Re: Foam still a key concern for shuttle launch

Once again, you might want to check what the liability for potential
losses if another space shuttle tragedy occurs. Your marginal cost
statement from above does not include output of the shuttle, and that
is the space station $ 25 billion worth of output, and therefore you
have made an isolated evaluation for the results of safety investments.
Basing your cost evaluation for any safety upgrade on the reduction of
risk alone, does not truly model the economics of the orbiter system,
as it disregards output. No substitute for space station construction
exists, and therefore potential losses for another tragedy are not
reflected the approx $ 1.1 billion reported by nasa in property loses
from the sts-107 tragedy, which by the way did not include flight
training and insurance payout costs. In addition stating what the
millions of dollars in losses per a day results from "not launching",
is setting nasa up to repeat mistakes of the passed by placing undo
pressures "to launch", something the rogers commission stated was a
factor in the sts-51l tragedy, and the caib in the sts-107 tragedy. As
mentioned before nasa has invested $ 2.2 billion in rtf, but this money
came at the cost of previously budgeted safety upgrades, such as the
eapu, an action described as hallow by the caib (page 188, col 2 par
8). Now if you would please present your research and sources for
you're conclusion that rtf testing has #1 "exceeded the point of
diminishing returns" and #2 that nasa is wasting time and money
"attempting to fix an unfixable problem", otherwise you are just
repeating you're non-validated non-correlated un-informed opinion.
Providing a statement from the administrator "that the ship is going
to shed foam until we stop flying" does not validate that it is an
unfixable problem, as he also admits that "think" they have
"contained and controlled" the foam shedding events since the
sts-107 tragedy. The original cited article in this thread states that
testing will continue, a fact that demonstrates nasa deems what the
caib determined was the cause for the sts-107 tragedy has still not
been fully understood, also demonstrated by the words of the nasa
administrator in how they have limited the conditions of foam
liberation, not understood it. This lack of scientific understanding
for the direct cause of foam liberation means you cannot quantify what
the actual risks or "reduced risks" are, as you have no metric or
reference, therefore you can only qualify them as the administrator did
in his statement. Now applying an isolated economic theory to the
shuttle by stating we have "exceeded the point of diminishing
returns" based on $ 2.2 billion invested, multiplied by the reduced
risks is not possible, because you cannot state what the actual number
of risk reduction are, much less account for the orbiters systems
actual output, and that is space station construction.
tom

The caib stated in reference to the rogers commision report, and the
shuttle independent assesment team of 2000.
caib report vol 1 page 198 par 1
"The harmful effects of schedule pressure identified in previous
reports had returned"

Now randy wrote:
"If the foam fixes are holding up the program, they cost ten million
dollars per day. If not, they cost what they cost, but it's hard to
imagine that they're worth the expected value of a Shuttle loss at this
point."

randy then asserted without citation, please provide your research as
to how you have concluded the probabilities in your assertion.
"The chances of either, at this point (at least due to foam) are very
small"
"We've been doing it, long past the point of diminishing returns."

randy then quoted the interview with administrator griffin.
"Q: But this environment is difficult in the sense that if you look
at something like the foam on the external tank hard enough, you're
bound to find something.
A: That's true. Speaking generically, we know foam comes off this ship.
Our goal has been over the last three years to remove large pieces of
foam so that they can't come off and to contain and control the foam
releases to some appropriate threshold. We think we've done that. This
ship is going to shed foam until we stop flying it."

Rand Simberg wrote:
On 16 Aug 2006 11:44:24 -0700, in a place far, far away,
columbiaaccidentinvestigation@xxxxxxxxx made the phosphor on my
monitor glow in such a way as to indicate that:

Once again, you might want to check what the liability for potential
losses if another space shuttle tragedy occurs. Your marginal cost
statement from above does not include output of the shuttle, and that
is the space station $ 25 billion worth of output, and therefore you
have made an isolated evaluation for the results of safety investments.

<snip gibberish>

Look, loon. Do you expect anyone to read your incomprehensible
gibberish when you can't even find the return key?

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Foam still a key concern for shuttle launch
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