorization Act, 1968
(b) NMI 1156.14 - Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
1. In accordance with References (a) and (b), the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel (hereafter referred to as the Panel) is requested to
review
the procedures and findings of the Apollo 13 Review Board (hereafter
referred to as the Board) established by Attachment (a).
2. The procedures established by the Board will be made available to
the
Panel for review and comment as provided in paragraph 4(a) of
Attachment
(a).
3. As Chairman of the Panel, you are designated an Observer on the
Board.
In this capacity, you, or another member of the Panel designated by
you,
are authorized to be present at those regular meetings of the Board
you
desire to attend. You are also authorized to receive oral progress
reports from the Chairman of the Board or his designee from time to
time
to enable you to keep the Panel fully informed on the work of the
Board.
4. The final report and any interim reports of the Board will be made
available promptly to the Panel for its review.
5. The Panel is requested to report to us on the procedures and
findings
of the Board at such times and in such form as you consider
appropriate,
but no later than 10 days after the submission to us of the final
report
of the Board.
George M. Low, Deputy Administrator T. O. Paine, Administrator
Enclosure
cc: Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman, Apollo 13 Review Board
M/Mr. Dale Myers
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C 20546
April 20, 1970
OFFICE or THE ADMINISTRATOR
TO : Mr. Dale D. Myers
Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight
SUBJECT : Apollo 13 Review
References: (a) Memorandum dated April 17, 1970, to Mr. Edgar M.
Cortright,
subject: Establishment of Apollo 13 Review Board
(b) Memorandum dated April 20, 1970, to Dr. Charles D.
Harrington, subject: Review of Procedures and Findings
of Apollo 13 Review Board
1. As indicated in paragraph 6 of Reference (a), you are directed to:
(a) Assure that all elements of the Office of Manned Space Flight
cooperate fully with the Board in providing records, data, and
technical
support as requested.
(b) Undertake through the regular OMSF organization such reviews,
studies,
and supporting actions as are required to develop timely
recommendations
to us on corrective measures to be taken prior to the Apollo 14
mission
with respect to hardware, operational procedures, flight crews, and
other
aspects of the Apollo Program
2. The recommendations referred to in paragraph l(b) above should be
submitted to us in such form and at such time as you deem appropriate,
but
a report should be submitted no later than ten days after the Apollo
13
Review Board submits its final report.
3. The assignments to the Apollo 13 Review Board and to the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel by References (a) and (b), respectively, in no
way
relieve you of your continuing full responsibility for the conduct of
the
Apollo and other OMSF programs.
Deputy Administrator Administrator
cc: Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Chairman, Apollo 13 Review Board
Mr. Charles D. Harrington, Chairman, Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel
NMI 8621.1
April 14, 1966
Management Instruction
SUBJECT: MISSION FAILURE INVESTIGATION POLICY AND
PROCEDURES
1. PURPOSE
This Instruction establishes the policy and procedures for
investigating
and documenting the causes of all major mission failures which occur
in
the conduct of NASA space and aeronautical activities.
2. APPLICABILITY
This Instruction is applicable to NASA Headquarters and field
installations.
3. DEFINITION
For the purpose of this Instruction, the following term shall apply:
Instruction: Failure is defined as not achieving a major mission
objective.
4. POLICY
a. It is NASA policy to investigate and document the causes of all
major
mission failures which occur in the conduct of its space and
aeronautical
activities and to take appropriate corrective actions as a result of
the
findings and recommendations.
b. The Deputy Administrator may conduct independent investigations of
major failures in addition to those investigations required of the
Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters Program Offices as set forth in
paragraph 5a
5. PROCEDURES
a. Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters Program Offices are
responsible,
within their assigned areas, for:
(1) Informing promptly the Deputy Administrator of each major
failure and apprising him of the nature of the failure, status
of investigations, and corrective or other actions which are
or will be taken.
(2) Determining the causes or probable causes of all failures,
taking corrective or other actions, and submitting written
reports of such determinations and actions to the Deputy
Administrator.
b. When the Deputy Administrator decides to conduct an independent
investigation, he will:
(l) Establish a (name of project) Review Board, comprised of
appropriate NASA officials;
(2) Define the specific responsibilities of each Board, encompassing
such tasks as:
(a) Reviewing the findings, determinations and corrective or other
actions which have been developed by contractors, field
installations and the Official-in-Charge of cognizant
Headquarters Program Office and presenting the Boards
conclusions as to their adequacy to the Deputy Administrator.
(b) Reviewing the findings during the course of investigations
with cognizant field installation and Headquarters officials.
(c) Recommending such additional steps (for example additional
tests) as are considered desirable, to determine the
technical and operational causes or probable causes of
failure, and to obtain evidence of nontechnical contributing
factors.
(d) Developing recommendations for corrective and other actions,
based on all information available to the Board.
(e) Documenting findings, determinations and recommendations for
corrective or other actions and submitting such
documentation to the Deputy Administrator.
c. Procedures for implementing the Board's recommendations shall be
determined by the Deputy Administrator.
6 CANCELLATION
NASA Management Manual Instruction 4-1-7 (T.S. 760), March 24,
l964.
Deputy Administrator
DISTRIBUTION:
SDL l
NMI 1156.14
December 7, 1967
Effective Date
Management Instruction
SUBJECT: AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL
1. PURPOSE
This Instruction sets forth the authority for, and the duties,
procedures, organization, and support of the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel.
2. AUTHORITY
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (hereafter called the "Panel"
was established under Section 6 of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration Authorization Act, 1968 (PL 90-67, 90th
Congress, 81 Stat. I68, 170). Since the Panel was established by
statute, its formation and use are not subject to the provisions of
Executive Order 11007 or of NMI 1150.2, except to the extent that
such provisions are made applicable to the Panel under this
Instruction.
3. DUTIES
a. The duties of the Panel are set forth in Section 6 of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization
Act, 1968, as follows:
"The Panel shall review safety studies and operations plans referred
to it
and shall make reports thereon, shall advise the Administrator with
respect to the hazards of proposed or existing facilities and proposed
operations and with respect to the adequacy of proposed or existing
safety
standards, and shall perform such other duties as the Administrator
may
request."
b. Pursuant to carrying out its statutory duties, the Panel will
review, evaluate, and advise on all elements of NASA's
safety system, including especially the industrial safety,
systems safety, and public safety activities, and the management of
these activities. These key elements of NASA's safety system are
identified and delineated as follows:
(1) Industrial Safety. This element includes those activities
which, on a continuing basis, provide protection for the well
being of personnel and prevention of damage to property
involved in NASA's business and exposed to potential hazards
associated with carrying out this business. Industrial safety
relates especially to the operation of facilities in the many
programs of research, development, manufacture, test,
operation, and maintenance. Industrial safety activities
include, but are not limited to, such functions as
(a) Determination of industrial safety criteria.
(b) Establishment and implementation of safety standards
and procedures for operation and maintenance of
facilities, especially test and hazardous
environment facilities.
(c) Development of safety requirements for the design of
new facilities.
(d) Establishment and implementation of safety standards
and procedures for operation of program support and
administrative aircraft.
(2) Systems Safety. This element includes those activities
specifically organized to deal with the potential hazards of
complex R&D systems that involve many highly specialized
areas of technology. It places particular emphasis on
achieving safe operation of these systems over their life
cycles, and it covers major systems for aeronautical and
space flight activities, manned or unmanned, including
associated groundbased research, development, manufacturing,
and test activities. Systems safety activities include, but
are not limited to, such functions as:
(a) Determination of systems safety criteria, including
criteria for crew safety.
(b) Determination of safety data requirements.
(c) Performance of systems safety analyses.
(d) Establishment and implementation of systems safety
plans.
(3) Public Safety. This element includes those activities which, on
a continuing basis, provide protection for the well being of
people and prevention of damage to property not involved in
NASA's business, but which may nevertheless be exposed to
potential hazards associated with carrying out this business.
Public safety activities include, but are not limited to,
such functions as:
(a) Determination of public safety criteria.
(b) Establishment and control of public safety hazards
associated with facility and systems tests and
operations.
(c) Establishment and implementation, as required,
of emergency or catastrophe control plans.
(4) Safety Management. This element includes both the program and
functional organizations of NASA and its contractors involved
in the identification of potential hazards and their
elimination or control as set forth in the foregoing
description of safety activities. It also includes the
management systems for planning, implementing, coordinating,
and controlling these activities. These management systems
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) The authorities, responsibilities, and working
relationships of the organizations involved in safety
activities, and the assessment of their
effectiveness.
(b) The procedures for insuring the currency and continuity
of safety activities, especially systems safety
activities which may extend over long periods of time
and where management responsibilities are transferred
during the life cycles of the systems.
(c) The plans and procedures for accident/incident
investigations, including those for the follow-up on
corrective actions and the feedback of accident/incident
information to other involved or interested
organizations.
(d) The analysis and dissemination of safety data.
4. PROCEDURES
a. The Panel will function in an advisory capacity to the
Administrator,
and, through him, to those organizational elements responsible for
management of the NASA safety activities.
b. The Panel will be provided with all information required to
discharge
its advisory responsibilities as they pertain to both NASA and its
contractors' safety activities. This information will be made
available
through the mechanism of appropriate reports, and by means of in situ
reviews of safety activities at the various NASA and contractor sites,
as
deemed necessary by the Panel and arranged through the Administrator.
The
Panel will thus be enabled to examine and evaluate not only the
general
status of the NASA safety system, but also the key elements of the
planned
and on-going activities in this system.
5. ORGANIZATION
a. Membership
(1) The Panel will consist of a maximum of nine members, who will
be appointed by the Administrator. Appointments will be for a
term of six years, except that, in order to provide continuity
of membership, one-third of the members appointed originally
to the Panel will be appointed for a term of two years,
one-third for a term of four years, and one-third for a term
of six years.
(2) Not more than four members of the Panel shall be employees
of NASA, nor shall such NASA members constitute a majority
of the composition of the Panel at any given time.
(3) Compensation and travel allowances for panel members shall be
as specified in Section 6 of the NASA Authorization Act,
1968.
b. Officers
(1) The Officers of the Panel shall be a Chairman and a Vice
Chairman, who shall be selected by the Panel from their
membership to serve for one-year terms.
(2) The Chairman, or Vice Chairman in his absence, shall preside at
all meetings of the Panel and shall have the usual powers of a
presiding officer.
c. Committees
(1) The Panel is authorized to establish special committees, as
necessary and as approved by the Administrator, to carry out
specified tasks within the scope of duties of the Panel.
(2) All such committee activities will be considered an
inseparable extension of Panel activities, and will be in
accordance with all applicable procedures and regulations
set forth in this Instruction.
(3) The Chairman of each special committee shall be a member of the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. The other committee members
may or may not be members of the Panel, as recommended by the
Panel and approved by the Administrator.
(4) Appointment of Panel members to committees as officers or
members will be either for one year, for the duration of their
term as Panel members, or for the lifetime of the committee,
whichever is the shortest. Appointments of non-Panel members
to committees will be for a period of one year or for the
lifetime of the committee, whichever is shorter.
(5) Compensation and travel allowances for committee members who
are not members of the Panel shall be the same as for members
of the Panel itself, except that compensation for such
committee members appointed from outside the Federal
Government shall be at the rate prescribed by the
Administrator for comparable-services.
d. Meetings
(1) Regular meetings of the Panel will be held as often as
necessary and at least twice a year. One meeting each year
shall be an Annual Meeting. Business conducted at this
meeting will include selecting the Chairman and the Vice
Chairman of the Panel, recommending new committees and
committee members as required or desired, approving the
Panel's annual report to the Administrator, and such other
business as may be required.
(2) Special meetings of the Panel may be called by the Chairman,
by notice served personally upon or by mail or telegraph to
the usual address of each member at least five days prior to
the meeting.
(3) Special meetings shall be called in the same manner by the
Chairman, upon the written request of three members of
the Panel.
(4) If practicable, the object of a special meeting should be sent
in writing to all members, and if possible a special meeting
should. be avoided by obtaining the views of members by mail
or otherwise, both on the question requiring the meeting and
on the question of calling a special meeting.
(5) All meetings of special committees will be called by their
respective chairmen pursuant to and in accordance with
performing their specified tasks.
(6) Minutes of all meetings of the Panel, and of special committees
established by the Panel, will be kept. Such minutes shall, at
a minimum, contain a record of persons present, a description
of matters discussed and conclusions reached, and copies of
all reports received, issued, or approved by the Panel or
committee. The accuracy of all minutes will be certified to by
the Chairman of the Panel (or by the Vice Chairman in his
absence) or of the committee.
e. Reports and Records
(1) The Panel shall submit an annual report to the
Administrator.
(2) The Panel will submit to the Administrator reports on all
safety reviews and evaluations with comments and
recommendations as deemed appropriate by the Panel.
(3) All records and files of the Panel, including agendas, minutes
of Panel and committee meetings, studies, analyses, reports,
or other data compilations or work papers, made available to
or prepared by or for the Panel, will be retained by the
Panel.
f. Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest
(1) Nongovernmental members of the Panel, and of special
committees established by the Panel, are "Special
Government Employees" within the meaning of NHB 1900.2A,
which sets forth guidance to NASA Special Government
employees regarding the avoidance of conflicts of interest
and the observance of ethical standards of conduct. A
copy of NHB 1900.2A and related NASA instructions on
conflicts of interest will be furnished to each Panel or
committee member at the time of his appointment as a NASA
consultant or expert.
(2) Nongovernmental members of the Panel or a special committee
will submit a "NASA Special Government Employees
Confidential Statement of Employment and Financial
Interests" (NASA Form 1271) prior to participating in the
activities of the Panel or a special committee.
6. SUPPORT
a. A staff, to be comprised of full-time NASA employees, shall be
established to support the Panel. The members of this staff will be
fully responsive to direction from the Chairman or the Panel.
b. The director of this staff will serve as Executive Secretary to the
Panel. The Executive Secretary of the Panel, in accordance with the
specific instructions from the Chairman of the Panel, shall:
(1) Administer the affairs of the Panel and have general supervision
of all arrangements for safety reviews and evaluations, and
other matters undertaken by the Panel.
(2) Insure that a written record is kept of all transactions, and
submit the same to the Panel for approval at each subsequent
meeting.
(3) Insure that the same service is provided for all special
committees of the Panel.
Administrator
CFR Title 14, Chapter 5, Subpart 1209.5.
PART 1. SUMMARY OF BOARD HISTORY AND PROCEDURES
The Apollo 13 Review Board was established on April 17, 1970, by
the
NASA Administrator and Deputy Administrator under the authority of
NASA
Management Instruction 8621.1, dated April 14, 1966. In the letter
establishing the Board, Mr. Edgar M. Cortright, Director of Langley
Research Center, was appointed as Chairman and the general
responsibili-
ties of the Board were set forth. The seven additional members of the
Board were named in a letter from the Administrator and the Deputy
Administrator to the Chairman, dated April 21, 1970. This letter also
designated a Manned Space Flight Technical Support official, a Counsel
to
the Board, several other supporting officials, and several observers
from
various organizations. In addition, in a letter dated April 20, 1970,
to
Dr. Charles D. Harrington, Chairman of the NASA Aerospace Safety
Advisory
Panel, that Panel was requested to review the Board's procedures and
findings.
The Review Board convened at the Manned Spacecraft Center,
Houston,
Texas, on Tuesday, April 21, 1970. Four Panels of the Board were
formed,
each under the overview of a member of the Board. Each of the Panels
was
chaired by a senior official experienced in the area of review
assigned to
the Panel. In addition, each Panel was manned by a number of
specialists,
thereby providing a nucleus of expertise for the review activity.
During
the period of the Board's review activities, the Chairmen of the four
Panels were responsible for the conduct of evaluations, analyses, and
other studies bearing on their Panel assignments, for preparing
preliminary findings and recommendations, and for developing other
information for the Board's consideration. To overview these Panel
efforts, each member of the Board assumed specific responsibilities
related to the overall review.
In addition to the direct participants in the Board activity, a
number of observers and consultants also attended various meetings of
the
Board or its constituent Panels. These individuals assisted the Review
Board participants with advice and counsel in their areas of expertise
and
responsibilities.
While the Board's intensive review activities were underway, the
Manned Spacecraft Center Apollo 13 Investigation Team, under James A.
McDivitt, Colonel, USAF, was also conducting its own analysis of the
accident on Apollo 13. Coordination between the Investigation Team
work
and the Apollo 13 Review Board activities was effected through the MSF
Technical Support official and by maintaining a close and continuing
working relationship between the Panel Chairmen and officials of the
MSC
Investigation Team.
The Board Chairman established a series of administrative
procedures
to guide the Board's activities. In addition, specific assignments of
responsibility were made to all individuals involved in the Board's
activities so as to insure an efficient review activity. Overall
logistic
and administrative support was provided by MSC.
The Board conducted both Executive and General Sessions. During
the
Executive Sessions, plans were agreed upon for guiding the Board's
activities and for establishing priorities for tests, analyses,
studies,
and other Board efforts. At the General Sessions, status of Panel
activities was reviewed by the Board with a view towards coordination
and
integration of all review activities. In addition, Board members
regularly
attended daily status meetings of the Manned Spacecraft Center
Investigation Team.
In general, the Board relied on Manned Spacecraft Center
postmission
evaluation activities to provide the factual data upon which
evaluation,
assessment, and analysis efforts could be based. However, the Board,
through a regular procedure, also levied specific data collection,
reduction, and analysis requirements on MSC. Test support for the
Board
was conducted primarily at MSC but also included tests run at other
NASA
Centers. Members of the Board and its Panels also visited a number of
contractor facilities to review manufacturing, assembly, and test
procedures applicable to the Apollo 13 mission.
The Chairman of the Board provided the NASA Deputy Administrator
with
oral progress reports. These reports summarized the status of Review
Board
activities at the time and outlined the tasks still ahead. All
material
used in these interim briefings was incorporated into the Board's
official
files.
As a means of formally transmitting its findings, determinations,
and
recommendations, the Board chose the format of this Final Report which
includes both the Board's Judgments as well as the reports of the
individual Panels.
A general file of all the data and information collected and
examined
by the Board has been established at the Langley Research Center,
Hampton,
Virginia. In addition, the MSC Investigation Team established a file
of
data at MSC.
PART 2. BIOGRAPHIES OF BOARD MEMBERS, OBSERVERS, AND PANEL
CHAIRMEN
CHAIRMAN OF THE APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD
EDGAR M. CORTRIGHT'
NASA Langley Research Center
Edgar M. Cortright, 46, Director of the NASA Langley Research
Center,
Hampton, Virginia, is Chairman of the Apollo 13 Review Board.
Mr.Cortright has been an aerospace scientist and administrator
for
22 years. He began his career at NASA's Lewis Research Center,
Cleveland,
Ohio, in 1948 and for the next 10 years specialized in research on
high-
speed aerodynamics there.
In October 1958, Mr. Cortright was named Chief of Advanced
Technology
Programs at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D. C., where he directed
ini-
tial formulation of NASA's Meteorological Satellite Program. In 1960,
he
became Assistant Director for Lunar and Planetary Programs and
directed
the planning and implementation of such projects as Mariner, Ranger,
and
Surveyor.
Mr. Cortright became Deputy Director of the Office of Space
Sciences
in 1961, and Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science and
Appli-
cations in 1965, in which capacities he served as General Manager of
NASA's space flight program using automated spacecraft. He joined the
Office of Manned Space Flight as Deputy Associate Administrator in
1967
and served in a similar capacity until he was appointed Director of
the
Langley Research Center in 1968.
He is a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astro-
nautics and of the American Astronautical Society. He has received the
Arthur S. Fleming Award, the NASA Medal for Outstanding Leadership,
and
the NASA Medal for Distinguished Service.
Mr. Cortright is the author of numerous technical reports and
articles, and compiled and edited the book, "Exploring Space With a
Camera".
He is a native of Hastings, Pennsylvania, and served as a U.S.
Navy
officer in World War II. He received Bachelor and Master of Science
degrees in aeronautical engineering from the Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute.
Mr. and Mrs. Cortright are the parents of two children.
ROBERT F. ALLNUTT
NASA Headquarters
Robert F, Allnutt, 34, Assistant to the NASA Administrator,
Washington, D C., is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board.
Mr. Allnutt was named to his present position this year. Prior to
that, he had been Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs
since
1967.
He joined NASA in 1960 as a patent attorney at the Langley
Research
Center, Hampton, Virginia. In 1961, he was transferred to NASA
Headquarters Washington, D. C.
Mr. Allnutt served as Patent Counsel for Communications Satellite
Corporation from January to September 1965, when he returned to NASA
Headquarters as Assistant General Counsel for Patent Matters.
He is admitted to the practice of law in the District of Columbia
and
the state of Virginia and is a member of the American Bar Association
and
the Federal Bar Association.
Mr. Allnutt was graduated from Virginia Polytechnic Institute
with
a B.S. degree in industrial engineering. He received Juris Doctor and
Master of Laws degrees from George Washington University Law
School.
Mr. and Mrs. Allnutt are the parents of two sons. The family
lives
in Washington, D. C
NEIL A. ARMSTRONG
NASA Astronaut
Neil A. Armstrong, 39, NASA astronaut, is a member of the Apollo
13
Review Board.
Commander of the Apollo 11 mission and the first man on the Moon
Mr.
Armstrong has distinguished himself as an astronaut and as an
engineering
test pilot.
Prior to joining the astronaut team at the Manned Spacecraft
Center,
Houston, Texas, in 1962, Mr. Armstrong was an X-15 rocket aircraft
project
pilot at the NASA Flight Research Center, Edwards, California.
Mr. Armstrong joined NASA at the Lewis Research Center,
Cleveland,
Ohio, in 1955, and later transferred to the Flight Research Center as
an
aeronautical research pilot.
His initial space flight was as command pilot of Gemini VIII,
launched March 16, 1966. He performed the first successful docking of
two
vehicles in space. The flight was terminated early due to a mal-
functioning thruster, and the crew was cited for exceptional piloting
skill in overcoming the problem and accomplishing a safe landing. He
has
served on backup crews for both Gemini and APOLLO.
Mr. Armstrong is a Fellow of the Society of Experimental Test
Pilots,
Associate Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, and member of the Soaring Society of America. He has re-
ceived the Institute of Aerospace Sciences Octave Chanute Award, the
AIAA
Astronautics Award, the NASA Exceptional Service Medal, the John F.
Montgomery Award, and the Presidential Medal of Freedom.
He is a native of Wapakoneta, Ohio, and received a B.S. degree in
aeronautical engineering from Purdue University and a M.S. degree from
the
University of Southern California. He was a naval aviator from 1949 to
1952 and flew 78 combat missions during the Korean action.
Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong have two sons.
JOHN F CLARK
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center
Dr. John F. Clark, 49, Director of the NASA Goddard Space Flight
Center, Greenbelt, Maryland, is a member of the Apollo 13 Review
Board.
He is an internationally known authority on atmospheric and space
sciences, holds four patents in electronic circuits and systems, and
has
written many scientific papers on atmospheric physics, electronics,
and
mathematics.
Dr. Clark joined NASA in 1958 and served in the Office of Space
Flight Programs at NASA Headquarters until 1961 when he was named
Director
of Geophysics and Astronomy Programs, Office of Space Sciences. From
1962
until 1965, he was Director of Sciences and Chairman of the Space
Science
Steering Committee, Office of Space Science and Applications.
In 1965, Dr. Clark was appointed Deputy Associate Administrator
for
Space Science and Applications (Sciences), and later that year, Acting
Director of Goddard. He was named director of the center in 1966.
Dr. Clark began his career in 1942 as an electronics engineer at
the
Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. From 1947 to 1948 he was
Assistant Professor of Electronic Engineering at Lehigh University,
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. He returned to NRL in 1948; and prior to
Join-
ing NASA, served as head of the Atmospheric Electricity Branch there.
He is a member of the American Association of Physics Teachers,
American Geophysical Union, Scientific Research Society of America,
Philosophical Society of Washington, the International Scientific
Radio
Union, and the Visiting Committee on Physics, Lehigh University. He
received the NASA Medals for Exceptional Service, Outstanding
Leadership,
and Distinguished Service.
Dr. Clark was born in Reading, Pennsylvania. He received a B.S.
degree in electrical engineering from Lehigh University, M.S. degree
in
mathematics from George Washington University, and Ph. D. in physics
from
the University of Maryland.
Dr. and Mrs. Clark have two children and live in Silver Springs,
Maryland.
WALTER R. HEDRICK, JR.
Headquarters, USAF
Brig. Gen. Walter R. Hedrick, Jr., 48, Director of Space, Office
of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, Headquarters,
USAF, Washington, D.C., is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board.
He has participated in most of the Air Force's major nuclear test
projects and has extensive experience as a technical project officer
and administrator.
General Hedrick Joined the Army Air Corps as an aviation cadet in
1941 and flew in combat with the 86th Fighter Bomber Group during
World
War II. After the War, he was assigned to the 19th Air Force, the 14th
Air
Force, and as a project officer under Air Force Secretary Stuart
Symington. From 1952 to 1955, he was assigned to the Air Force Office
of
Atomic Energy.
In 1955, he was assigned to the Technical Operations Division,
Air
Force Special Weapons Command, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. In
1957, he was named Commander of the 4951st Support Squadron, Eniwetok;
and
the following year, he was reassigned to Kirtland AFB as Assistant to
the
Group Commander and later as Air Commander of the 4925th Test Group.
General Hedrick Joined the Special Systems Office, Air Force
Ballistics
Division, Los Angeles, in 1960. He was named Commander of the
Satellite
Control Facility in 1965, and in 1966, he was appointed Deputy
Commander,
Air Force Systems Command. He received his present assignment in 1967.
General Hedrick is a Command Pilot and has received numerous Air
Force awards.
His home town is Fort Worth, Texas, and he attended Texas Techno-
logical College, Lubbock, prior to joining the service. He received
B.S.
and M.S. degrees in physics from the University of Maryland.
General and Mrs. Hedrick are the Parents of two sons.
VINCENT L. JOHNSON
NASA Headquarters
Vincent L Johnson, 51, Deputy Associate Administrator for Space
Science and Applications (Engineering), NASA Headquarters, is a member
of
the Apollo 13 Review Board.
Mr. Johnson was appointed to his present position in 1967. Prior
to
that time, he had been Director of the Launch Vehicle and Propulsion
Programs Division, Office of Space Science and Applications, since
1964.
He was responsible for the management and development of the light and
medium launch vehicles used for NASA's unmanned earth orbital and deep
space programs. His division also directed studies of future unmanned
launch vehicle and propulsion system requirements.
Mr. Johnson joined NASA in 1960, coming from the Navy Department
where he had been an engineer with the Bureau of Weapons. His first
assignments with NASA were as Program Manager for the Scout, Delta,
and
Centaur launch vehicles.
He was a naval officer during World War II, serving with the
Bureau
of Ordnance. Prior to that, he was a physicist with the Naval Ordnance
Laboratory.
Mr. Johnson was born in Red Wing, Minnesota, and attended the
University of Minnesota.
He and Mrs. Johnson live in Bethesda, Maryland. They are the
parents of two children.
MILTON KLEIN
NASA Headquarters
Milton Klein, 46, Manager, Space Nuclear Propulsion Office, NASA
Headquarters, is a member of the Apollo 13 Review Board.
Mr. Klein has been in his present position since 1967. Prior to
that
he had been Deputy Manager since 1960. The Space Nuclear Propulsion
Office
is a joint activity of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the
National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. The office conducts the national
nuclear rocket program. He is also Director of the Division of Space
Nuclear Systems of the AEC, responsible for space nuclear electric
power
activities.
Mr. Klein became associated with atomic energy work in 1946, when
he
was employed by the Argonne National Laboratory. In 1950, he joined
the
AEC's Chicago Operations Office as staff chemical engineer. Later, he
was
promoted to Assistant Manager for Technical Operations. Generally
engaged
in reactor development work for stationary power plants, he had a
primary
role in the power reactor demonstration program.
Mr. Klein was born in St. Louis, Missouri. He served in the U.S.
Navy during World War II.
He has a B S. degree in chemical engineering from Washington
University and a Master of Business Administration degree from Harvard
University.
Mr. and Mrs. Klein and their three children live in Bethesda,
Maryland.
HANS M. MARK
NASA Ames Research Center
Dr. Hans M. Mark, 40, Director of the NASA Ames Research Center,
Moffett Field, California, is a member of the APOLLO 13 Review
Board.
Prior to being appointed Director of the Ames Research Center he
was,
from 1964 to 1969, Chairman of the Department of Nuclear Engineering
at
the University of California, Berkeley, California.
An expert in nuclear and atomic physics, he served as Reactor
Administrator of the University of California's Berkeley Research
Reactor,
professor of nuclear engineering and a research physicist at the
University's Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, California, and
consultant to the U.S. Army-and the National Science Foundation. He
has
written many scientific papers.
Except for 2 years as an Assistant Professor of Physics at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1958 to 1960, Dr. Mark's
administrative, academic, and research career has been centered at the
University of California (Berkeley).
Dr. Mark received his A.B. degree in physics from the University
of California, Berkeley, in 1951 and returned there as a research
physicist in 1955, one year after receiving his Ph. D. in physics
from M.I.T.
He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society and a member of
the
American Geophysical Union, the American Society for Engineering
Educa-
tion and the American Nuclear Society.
Dr. Mark was born in Mannheim, Germany, and came to the United
States when he was 11 years old. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen
in 1945.
Dr. and Mrs. Mark are the Parents of two children.
COUNSEL TO THE APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD
GEORGE T. MALLEY
NASA Langley Research Center
George T. Malley, 57, Chief Counsel, Langley Research Center,
Hampton, Virginia, is the Legal Counsel to the Apollo 13 Review Board.
He
also served as Counsel to the Apollo 204 Review Board.
Mr. Malley is the Senior Field Counsel of NASA and has been
assigned
to Langley since 1959. He was with the Office of the General Counsel,
Department of the Navy, from 1950 to 1959, where he specialized in
admiralty and international law.
He is a retired Navy officer and served on active duty from 1939
to
1946, mainly in the South Pacific. His last assignment was commanding
officer of the U.S.S. Fentress.
Mr. Malley has an A.B. degree from the University of Rochester
and an
LL.B. degree from Cornell University Law School. He is a native of
Rochester, New York, and is a member of the New York Bar and the
Federal
Bar Association.
Mr. and Mrs. Malley and their two children live in Newport News,
Virginia.
MANNED SPACE FLIGHT TECHNICAL SUPPORT
CHARLES W. MATHEWS
NASA Headquarters
Charles W. Mathews, 49, Deputy Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D. C., directs the Office
of
Manned Space Flight technical support to the Apollo 13 Review Board.
Mr. Mathews has been a research engineer and project manager for
NASA
and its predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA), since 1943. In his present assignment, he serves as general
manager of manned space flight.
Prior to his appointment to this position in 1968, he had been
Director, Apollo Applications Program, NASA Headquarters, since
January
1967.
Mr. Mathews was Gemini Program Manager at the Manned Spacecraft
Center, Houston, Texas, from 1963 until 1967. Prior to that time, he
was
Deputy Assistant Director for Engineering and Development and Chief of
the
Spacecraft Technology Division at MSC.
Mr. Mathews transferred to MSC (then the Space Task Group) when
Project Mercury became an official national program in 1958. He served
as
Chief of the Operation Division. He had been at the Langley Research
Center, Hampton, Virginia, since 1943 engaged in aircraft flight
research
and automatic control of airplanes. He became involved in manned
space-
craft studies prior to the first Sputnik flights, and he conducted
early
studies on reentry. Mr. Mathews was chairman of the group which
developed
detailed specifications for the Mercury spacecraft.
Mr. Mathews has been awarded the NASA Distinguished Service Medal
and
the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal. He has received the NASA Group
Achievement Award - Gemini Program Team.
He is a Fellow of the American Astronautical Society and an
Associate
Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. He
is
the author of numerous technical articles published by NASA.
Mr. Mathews, a native of Duluth, Minnesota, has a B S. degree in
aeronautical engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy,
New York.
Mr. and Mrs. Mathews live in Vienna, Virginia. They have two
children
APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD OBSERVERS
WILLIAM A. ANDERS
National Aeronautics and Space Council
William A. Anders, 36, Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics
and Space Council, Washington, D.C., is an official observer of the
Apollo 13 Review Board.
Prior to being appointed to his present position in 1969, Mr.
Anders
was a NASA astronaut and an Air Force lieutenant colonel. He was lunar
module pilot on the Apollo & lunar orbital mission, man's first visit
to
the vicinity of another celestial body.
Mr. Anders joined the NASA astronaut team at the Manned
Spacecraft
Center, Houston, Texas, in 1963. In addition to his Apollo 8 flight,
he
served as backup pilot for Gemini 11 and backup command module pilot
for
Apollo 11, the first lunar landing mission.
Mr. Anders was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air Force
upon
graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy. After flight training, he
served
as a pilot in all-weather interceptor squadrons of the Air Defense
Command. Prior to becoming an astronaut, he was a nuclear engineer and
instructor pilot at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, Kirtland Air
Force
Base, New Mexico.
He is a member of the American Nuclear Society and has been
awarded
the Air Force Commendation Medal, Air Force Astronaut Wings, the NASA
Distinguished Service Medal, and the New York State Medal for Valor.
Mr. Anders was born in Hong Kong. He received a B.S. degree from
the
U.S. Naval Academy and an M.S. degree in nuclear engineering from the
Air
Force Institute of Technology.
Mr. and Mrs. Anders are the parents of five children.
CHARLES D. HARRINGTON
Douglas United Nuclear, Inc.
Dr. Charles D Harrington, 59, President and General Manager,
Douglas United Nuclear, Inc., Richland, Washington, is an official
observer of the Apollo 13 Review Board.
Dr. Harrington, who has been associated with all phases of the
chemical and nuclear industrial fields since 1941, is Chairman of the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, a statutory body created by
Congress.
From 1941 to 1961, he was employed by the Mallinckrodt Chemical
Works, St. Louis, Missouri. Dr. Harrington started with the company as
a
research chemist and in 1960, after a procession of research and
management positions, was appointed Vice President, Mallinckrodt
Nuclear
Corporation and Vice President, Mallinckrodt Chemical Works.
In 1961, when the fuel material processing plant of Mallinckrodt
became the Chemicals Division of United Nuclear Corporation, Dr.
Harrington was named Vice President of that division.
He became Senior Vice President, United Nuclear Corporation,
Centreville, Maryland, in 1963.
In 1965, Dr. Harrington was appointed President and General
Manager,
Douglas United Nuclear, Inc. The company manages production reactors
and
fuels fabrication facilities at Hanford, Washington, for the Atomic
Energy
Commission.
He is the co-author of a book, "Uranium Production Technology,"
and
has written numerous technical papers. He has received the Mid- West
Award
of the American Chemical Society for contributions to technology in
the
nuclear energy field.
He is director of several corporations, including United Nuclear,
as well as Professional councils and societies.
Dr. Harrington has M.S., M.A., and Ph. D. degrees in chemistry
from
Harvard University.
I. IRVING PINKEL
NASA Lewis Research Center
I. Irving Pinkel, 57, Director, Aerospace Safety Research and
Data
Institute at the NASA Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, is an
official observer of the Apollo 13 Review Board.
Until recently, he directed research at Lewis Research Center on
rocket propellant and electric power generation systems for space
vehicles, compressors and turbines for advanced aircraft engines, and
lubrication systems for rotating machines for these systems.
Mr. Pinkel entered Government scientific service in 1935 as a
physicist with the U.S. Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In
1940, he joined the staff of the Langley Research Center, Hampton,
Virginia, as a physicist. When the Lewis Research Center was built in
1942, he transferred there.
He has been elected to Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Xi, honorary
scientific
society, and Pi Mu Epsilon, honorary mathematics fraternity. He is an
Ohio
Professional Engineer, served on the former NACA subcommittees on
Meteorological Problems, Icing Problems, Aircraft Fire Prevention and
Flight Safety, and is a member of the NASA Research and Technology
Advi-
sory Subcommittee on Aircraft Operating Problems. He has been a
Special
Lecturer, Case Institute of Technology Graduate School.
Mr. Pinkel has received the Flight Safety Foundation Award for
con-
tributions to the safe utilization of aircraft, the Laura Taber
Barbour
Award for development of a system for suppressing aircraft crash
fires,
the NACA Distinguished Service Medal, and the NASA Sustained Superior
Performance Award.
He was born in Gloversville, New York, and was graduated from the
University of Pennsylvania.
Mr. and Mrs. Pinkel live in Fairview Park, Ohio. They are the
parents of two sons.
JAMES E. WILSON, JR.
Committee on Science and Astronautics
United States House of Representatives
James E. Wilson, Jr., 39, Technical Consultant, United States
House
of Representatives Committee on Science and Astronautics, is an
official
observer of the Apollo 15 Review Board.
Mr. Wilson has been technical consultant to the Committee since
1963.
NavalFrom 1961 to 1963, he was Director of Research and Development, U.S.
Propellant Plant, Indian Head, Maryland. Mr. Wilson managed the
Polaris
Program at Indian Head from 1956 to 1961.
From 1954 to 1956, Mr. Wilson served as an officer in the U.S.
Army
Signal Corps. He was a development engineer with E. I. DuPont,
Wilmington,
Delaware, from 1953 to 1954.
Mr. Wilson is a member of Phi Sigma Alpha, a National Honor
Society;
American Institute of Chemical Engineers; American Chemical Society,
and
American Ordnance Association.
Mr. Wilson is co-author of several publications of the House
Commit-
tee on Science and Astronautics.
He received a B.S. degree in chemical engineering from the
Univer-
sity of Maine and a Master of Engineering Administration degree from
George Washington University.
Mr. and Mrs. Wilson live in LaPlata, Maryland. They have two
children.
APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD PANEL CHAIRMEN
SEYMOUR C. HIMMEL
NASA Lewis Research Center
Dr. Seymour C. Himmel, Assistant Director for Rockets and
Vehicles,
Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, heads the Design Panel of the
Apollo 13 Review Board.
Dr. Himmel joined Lewis in 1948 as an aeronautical research
scien-
tist. He has occupied supervisory positions since 1953.
He has been awarded the NASA Exceptional Service Medal and the
NASA
Group Achievement Award as manager of the Agena Project Group. Dr.
Himmel
has served on a number of advisory committees. He is an Associate
Fellow
of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and a
member of
Tau Beta Pi and Pi Tau Sigma. He is the author of more than 25
technical
papers.
Dr. Himmel has a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree from
the
College of the City of New York and M.S. and Ph. D. degrees from Case
Institute of Technology.
Dr. and Mrs. Himmel live in Lakewood, Ohio.
EDWIN C. KILGORE
NASA Langley Research Center
Edwin C. Kilgore, 47, Deputy Chief, Engineering and Technical
Serv-
ices, Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia, heads the Project
Management Panel of the Apollo 13 Review Board.
Mr. Kilgore joined the Langley science staff in 1944 and served
in a
variety of technical and management positions until promotion to his
present position in 1968.
He has received the Honorary Group Achievement Award for his role
in
achieving a record of 97 consecutive successes for solid propellant
rocket
motors and the NASA-Lunar Orbiter Project Group Achievement Award for
outstanding performance. He is a member of Pi Tau Sigma, honorary
mechanical engineering society.
Mr. Kilgore was born in Coeburn, Virginia. He was graduated from
Virginia Polytechnic Institute with a B.S. degree in mechanical engi-
neering.
Mr. and Mrs. Kilgore and their two daughters live in Hampton.
HARRIS M. SCHURMEIER
California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Harris M. Schurmeier, 45, Deputy Assistant Laboratory Director
for
Flight Projects, California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion
Lab-
oratory, Pasadena, California, heads the Manufacturing and Test Panel
of
the Apollo 13 Review Board.
Mr. Schurmeier was appointed to his current position in 1969.
Prior
to that he was Mariner Mars 1969 Project Manager, Voyager Capsule
System
Manager and Deputy Manager of the Voyager Project, and Ranger Project
Manager at JPL.
He has received the NASA Medals for Exceptional Scientific
Achieve-
ment and Exceptional Service. In addition, he has received the Astro-
nautics Engineer Award, and the NASA Public Service Award.
He was born in St. Paul, Minnesota. He has received a B.S. degree
in
mechanical engineering, M.S. degree in aeronautical engineering, and a
professional degree in aeronautical engineering from the California
Institute of Technology.
Mr. Schurmeier was a naval officer in World War II. He and his
wife and four children live in Altadena, California.
FRANCIS B. SMITH
NASA Headquarters
Francis B. Smith, 47, Assistant Administrator for University
Affairs,
NASA Headquarters, is leader of the Mission Events Panel of the Apollo
13
Review Board
Mr. Smith has been in his present position since 1967. Prior to
that
he had been Assistant Director, Langley Research Center, Hampton,
Virginia, since 1964. He joined the Langley science staff in 1947. He
is
an expert in several fields, including radio telemetry, radar, elec-
tronic tracking systems, and missile and range instrumentation.
Mr. Smith was born in Piedmont, South Carolina, and received a
B.S.
degree in electrical engineering from the University of South
Carolina,
where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. He remained at the University
as
an instructor from 1943 to 1944 and then served in the U.S. Navy until
1946.
Mr. and Mrs. Smith and their three children live in Reston, Virginia.
PART 3. BOARD ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS FOR
BOARD PANELS
BOARD ORGANIZATION
After reviewing the scope of the Board's charter, the Chairman
and
Board Members agreed upon the Panel and Support Office structure
depicted
on the following organization chart. Each Panel was assigned specific
responsibilities for reviewing major elements of the overall Board
task,
with particular emphasis upon establishing a sound and independent
technical data base upon which findings, determinations, and
recommenda-
tions by the Board could be based. The Panels were staffed with in-
dividual NASA specialists and established working arrangements with
the
Manned Space Flight line organization personnel working in analogous
areas.
The Board's support offices were structured to provide necessary
staff, logistics, and administrative support without duplication of
available MSC assistance.
In addition to this structure, the Board and Panels also utilized
the special assistance of expert consultants.
Panel assignments, complete Panel membership, and the official
Board
organization approved by the Chairman are included in this part of the
Board report.
GENERAL ASSIGNMENTS FOR BOARD PANELS
(AS DOCUMENTED IN THE BOARD'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES)
Panel 1 - Mission Events Panel
It shall be the task of the Mission Events Panel to provide a de-
tailed and accurate chronology of all pertinent events and actions
leading
to, during, and subsequent to the Apollo 13 incident. This
information, in
narrative and graphical time history form, will provide the Apollo 13
Review Board an official events record on which their analysis and
conclusions may be based. This record will be published in a form
suitable
for inclusion in the Review Board's official report.
The Panel will report all significant events derived from
telemetry
records, air-to-ground communications transcripts, crew and control
center
observations, and appropriate documents such as the flight plan,
mission
technique description, Apollo Operation Handbook, and crew checklists.
Correlation between various events and other observations related to
the
failure will be noted. Where telemetry data are referenced, the Panel
will
comment as appropriate on its significance, reliability, accuracy, and
on
spacecraft conditions which might have generated the data.
The chronology will consist of three major sections' Preincident
Events, Incident Events, and Postincident Events. The decision-making
process leading to the safe recovery, referencing the relevant contin-
gency plans and available alternates, will be included.
Preincident Events. - This section will chronicle the progress of
the flight from the countdown to the time of the incident. All action
and data relevant to the subsequent incident will be included.
Incident Events. - This section will cover that period of time
be-
ginning at 55 hours and 52 minutes after lift-off and continuing so
long
as abnormal system behavior is relevant to the failure.
Postincident Events. - This section will document the events and
activities subsequent to the incident and continuing to mission
termina-
tion (Splash). Emphasis will be placed on the rationale used on
mission
completion strategy.
Panel 1 Membership
Mr. F. B. Smith, Panel Chairman
Assistant Administrator for University Affairs
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D. C.
Dr. Tom B. Ballard
Aerospace Technologist
Flight Instrument Division
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia
Mr. M. P. Frank
Flight Director
Flight Control Division
Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas
Mr. John J. Williams
Director, Spacecraft Operations
Kennedy Space Center
Florida
Mr. Neil Armstrong, Board Member and Panel Monitor
Astronaut
Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas
Panel 2 - Manufacturing and Test Panel
The Manufacturing sad Test Panel shall review the manufacturing
and
testing, including the associated reliability and quality assurance
activities, of the flight hardware components involved in the flight
failure as determined from the review of the flight data and the
analysis
of the design. The purpose of this review is to ascertain the adequacy
of
the manufacturing procedures, including any modifications, and the
pre-
flight test and checkout program, and any possible correlation of
these
activities with the inflight events.
The Panel shall consist of three activities:
Fabrication and Acceptance Testing - This will consist of
reviewing
the fabrication, assembly, and acceptance testing steps actually used
during the manufacturing of the specific flight hardware elements in-
volved. Fabrication, assembly, and acceptance testing procedures and
records will be reviewed, as well as observation of actual operations
when
appropriate.
Subsystem and System Testing - This will consist of reviewing all
the
flight qualification testing from the completion of the component-
level
acceptance testing up through the countdown to lift-off for the
specific
hardware involved. Test procedures and results will be reviewed as
well as
observing specific tests where appropriate. Results of tests on other
serial number units will also be reviewed when appropriate.
Reliability and Quality Assurance - This will be an overview of
both
the manufacturing and testing, covering such things as parts and
material
qualification and control, assembly and testing procedures, and
inspection
and problem/failure reporting and closeout.
Panel 2 Membership
Mr. Harris M. Schurmeier, Panel Chairman
Deputy Assistant Laboratory Director for Flight Projects
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Pasadena. California
Mr. Edward F. Baehr
Assistant Chief, Launch Vehicles Division
Deputy Manager, Titan Project
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio
Mr. Karl L. Heimburg
Director, Astronautics Laboratory
Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsville, Alabama
Mr. Brooks T. Morris
Manager, Quality Assurance and Reliability Office
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Pasadena, California
Dr. John F. Clark, Board Member and Panel Monitor
Director
Goddard Space Flight Center
Greenbelt, Maryland
Panel 3 - Design Panel
The Design Panel shall examine the design of the oxygen and asso-
ciated systems to the extent necessary to support the theory of
failure.
After such review the Panel shall indicate a course of corrective
action
which shall include requirements for further investigations and/or re-
design. In addition, the Panel shall establish requirements for review
of
other Apollo spacecraft systems of similar design.
The Panel shall consist of four subdivisions:
Design Evaluation - This activity shall review the requirements
and
specifications governing the design of the systems, subsystems and
com-
ponents, their derivation, changes thereto and the reasons therefore,
and
the design of the system in response to the requirements, including
such
elements as design approach, material selection, stress analysis, de-
velopment and qualification test programs, and results. This activity
shall also review and evaluate proposed design modifications,
including
changes in operating procedures required by such modifications.
Failure Modes and Mechanisms - This activity shall review the
design
of the systems to ascertain the possible sources of failure and the
manner
in which failures may occur. In this process, they shall attempt to
correlate such modes with the evidence from flight and ground test
data.
This shall include considerations such as: energy sources, materials
compatibility, nature of pressure vessel failure, effects of
environment
and service, the service history of any suspect systems and
components,
and any degradation that may have occurred.
Electrical - This activity shall review the design of all
electrical
components associated with the theory of failure to ascertain their
adequacy. This activity shall also review and evaluate proposed design
modifications, including changes in operating-procedures required by
such
modifications.
Related Systems - This activity shall review the design of all
systems similar to that involved in the Apollo 13 incident with the
view
to establishing any commonality of design that may indicate a need for
redesign. They shall also consider the possibility of design modifica-
tions to Permit damage containment in the event of a failure.
Panel 3 Membership
Dr. Seymour C. Himmel, Panel Chairman
Assistant Director for Rockets and Vehicles
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio
Mr. William F. Browns Jr.
Chief, Strength of Materials Branch
Materials and Structures Division
Administration Directorate
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio
Mr. R. N. Lindley
Special Assistant to the Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D. C.
Dr. William R. Lucas
Director, Program Development
Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsville, Alabama
Mr. J. F. Saunders, Jr.
Project Officer for Command and Service Module
Office of Manned Space Flight
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D. C.
Mr. Robert C. Wells
Head, Electric Flight Systems Section
Vehicles Branch
Flight Vehicles and Systems Division
Office of Engineering and Technical Services
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia
Mr. Vincent L. Johnson, Board Member and Panel Monitor
Deputy Associate Administrator for Engineering
Office of Space Science and Applications
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D. C.
Panel 4 - Project Management Panel
The Project Management Panel will undertake the following tasks:
1. Review and assess the effectiveness of the management struc-
ture employed in Apollo 13 in all areas pertinent to the Apollo 13
incident. This review will encompass the organization, the responsi-
bilities of organizational elements and the adequacy of the staffing.
2. Review and assess the effectiveness of the management systems
employed on Apollo 13 in all areas pertinent to the Apollo 13
incident.
This task will include the management systems employed to control the
appropriate design, manufacturing, and test operations; the processes
used
to assure adequate communications between organizational elements; the
processes used to control hardware and functional interfaces; the
safety
processes involved; and protective security.
3. Review the project management lessons learned from the Apollo
13 mission from the standpoint of their applicability to subsequent
Apollo missions.
Tasks 1 and 2, above, should encompass both the general review of
the
processes used in Apollo 13 and specific applicability to the possible
cause or causes of the mission incident as identified by the Board.
Panel 4 Membership
E. C. Kilgore, Panel Chairman
Deputy Chief, Office of Engineering and Technical Services
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia
R. D. Ginter
Director of Special Programs Office
Office of Advanced Research and Technology
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D.C.
Merrill H. Mead
Chief of Programs and Resources Office
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California
James B. Whitten
Assistant Chief, Aeronautical and Space Mechanics Division
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia
Milton Klein, Board Member and Panel Monitor
Manager, AEC-NASA Space Nuclear Propulsion Office
Washington, D.C.
Board Observers
William A. Anders
Executive Secretary
National Aeronautics and Space Council
Washington, D.C.
Dr. Charles D. Harrington
Chairman
NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Washington, D.C.
I. Irving Pinkel
Director
Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland, Ohio
Mr. James E. Wilson
Technical Consultant to the Committee on Science and Astronautics
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
Apollo 13 Review Board Support Staff
Brian M. Duff
Public Affairs Officer
Manned Spacecraft Center
Houston, Texas
Gerald J. Mossinghoff
Director of Congressional Liaison
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D.C.
Edward F. Parry
Counsel to Office of Manned Space Flight
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D.C.
Raymond G. Romatowski
Deputy Assistant Director for Administration
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia
Ernest P. Swieda
Deputy Chief, Skylab Program Control Office
Kennedy Space Center, Florida
Consultants to the Board
Dr. Wayne D. Erickson, Head
Aerothermochemistry Branch
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia
Dr. Robert Van Dolah
Acting Research Director
Safety Research Center
Bureau of Mines
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
MSC Support to the Board
These persons were detailed by MSC to support the Apollo 13
Review
Board during its review activity at MSC. They are identified by MSC
Position title.
Roy C. Aldridge
Assistant to the Director of Administration
Mary Chandler
Secretary
Rex Cline
Technical Writer/Editor
Evon Collins
Program Analyst
Leroy Cotton
Equipment Specialist
Maureen Cruz
Travel Clerk
Janet Harris
Clerk Stenographer
Marjorie Harrison
Secretary
Phyllis Hayes
Secretary
William N. Henderson
Management Analyst
Sharon Laws
Secretary
Carolyn Lisenbee
Secretary
Judy Miller
Secretary
Jamie Moon
Technical Editor
Dorothy Newberry
Administrative Assistant
Lettie Reed
Editorial Assistant
Charlene Rogozinski
Secretary
Joanne Sanchez
Secretary
Billie Schmidt
Employee Development Specialist
Frances Smith
Secretary
George Sowers
Management Presentations Officer
Elaine Stemerick
Secretary
2-26
Mary Thompson
Administrative Assistant
Alvin C. Zuehlke
Electrical Engineer
PART 4. SUMMARY OF BOARD ACTIVITIES
APRIL 19, 1970
Chairman E. M. Cortright met with Langley officials to begin
planning
the Apollo 13 Review Board approach. Tentative list of Panel Members
and
other specialists were developed for consideration.
APRIL 20, 1970
Chairman Cortright met with the NASA Administrator, Deputy
Adminis-
trator, and key NASA officials in Washington, D.C., to discuss Board
membership.
The Chairman met with NASA Office of Manned Space Flight top
offi-
cials while enroute to MSC on NASA aircraft and discussed program
organi-
zation plans for review of the accident, and coordination with Apollo
13
Review Board activity.
APRIL 21, 1970
Chairman Cortright met with MSC officials to discuss Apollo 13
Review
Board support.
A formal MSC debriefing of the Apollo 13 crew was conducted for
MSC
officials and Apollo 13 Review Board personnel already at MSC.
Detailed discussions between early arrivals on the Review Board
and
the MSC Investigation Team were held to provide quick-look data on the
Apollo 13 accident and to develop detailed procedures for MSC support
of
the Apollo 13 Board.
Chairman Cortright met with members of the Press to report on
early
activity of the Board and to inform them of plans for keeping the
Press
current on Board activities.
The first meeting of the Board was held at 8 p.m. to discuss
Board
composition, structure, assignments, and scope of review. Preliminary
plans were developed for appointing various specialists to assist the
Board in its analysis and evaluation.
APRIL 22, 1970
The Board met with Colonel McDivittts MSC Investigation Team to
re-
view the progress made by MSC in identifying causes of the accident
and in
developing an understanding of sequences and relationships between
known
inflight events. In addition, MSC officials briefed the Board on MSC
Investigation Team structure and assignments.
The Board met with Panel 1 of the MSC Investigation Team for de-
tailed discussion of inflight events and consideration of early con-
clusions on implications of preliminary data analysis.
The Board held its second meeting to discuss MSC investigative
efforts and additional appointments of Panel specialists.
Board members attended Panel 1 evening roundup of day's
evaluation
activities, which included detailed discussions of specific studies,
data
reductions, and support test activities already underway.
APRIL 23, 1970
The Apollo 15 Review Board established itself in proximity to the
MSC
Investigation Team in Building 45, and arranged for all administrative
and logistics support to the Board.
A daily schedule of meetings, reviews, briefings, and discussions
was established, including preliminary plans for contractor meetings,
special support tests, and accumulation of accident-related
information.
Initial task assignments and responsibilities were made to Board
Panels as guidance for detailed review work. Individual Board members
were
assigned Panel overview responsibilities or other special tasks.
Administrative procedures were developed for Board activity, par-
ticularly to provide efficient interface with MSC personnel.
Board and Panel Members again met with MSC officials to further
re-
view the sequence of events in the Apollo 15 mission and to examine
early
hypotheses concerning causes of these events.
The Board convened for an evening meeting to discuss the progress
to
date and to coordinate Panel activities for the next few days.
Discussion
centered upon immediate requirements for data collection and analysis.
Chairman Cortright appointed additional NASA specialists in order
to
bring Panels up to strength.
APRIL 24, 1970
Board Members, Panel Chairmen, and MSC officials reviewed
additional
data analysis made by MSC and contractor personnel with particular
empha-
sis upon the service module (SM) cryogenic system.
The Board convened and reviewed the progress to date. Tentative
approvals were given for Board trips to North American Rockwell (NR),
Downey, California, Beech Aircraft, Boulder, Colorado, and other loca-
tions.
Chairman Cortright briefed the Press on progress to date.
Panel Chairmen and Members continued their detailed analysis of
failure modes, test histories, mission events, and other data bearing
upon the accident.
Board Members and Panel Chairmen met with Mr. Norman Ryker of NR
on
NR's activities involving design, qualification, and tests of SM cryo-
genic oxygen tanks.
APRIL 25, 1970
The Board met to discuss details of onsite inspections of command
service module (CSM) flight hardware at principal contractor installa-
tions.
Panels examined in detail probable failure modes based on data
analyzed at that time.
Specific plans were discussed by the Board relating to evaluation
of
oxygen tank assembly and checkout operations, including review of
component histories.
The MSC Investigation Team members briefed Board Personnel on
Kennedy
Space Center checkout operations of the service module cryogenic and
electric power systems, including a detailed briefing covering oxygen
tank
detanking operations.
APRIL 26, 1970
Board and Panel Members traveled to North American Rockwell,
Downey,
for detailed briefings by NR engineers and management. NR reviewed its
progress in an intensive analysis of the Apollo 13 malfunction,
including
a review of approved special tests. Oxygen tank, fuel cell components,
assemblies and other hardware were also inspected.
APRIL 27, 1970
An Executive Session of the Board met to discuss progress of
specific
analyses required to verify tentative conclusions on oxygen tank
failure
and service module EPS failure.
Additional Board specialists arrived at MSC and received detailed
briefings by MSC and Board personnel on selected aspects of the Apollo
13
data.
Panel Members received and assessed a preliminary MSC evaluation
of
the Apollo 13 accident, including tentative conclusions on the most
probable failure modes.
Procedures were established to provide information flow on the
status
of review to Board observers.
The Board reviewed work plans for the coming week with each Panel
and
established review priorities and special task assignments.
APRIL 28, 1970
Chairman Cortright outlined a plan for the Board's preliminary
report
scheduled for presentation to the Deputy Administrator during his
visit to
MSC on May 1. Each Panel Chairman was to summarize the status of his
Panel's activities for Dr. George Low on Friday, April 29, 1970.
Board Member Neil Armstrong completed arrangements to provide
each
Board Member and Panel Chairman an opportunity for detailed simulation
of
the Apollo 13 inflight accident using MSC's CSM simulation equipment.
Board and Panel Members reviewed enhanced photographs of the
Apollo 13 service module at the MSC Photographic Laboratory.
Dr. von Elbe of Atlantic Research Company briefed Board and Panel
Members on cryogenics and combustion phenomena.
A representative of the Manufacturing and Test Panel performed an
onsite inspection at Beech Aircraft, Boulder.
Manufacture and Test Panel-personnel reviewed detanking
procedures
followed at KSC during the Apollo 13 countdown demonstration test
(CDDT).
Board and Panel personnel reviewed progress to date at a general
Board meeting involving all Review Board personnel.
APRIL 29, 1970
Dr. Charles Harrington, Board Observer and Chairman of the
Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel, arrived for a 2-day detailed review of Board
pro-
cedures and Progress in the accident review.
The Board reviewed North American Rockwell preliminary
recommenda-
tions involving oxygen tank redesign.
The Board continued to review and examine oxygen tank ignition
sources and combustion propagation processes with specialists from
MSC,
other NASA Centers, and contractor personnel.
The Mission Events Panel continued to examine and record details
of
all significant mission events as a basis for other Panel evaluations
and
study.
Chairman Cortright convened two Board meetings to review Panel
pro-
gress to date and to discuss work plans for the next several days.
The Project Management Panel visited North American Rockwell at
Downey to review detailed procedures for acceptance tests,
subcontractor
inspections, project documentation, and other management interface
areas.
APRIL 30, 1970
The Safety Advisory Panel continued discussions with Board
Chairman
and MSC officials on progress of total Apollo 13 review efforts.
Panel Members reviewed instrumentation used in Apollo 13
spacecraft
in order to establish the validity of telemetry data being used in
Board
analysis.
Chairman Cortright convened two Board meetings to review progress
of
the work and to discuss preliminary findings of the Board.
Project Management personnel visited Beech Aircraft Corporation
to
review procedures used for assembly of cryogenic oxygen tanks and to
dis-
cuss communication and information systems within the APOLLO Program.
Panels continued to review detailed data in their respective areas.
MAY 1, 1970
Board and Panel personnel participated in a joint MSC/Apollo 13
Review Board status presentation to the NASA Deputy Administrator.
The
meeting covered all significant Apollo 13 findings and early
conclusions
on the cause of the accident and appropriate remedial actions.
The MSC staff briefed Board Members on initiaI evaluations of
pro-
posed design changes in oxygen tank system.
Panel Members continued to assess data accumulated from the
Apollo 13
mission with particular emphasis upon the design and performance of
elec-
tric power systems used in the service module.
Board Members and Panel Chairmen reviewed specific test matrix
being
proposed by Apollo 13 Review Board specialists covering most
significant
unknowns involved in understanding failure mechanisms.
MAY 2, 1970
Board Members met in General Session to discuss preparation of a
com-
plete "failure tree" as an additional guide in conducting a complete
re-
view and investigation. Specific aspects of this approach were
reviewed.
The Project Management Panel reviewed oxygen tank reliability
history
and quality assurance criteria used in assembly, test, and checkout of
these systems.
Panel specialists continued reviewing data from the mission with
emphasis upon integrating various data points into logical failure
mode
patterns established by MSC and Board personnel.
MAY 3 1970
Chairman Cortright and Board Members conducted a detailed review
of
individual Panel status and progress and established milestones for
additional analytical work and preparation of preliminary findings.
The Board and Panel agreed to tentative report structure,
including
required exhibits, tables, drawings, and other reference data.
The Board established a system for tabulating all significant
mission
events and explanatory data, including the support tests required to
clarify questions raised by events.
Panel Members worked on individual analyses with particular
attention
to developing requirements for additional test activity in support of
ten-
tative conclusions.
The Board agreed to strengthen its technical reviews of
combustion
propagation and electrical design by adding specialists in these
areas.
MAY 4, 1970
The Design Panel continued its intensive review of the "shelf
drop"
incident at NR involving the cryogenic oxygen flight tank used in
Apollo 13 in order to understand possible results of this event.
The Mission Events Panel continued to analyze telemetry data
received
by MSC, with particular attention on data received in proximity to the
data dropout period during the Apollo 13 mission and on fan turnons
during
the flight.
The Board transmitted a formal listing of 62 requests for data,
analyses, and support tests required for Board review activity.
The Board continued to meet with individual Panels and support
offices to review the status of preliminary findings and work
completed.
MAY 5, 1970
The Board met in General Session to discuss the scope and conduct
of
support test activity, including careful documentation of test methods
and
application of test results.
MSC personnel briefed Panel Members on availability of additional
telemetry data in the MSC data bank in order to insure Board
considera-
tion of all possible useful data.
Panels commenced initial drafting of preliminary findings in
specific
areas, including summary descriptions of system performance during the
Apollo 13 flight.
The Board met with the MSC Investigation Team for complete review
of
the proposed test program.
MAY 6, 1970
Board Members, MSC personnel, and Members of NASA's Aerospace
Safety
Advisory Panel met for detailed discussions and evaluation of accident
review status and progress. The review covered oxygen tank questions,
recovery operations, and a mission simulation by MSC astronauts.
Panel Members continued to work on the preparation of preliminary
Panel drafts.
Chairman Cortright transmitted additional requests for tests to
MSC
and modified procedures for control of overall test activity relating
to
the Apollo 13 accident.
MAY 7, 1970
The General Board Session reviewed complete analysis and test
support
activities being conducted for the Board and MSC at various
governmental
and contractor installations.
Board and Panel Members met to discuss Ames laboratory tests con-
cerning liquid oxygen combustion initiation energies required in the
cryogenic oxygen tank used in the Apollo 13 SM.
Panel 1 Members reviewed mission control equipment and operating
procedures used during the Apollo 13 mission and reviewed actual
mission
events in detail.
The Panels continued to develop preliminary drafts of their
reviews
and analyses for consideration by the Board.
MAY 8, 1970
Dr. Robert Van Dolah, Bureau of Mines, joined the Board as a con-
sultant on combustion propagation and reviewed Apollo 13 Review Board
data
developed to date.
The General Board Session convened to review proposed report
format
and scope. An agreement was reached on appendices, on the structure of
the
report, and on the degree of detail to be included in individual Panel
reports.
Chairman Cortright assigned additional specific test overview re-
sponsibilities to members of the Apollo 13 Review activity.
Panel 1 conducted a formal-interview with the MSC Flight Director
covering all significant mission events from the standpoint of ground
controllers.
Panels 2 through 4 continued developing preliminary reports.
Panel 4
announced a formal schedule of interviews of MSC, contractors, and
NASA
Headquarters personnel.
Board Members explored in detail possible failure mode sequences
developed by MSC personnel involving ignition and combustion within
the SM
cryogenic oxygen tank.
The Board recessed for 3 days, leaving a cadre of personnel at
MSC to
edit preliminary drafts developed by the Panels and to schedule
further
activity for the week of May 11.
MAY 9, 1970
Board in recess.
MAY 10, 1970
Board in recess.
MAY 11, 1970
Board in recess. MSC support personnel continued work obtaining
additional technical data for Board review.
MAY 12, 1970
Board Members returned to MSC.
Board Members attended a General Session to review progress and
status of the report.
Panel Chairmen reported on individual progress of work and estab-
lished schedules for completion of analyses and evaluations.
Chairman Cortright reported on the Langley Research Center
support
test program aimed at simulation of SM panel ejection energy pulses.
MAY 13, 1970
Board Members reviewed preliminary drafts of report chapter on
Re-
view and Analysis and Panel 1 report on Mission Events.
Mission Events Panel Members interviewed Electrical, Electronic,
and
Communications Engineer (EECOM) and one of the Apollo 13 Flight
Directors
on activities which took place in the Mission Control Center (MCC)
during
and after the flight accident period.
Panel 4, Project Management Panel, conducted interviews with
princi-
pal Apollo 13 program personnel from MSC and contract organizations.
Panel Members continued drafting preliminary versions of Panel
re-
ports for review by the Board.
Manufacturing and Test Panel representatives discussed program
for
oxygen tank testing to be conducted at Beech Aircraft.
Board Members met in General Session to review report milestones
and
required test data for the week ahead.
MAY 14, 1970
Board met in General Session to review Panel report progress and
to
agree to firm schedules for completion of all Review Board
assignments.
Project Management Panel continued to interview key Apollo
project
personnel from NASA Centers and contractors.
Panel Members circulated first drafts of all Panel reports to
Board
Members for review and correction.
MAY 15, 1970
Mission Events Panel personnel interviewed Apollo 13 Command
Module
Pilot John Swigert to verify event chronology compiled by the Panel
and to
review crew responses during Apollo 13 mission.
Project Management Panel continued interviewing key project
personnel
with NASA Centers and contractors.
MSC personnel provide Board Members and Panel Chairmen with a
detailed briefing on all support tests and analyses being performed in
connection with the MSC and Board reviews.
Board Members met in Executive Session to review preliminary
drafts
of Panel reports and findings and determinations and to provide
additional
instructions and guidance to Panel Chairmen.
Panel Members continued to review and edit early Panel drafts and
to
compile reference data in support of findings.
MAY 16, 1970
Board met in General Session to review further revisions of
preliminary findings and determinations and to establish working
schedules
for completion of the Board report.
Panel Members continued to edit and refine Panel reports on basis
of
discussions with MSC personnel and further analysis of Apollo 13
documentation.
MAY 17, 1970
Draft material for all parts of Board report was reviewed by
Panel
Members and staff. Changes were incorporated in all draft material and
recirculated for additional review and comment.
Board Members met in General Session to review report progress
and to
examine results from recent support tests and analyses being conducted
at
various Government and contractor installations.
The Apollo 13 Review Board discussed a continuing series of
support
tests for recommendation to MSC following presentation of report and
recess of the Board.
MAY 18, 1970
Board Members reviewed Special Tests and Analyses Appendix of the
report and examined results of completed tests.
Board met in General Session to discuss control-procedures for
reproduction and distribution of Board report.
Mission Events Panel distributed a final draft of their report
for
review by Board Members.
Board reviewed a preliminary draft of findings and determinations
prepared by Panel Chairmen, Board Members, and Board Chairman.
A Manufacture and Test Panel representative reviewed special
oxygen
tank test programs at Beech Aircraft.
MAY 19. 1970
Board Members met in Executive Session to continue evaluation and
assessment of preliminary findings, determinations, and
recommendations
prepared by individual Board Members and Panel Chairmen.
Board met in General Session to review final draft of Mission
Events
Panel report.
Manufacture and Test Panel preliminary report was distributed to
Board Members for review and comment.
Design Panel preliminary report was distributed to Board Members
for
review and comment.
Design Panel Members met with MSC Team officials to discuss
further
test and analyses support for the Board.
MAY 20, 1970
Board Members met in Executive Session to review and evaluate
reports
from the Design Panel and from the Manufacturing and Test Panel.
Project Management Panel distributed final draft of its report to
Board Members for review and comment.
Chairman Cortright met with Mr. Bruce Lundin of the Aerospace
Safety
Advisory Panel to discuss progress of Board review and analysis.
MAY 21, 1970
Board Members met in Executive Session for final review of
Project
Management Panel report.
Board Members and others met with MSC officials to review in
detail
the activities and actions taken after the Apollo 204 accident
concerning
ignition flammability for materials and control in the CSM.
A third draft of preliminary findings, determinations, and
recommen-
dations was developed and circulated by the Chairman for review and
comment.
Arrangements were made with NASA Headquarters officials for pack-
aging, delivery, and distribution of the Board's final report.
Mission Events Panel conducted an interview with Lunar Module
Pilot
IIaise to review selected mission events bearing on the accident.
MAY 22, 1970
Mission Events Panel representatives met with MSC officials to
review
in detail several events which occurred during later flight stages.
Board met in Executive Session to assess latest drafts of
findings,
determinations, and recommendations circulated by the Chairman.
Board met in General Session to review total progress in all
report
areas and to establish final schedule for preparation of Board report.
Langley Research Center representative M. Ellis briefed the Board
on
ignition and combustion of materials in oxygen atmosphere tests being
con-
ducted in support of the Apollo 15 Review.
Board Observer I. I. Pinkel briefed the Board on Lewis Research
Center fire propagation tests involving Teflon.
MAY 23, 1970
Board Members reviewed Chapter 4 of Board report entitled "Review
and
Analysis."
Panel Chairmen reviewed draft findings and determinations
prepared by
the Board.
MAY 24, 1970
Board Members reviewed NASA Aerospace Safety Panel report
covering
Apollo activities during the period of 1968-69.
Board met in Executive Session for detailed review of support
test
status and progress and of documentation describing the results of
test
activity.
Board met in Executive Session for further review of findings,
determinations and recommendations.
MAY 25, 1970
Board met in Executive Session to review test progress and
decided
to postpone submittal of final report until June 8 in order to
consider
results of Langley Research Center panel ejection tests.
Board Members continued to review MSC Investigation Team
preliminary drafts and refine Apollo 13 data in the various Board
appendices.
Board met in Executive Session for further consideration of
findings,
determinations, and recommendations.
MAY 26, 1970
Board met in General Session and interviewed Astronaut James
Lovell
regarding crew understanding of inflight accident.
Board Members reviewed proposed MSC tank combustion test and
agreed
to test methodology and objectives.
Panel Members continued preparation of individual Panel reports.
MAY 27, 1970
Board and Panel Members received a detailed briefing on
thermostatic
switch failure during MSC heater tube temperature tests.
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel met with Chairman Cortright,
Board
Members, and Panel Chairmen to review Board progress and status of
findings and conclusions.
Board met in General Session to review status of Panel reports,
documentation of test data and results, and plans for report typing
and
review.
Board agreed to recess for several days to accumulate additional
test information on panel separation and full scale tank ignition
data.
MAY 28, 1970
Board in recess.
MAY 29, 1970
Board in recess.
MAY 30, 1970
Board in recess.
MAY 31, 1970
Board in recess.
JUNE 1, 1970
Board Members returned to MSC.
Board and Panel Members met in General Session to discuss
revisions
of Panel reports in light of latest information regarding thermostatic
switch failure during CDDT at KSC.
Board approved new schedule for Board report calling for final
versions of Panel reports by Monday, June 8.
JUNE 2, 1970
Chairman Cortright briefed the Press on the status of the Board's
work and future plans.
Board and Panel Members participated in a detailed interview and
discussion with MSC and contractor personnel regarding specific
coordina-
tion steps taken during oxygen tank no. 2 detanking operations at KSC.
Board Members met in Executive Session to review latest test
results
and to assess status of Board findings and determinations.
JUNE 3, 1970
Board and Panel Members met with MSC Program Office personnel for
a
detailed update of recent MSC information and analyses stemming from
on-
going test programs.
Board Members and Panel Chairmen completed final reviews of Panel
reports and also reviewed final draft of findings, determinations, and
recommendations.
Board and Panel Members received a detailed briefing on
thermostatic
switch questions with emphasis upon actions of various organizations
during and after detanking operations at KSC.
JUNE 4, 1970
Board Members met in Executive Session and completed final
revisions
of Chapter 4 of the Board summary.
Board and Panel Members witnessed a special full-scale tank
ignition
test performed at MSC.
Panel Chairmen completed final revisions of individual Panel
reports
and submitted copy to the Reports Editorial Office.
Board met in Executive Session and agreed to final schedule for
re-
port printing and delivery to the Administrator on June 15, 1970.
JUNE 5, 1970
Board Members met in Executive Session and completed work on
Chap-
ter 5 of the Board Summary Report (Findings, Determinations, and
Recom-
mendations).
Board Members reviewed final version of Project Management Panel
report and authorized printing as Appendix E.
Board Members Hedrick and Mark completed final tabulation of test
support activities performed for the Board.
Board Members reviewed films of special test activities performed
at various NASA Centers.
JUNE 6, 1970
Board met in Executive Session throughout the day and completed
its review of Chapter 5 of its report (Findings, Determinations, and
Recommendations).
Board Members completed review of analyses to be incorporated in
Appendix F, Special Tests and Analyses.
JUNE 7, 1970
The Board met in Executive Session and approved plans and
schedules
for final editorial review and publication of the Board report.
The Chairman recessed the Board until June 15 at which time the
Board is scheduled to reconvene in Washington, D.C., to present its
report to the NASA Administrator and Deputy Administrator.
CHAPTER 3
DESCRIPTION OF APOLLO 13 SPACE VEHICLE
AND MISSION SUMMARY
This chapter is extracted from Mission Operation Report No.
M-932-70,
Revision 3, published by the Program and Special Reports Division
(XP),
Executive Secretariat, NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
Discussion in this chapter is broken into two parts. Part l is
designed to acquaint the reader with the flight hardware and with the
mission monitoring, support, and control functions and capabilities.
Part
2 describes the Apollo 13 mission and gives a mission sequence of
events
summary.
PART 1 APOLLO/SATURN V SPACE VEHICLE
The primary flight hardware of the Apollo Program consists of the
Saturn V launch vehicle and Apollo spacecraft (fig. 3-1).
Collectively,
they are designated the Apollo/Saturn V space vehicle (SV). Selected
major
systems and subsystems of the space vehicle may be summarized as
follows.
SATURN V LAUNCH VEHICLE
The Saturn V launch vehicle (LV) is designed to boost up to
300,000
pounds into a 105-nautical mile earth orbit and to provide for lunar
payloads of over 100,000 pounds. The Saturn V LV consists of three
propulsive stages (S-IC, S-II, S-IVB), two interstages, and an
instrument
unit (IU).
S-IC Stage
The S-IC stage (fig. 3-2) is a large cylindrical booster, 138
feet
long and 33 feet in diameter, powered by five liquid propellant F-1
rocket
engines. These engines develop a nominal sea level thrust total of
approximately 7,650,000 pounds. The stage dry weight is approximately
288,000 pounds and the total loaded stage weight is approximately
5,031,500 pounds. The S-IC stage interfaces structurally and electri-
cally with the S-II stage. It also interfaces structurally, elec-
trically, and pneumatically with ground support equipment (GSE)
through
two umbilical service arms, three tail service masts, and certain
electronic systems by antennas. The S-IC stage is instrumented for
operational measurements or signals which are transmitted by its inde-
pendent telemetry system.
S-II Stage
The S-II stage (fig. 3-3) is a large cylindrical booster, 81.5
feet
long and 33 feet in diameter, powered by five liquid propellant J-2
rocket
engines which develop a nominal vacuum thrust of 230,000 pounds each
for a
total of 1,150,000 pounds. Dry weight of the S-II stage is
approximately
78,050 pounds. The stage approximate loaded gross weight is 1,075,000
pounds. The S-IC/S-II interstage weighs 10,460 pounds. The S-II stage
is
instrumented for operational and research and development measurements
which are transmitted by its independent telemetry system. The S-II
stage
has structural and electrical interfaces with the S-IC and S-IVB
stages,
and electric, pneumatic, and fluid interfaces with GSE through its
umbilicals and antennas.
S-IVB Stage
The S-IVB stage (fig. 3-4) is a large cylindrical booster 59 feet
long and 21.6 feet in diameter, powered by one J-2 engine. The S-IVB
stage is capable of multiple engine starts. Engine thrust is 203,000
pounds. This stage is also unique in that it has an attitude control
capability independent of its main engine. Dry weight of the stage is
25,050 pounds. The launch weight of the stage is 261,700 pounds. The
interstage weight of 8100 pounds is not included-in the stated
weights.
The stage is instrumented for functional measurements or signals which
are transmitted by its independent telemetry system.
The high performance J-2 engine as installed in the S-IVB stage
has a
multiple start capability. The S-IVB J-2 engine is scheduled to
produce a
thrust of 203,000 pounds during its first burn to earth orbit and a
thrust
of 178,000 pounds (mixture mass ratio of h.5:1) during the first 100
seconds of translunar injection. The remaining translunar injection
acceleration is provided at a thrust level of 203,000 pounds (mixture
mass
ratio of 5.0:1). The engine valves are controlled by a pneumatic
system
powered by gaseous helium which is stored in a sphere inside a start
bottle. An electrical control system that uses solid stage logic
elements
is used to sequence the start and shutdown operations of the engine.
Instrument Unit
The Saturn V launch vehicle is guided from its launch pad into
earth
orbit primarily by navigation, guidance, and control equipment located
in
the instrument unit (IU). The instrument unit is a cylindrical
structure
21.6 feet in diameter and 3 feet high installed on top of the S-IVB
stage.
The unit weighs 4310 pounds and contains measurements and telemetry,
command communications, tracking, and emergency detection system
components along with supporting electrical power and the
environmental
control system.
APOLLO SPACECRAFT
The Apollo spacecraft (S/C) is designed to support three men in
space
for periods up to 2 weeks, docking in space, landing on and returning
from
the lunar surface, and safely entering the earth's atmosphere. The
Apollo
S/C consists of the spacecraft-to-LM adapter (SLA), the service module
(SM), the command module (CM), the launch escape system (LES), and the
lunar module (LM). The CM and SM as a unit are referred to as the
command
and service module (CSM).
Spacecraft-to-LM Adapter
The SLA (fig. 3-5) is a conical structure which provides a
structural
load path between the LV and SM and also supports the LM. Aerodynami-
cally, the SLA smoothly encloses the irregularly shaped LM and
transitions
the space vehicle diameter from that of the upper stage of the LV to
that
of the SM. The SLA also encloses the nozzle of the SM engine and the
high
gain antenna.
Spring thrusters are used to separate the LM from the SLA. After
the
CSM has docked with the LM, mild charges are fired to release the four
adapters-which secure the LM in the SLA. Simultaneously, four spring
thrusters mounted on the lower (fixed) SLA panels push against the LM
landing gear truss assembly to separate the spacecraft from the launch
vehicle.
Service Module
The service module (SM) (fig. 3-6) provides the main spacecraft
pro-
pulsion and maneuvering capability during a mission. The SM provides
most
of the spacecraft consumables (oxygen, water, propellant, and
hydrogen)
and supplements environmental, electrical power, and propulsion
requirements of the CM. The SM remains attached to the CM until it is
jettisoned just before CM atmospheric entry.
Structure.- The basic structural components are forward and aft
(upper and lower) bulkheads, six radial beams, four sector honeycomb
panels, four reaction control system honeycomb panels, aft heat
shield,
and a fairing. The forward and aft bulkheads cover the top and bottom
of
the SM. Radial beam trusses extending above the forward bulkhead
support
an secure the CM. The radial beams are made of solid aluminum alloy
which
has been machined and chem-milled to thicknesses varying between 2
inches
and 0.018 inch. Three of these beams have compression pads and the
other
three have shear-compression pads and tension ties. Explosive charges
in
the center section of these tension ties are used to separate the CM
from
the SM.
An aft heat shield surrounds the service propulsion engine to
protect
the SM from the engine's heat during thrusting. The gap between the CM
and
the forward bulkhead of the SM is closed off with a fairing which is
composed of eight electrical power system radiators alternated with
eight
aluminum honeycomb panels. The sector and reaction control system
panels
are 1 inch thick and are made of aluminum honeycomb core between two
aluminum face sheets. The sector panels are bolted to the radial
beams.
Radiators used to dissipate heat from the environmental control
subsystem
are bonded to the sector panels on opposite sides of the SM. These
radiators are each about 30 square feet in area.
The SM interior is divided into six sectors, or bays, and a
center
section. Sector one is currently void. It is available for
installation of
scientific or additional equipment should the need arise. Sector two
has
part of a space radiator and a reaction control system (RCS) engine
quad
(module) on its exterior panel and contains the service propulsion
system (SPS) oxidizer sump tank. This tank is the larger of the two
tanks
that hold the oxidizer for the SPS engine. Sector three has the rest
of
the space radiator and another RCS engine quad on its exterior panel
and
contains the oxidizer storage tank. This tank is the second of two SPS
oxidizer tanks and feeds the oxidizer sump tank in sector two. Sector
four
contains most of the electrical power generating equipment. It
contains
three fuel cells, two cryogenic oxygen and two cryogenic hydrogen
tanks,
and a power control relay box. The cryogenic tanks supply oxygen to
the
environmental control subsystem and oxygen and hydrogen to the fuel
cells.
Sector five has part of an environmental control radiator and an RCS
engine quad on the exterior panel and contains the SPS engine fuel
sump
tank. This tank feeds the engine and is also connected by feed lines
to
the storage tank in sector six. Sector six has the rest of the
environmental control raditor and an RCS engine quad on its exterior
and
contains the SPS engine fuel storage tank which feeds the fuel sump
tank
in sector five. The tanks are used to provide helium pressurant for
the
SPS propellant tanks.
Propulsion - Main spacecraft propulsion is provided by the
20500-pound thrust SPS. The SPS engine is a restartable, non-
throttleable
engine which uses nitrogen tetroxide (N204) as an oxidizer and a 50-50
mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetrical-dimethylhydrazine (UDMX) as
fuel.
(These propellants are hypergolic, i.e., they burn spontaneously when
combined without need for an igniter.) This engine is used for major
velocity changes during the mission, such as midcourse corrections,
lunar
orbit insertion, transearth injection, and CSM aborts. The SPS engine
responds to automatic firing commands from the guidance and navigation
system or to commands from manual controls. The engine assembly is
gimbal-mounted to allow engine thrust-vector alignment with the
spacecraft
center of mass to preclude tumbling. Thrust-vector alignment control
is
maintained by the crew. The SM RCS provides for maneuvering about and
along three axes.
Additional SM systems.- In addition to the systems already
described,
the SM has communication antennas, umbilical connections, and several
exterior mounted lights. The four antennas on the outside of the SM
are
the steerable S-band high-gain antenna, mounted on the aft bulkhead;
two
VHF omnidirectional antennas, mounted on opposite sides of the module
near
the top; and the rendezvous radar transponder antenna, mounted in the
SM
fairing.
Seven lights are mounted in the aluminum panels of the fairing.
Four lights (one red, one green, and two amber) are used to aid the
astronauts in docking: one is a floodlight which can be turned on to
give astronauts visibility during extravehicular activities, one is a
flashing beacon used to aid in rendezvous, and one is a spotlight used
in rendezvous from 500 feet to docking with the LM.
SM/CM separation.- Separation of the SM from the CM occurs
shortly
before entry. The sequence of events during separation is controlled
automatically by two redundant service module jettison controllers
(SMUC)
located on the forward bulkhead of the SM.
Command Module
The command module (CM) (fig. 3-7) serves as the command,
control,
and communications center for most of the mission. Supplemented by the
SM,
it provides all life support elements for three crewmen in the mission
environments and for their safe return to the earth's surface. It is
capable of attitude control about three axes and some lateral lift
translation at high velocities in earth atmosphere. It also permits LM
attachment, CM/LM ingress and egress, and serves as a buoyant vessel
in
open ocean.
Structure - The CM consists of two basic structures joined
together:
the inner structure (pressure shell) and the outer structure (heat
shield). The inner structure, the pressurized crew compartment, is
made of
aluminum sandwich construction consisting of a welded aluminum inner
skin,
bonded aluminum honeycomb core, and outer face ***. The outer
structure
is basically a heat shield and is made of stainless steel- brazed
honeycomb brazed between steel alloy face sheets. Parts of the area
between the inner and outer sheets are filled with a layer of fibrous
insulation as additional heat protection.
Display and controls.- The main display console (MDC) (fig. 3-8)
has
been arranged to provide for the expected duties of crew members.
These
duties fall into the categories of Commander, CM Pilot, and LM Pilot,
occupying the left, center, and right couches, respectively. The CM
Pilot
also acts as the principal navigator. All controls have been designed
so
they can be operated by astronauts wearing gloves. The cotrols are
predominantly of four basic types: toggle switches, rotary switches
with
click-stops, thumb-wheels, and push buttons. Critical switches are
guarded
so that they cannot be thrown inadvertently. In addition, some
critical
controls have locks that must be released before they can be operated.
Flight controls are located on the left center and left side of
the
MDC, opposite the Commander. These include controls for such
subsystems as
stabilization and control, propulsion, crew safety, earth landing, and
emergency detection. One of two guidance and navigation computer
panels
also is located here, as are velocity, attitude, and altitude
indicators