Re: SpaceX Falcon Ready to Go - Again.
- From: "Tom Cuddihy" <tom.cuddihy@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: 13 Dec 2005 19:08:54 -0800
Josh Hopkins wrote:
> "Tom Cuddihy" <tom.cuddihy@xxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
> news:1134070432.895490.130580@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >
> > Ed Kyle wrote:
> > > Tom Cuddihy wrote:
> > > > Ed Kyle wrote:
> > > > > Ed Kyle wrote:
> > > > > BTW, there has been a lot of talk about how wonderful
> > > > > a place Kwaj is for launching rockets. The truth is that
> > > > > there are so many occupied islands in the region to the
> > > > > east that launch azimuths are suprisingly limited.
> > > > > Azimuths from 55 degrees to 110 degrees present
> > > > > downrange problems, for example.
> > > > >
> > > > > - Ed Kyle
> > > >
> > > > How much of a problem is that really though? If a 1 mi^2 island 100
> > > > miles to the northwest is downrange, the chances that any kind of
> > > > launch would actually hit there are miniscule.
> > >
> > > The problem is that it isn't one island, it is "approximately"
> > > 1,225 islands comprising 29 atolls. Unfortunately for SpaceX,
> > > Kwajalein is on the western side of the Republic of the Marshall
> > > Islands, which places most of the "approximately" 1,225 islands,
> > > and 60,000 islanders, on the downrange side, space launch wise.
> > >
> > > See, for example: "http://www.rmiembassyus.org/General%20Info.htm"
> > >
> > > - Ed Kyle
> >
> > First of all, pretty much all useful launch azimuths vary from true
> > north to east, and the single alternate launch azimuth to the southwest
> > for polar sun synchronous orbits. (though there's no real reason not
> > launch with an azimuth of 352T)
>
> Your impression of what constitutes "useful" launch azimuths is purely a
> result of American geography. Launching to the southeast (on the appropriate
> azimuth) results in the same orbit and the same performance (to first and
> second order) as launching on the equivalent azimuth to the northeast. Both
> quadrants are equally useful. The only reason Americans launch predominantly
> northeast instead of southeast is that the Bahamas and Los Angeles are
> southeast of our major launch sites. Launches from Wallops *do* commonly go
> southeast. Likewise, we launch southwest out of Vandenberg only because
> there is land to the northwest. People at launch sites on the northern edge
> of continents - notably Kourou and Plesetsk - consider the northerly
> direction to be the normal one for sunsynchronous missions.
My impression of what constitutes "useful" launch azimuths has more to
do with destinations than safety. I'm lookin from the 4 deg lat. of
Kwajalein and guessing what the best trajectories for maximizing
payload and utility would be. I don't have a wealth of experience in
what those useful trajectories are, since yes, most of the launches
I've studied take place from American pads. But what is to be gained
from launching southeast from 4 deg N? You're still going to be in a 4
deg inclined orbit, right?
>
> > Second, 100% of those people are located on less than 50 sq. miles of
> > land (obtained by subtracting some 20 sq. miles of the bigger
> > uninhabited atolls from the total 70 sq. miles.)
> > spread out over 750,000 sq. miles of ocean. Let's look at probability
> > here: assume a 100% chance a rocket launched from kwajalein is going to
> >
> > come down somewhere in the Marshall Islands (which is rediculous) that
> > still gives it about a 50/750000 = 0.007% chance of even hitting a
> > populated island--that's not populated area, but populated island. And
> > this assumes a uniform probability of hitting a populated island.
>
> I don't know the details of how the Army does range safety in the Marshall
> islands, but on the Eastern and Western Test Ranges (i.e. the Cape and
> Vandenberg) the rule is that overflight is allowed if, and only if, you can
> show that the casualty expection is less than 30x10e-6, or thirty fatalities
> per million launches - a few orders of magnitude lower than your figure.
>
> In order to compute this, you examine the planned flight corridor (or more
> precisely, the corridor of the potential impact points, which isn't
> necessarily underneath the flight corridor), the probability of failure at
> each point in time, how far off the planned track the rocket could get, the
> size and quantity of the debris that would be created by the failure, the
> population living in the impact zone at each of those points in time, and
> estimate what the odds are that anyone would actually get hit. It is routine
> for the impact point track to safely cross continents late in flight, in
> part because the large population exposed is negated by the very brief
> duration they are at risk. (Launches out of the Cape almost always have IIP
> tracks over Europe or Africa, and polar launches out of Kourou cross
> Canada). But the risk within the first thousand or so miles of the launch
> site is much higher because the rocket is moving more slowly and spends much
> more time there, and therefore it's very difficult to meet the safety
> threshold over land anywhere near the launch site.
>
> One important point here is that a rocket launched from Kwajelein isn't
> going to fly back and forth over the entire 750,000 sq. mi. ocean range of
> the Marshal Islands. It's going to follow a pretty narrow path, and most of
> the risk is going to be concentrated along and adjacent to that path. If
> that path happens not to cross any populated islands, then it's probably
> safe, and probably going to be allowed. If it does cross near an island, the
> probability may be much higher than the 0.007 you computed, and it's very
> likely not safe.
>
> > In fact, the majority of RMI's population is in unuseful azimuths to
> > the southeast, like the only 'city' on Majuro, so a realistic
> > probablity would give an even lower number. Add in probablities of
> > failure to begin with, realities of ballistic physics, and the actual
> > probability of death or injury to a person and it's just rediculously
> > silly as a concern.
>
> It's very easy for people who really want to launch rockets to wave their
> hands and claim that the probabilities are rediculously low. That's why
> there are separate groups of people who are responsible for safety, and not
> for rocket launching. Most of them are really pretty reasonable. If you do
> the math and prove to them that it is safe, they'll let you launch.
Nuclear regulators are pretty reasonable too. That doesn't mean the
price of compliance isn't many orders of magnitude higher than the
actual risk cost should be. That's my point--safety for uninvolved
parties is approached with a nuclear mentality. (Don't get me started
on nuclear mentalities.) If the first airplane flights had been
regulated this way, the commercial air market never would have evolved,
becuase you never would have been able to get an airport close enough
to populated areas to allow the kind of investment and experimentation
that moved airplanes from the garage to the US Postal service, and on
to passenger service.
>
> > Our whole launch safety process needs an entire rethinking. If the same
> > principles currently used with likelihood of failure were applied to
> > aviation, no major city in America would qualify for an airport.
>
> Funny you should bring that up. The 1950s US law that established the range
> safety authority used as its primary benchmark the objective that third
> party civilians should be exposed to no more risk from rocket launches than
> they already were from aircraft spontaneously crashing on them. As I
> understand it, that's where the 30x10e-6 value comes from. Despite this
> week's incident at Midway, and the occasional Cessna or F-16 crashing in an
> urban area, aircraft are allowed to operate over cities because they are
> demonstrably much, much less likely to fail than rockets have been to date.
> Therefore, many more people can be in the threatened zone without exceeding
> a reasonable casualty expectation threshold.
That airplane risk is a stochastic risk--we take the real, measured
risk to uninvolved personnel from airplane crashes--then we conjure up
a predicited risk for the rocket launch by breaking the whole thing
down into many discrete predicitive elements the way you outlined.
Nobody knows the stochastic real risk for rockets because
stochastically it's been zero--because we DON'T take risks. But ask
yourself this--if the first airplane designers had had to take the same
process, with no stochastic probability history to back them up (as
they had in the 50's), and had had to break down their safety in the
same way, would we even have transcontinental flight today? I doubt
more than 4 or 5 airports would ever have been built.
Certainly I'm not claiming that range safety is the main factor holding
back entrepenurial spaceflight. But the entire 'safety first' paradigm
has gotten a bit rediculous, don't you think?
.
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