Re: Bush says about the shuttle....and that the White House would not be all that upset if it never flew again.
- From: "Bob Haller" <hallerb@xxxxxxx>
- Date: 17 Oct 2005 19:47:24 -0700
Then theres this.....
Keith Cowing
Monday, October 17, 2005
NASA is faced with a dilemma right now: It wants to fly 19 Space
Shuttle missions - 18 to the International Space Station (ISS) and one
mission to service the Hubble Space Telescope between now and the end
of FY 2010. The problem is that NASA simply does not have the money to
do this. As it has been preparing its FY2007 budget NASA identified
$5.6 billion in so-called "over-guideline" costs needed to support
these missions - at the rate it wanted to fly the missions.
Two alternate approaches are currently under serious consideration - in
real time - at NASA. One, the so-called "Serial Processing" option
would reduce the shuttle flight rate to 2 missions per year, cut the
workforce, stop building the ISS, and live with the consequences.
The other approach would fuse current Space Shuttle, ISS, and
Exploration development closely together such that existing
capabilities could support emerging ones - all this serving to allow
ISS assembly to continue further.
NASA is still deliberating internally on what approach to take with
regard to the formulation of the FY2007 budget.
Serial Processing
The Serial Processing approach would only allow 2 shuttle flights per
year and would not have any capability to add missions if the need
arose. This would mean approximately 8 missions would be flown before
the shuttle fleet would be retired - 7 to the ISS and 1 to Hubble. In
the year that Hubble was serviced, there would be only one shuttle
flight to the ISS thus requiring a new arrangement with Russia for crew
transport (assuming Iran Nonproliferation Act changes have been made),
a longer stay for any Americans on board, or a period when no Americans
are on board ISS.
The assembly of the ISS would be halted almost immediately and the
remaining shuttle flights to ISS would be for logistics purposes only -
to support the configuration which is now on-orbit. The shuttle
propulsion workforce would be cut and would only be able to support the
reduced shuttle flight rate and would not be able to support any
exploration development (CLV and Heavy Launch Vehicle). This propulsion
expertise would then need to be recreated a few years hence when the
CEV and heavy launch vehicles begin to fly.
Other issues to be considered include the construction and launching of
a new docking adaptor NASA is planning for the ISS which would allow
alternate launch vehicles to dock with and service the ISS - and
whether this needs to be launched on a priority basis so as to allow
private sector resupply of the ISS. An RFP on the topic of commercial
ISS servicing was promised by Mike Griffin last summer - but has yet to
materialize.
Under the serial processing option shuttle processing would be reduced
to a single shift with one orbiter processed after another. There would
no longer be any simultaneous or parallel shuttle processing as is now
the case. At least one of the orbiters would also likely be retired
sooner rather than later. Workforce cuts from United Space Alliance
would start in FY 2006 with 600 or so people laid off - rising to an
eventual total cut by FY 2010 of over 6,000.
Not flying ISS hardware developed (at great expense) by the
International Partners is not going to go down well. Not only have the
partners sunk substantial sums of money into the ISS program, they may
have legal recourse to seek financial compensation for their
investments. Moreover, although he has not made this an important part
of his exploration plans, Mike Griffin would find greatly diminished
enthusiasm among other countries for participation in NASA's
exploration plans.
Plan B
The other approach, proposed by the Space Operations Mission
Directorate (SOMD), is to start development of shuttle derived launch
vehicles as defined in NASA's exploration architecture with a merger of
and SOMD and Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) staff and
organizations. The two efforts would have their budgets integrated such
that continuing shuttle work as well as CEV and CLV work would be done
in a coordinated fashion. If the economic efficiencies are achieved
then the serial processing approach could be avoided.
As part of this integrated plan test flights of the CEV's Crew Launch
Vehicle (CLV) and heavy launch vehicle systems could be done utilizing
existing shuttle personnel and facilities. The propulsion workforce
that supports shuttle operations could also support CEV development and
testing and thus provide the core of any future support the new launch
vehicles would eventually require.
Of course, to anyone who has worked in human spaceflight over the past
decades, this should sound familiar. This approach follows a
long-standing NASA propensity to stick things together when they are
apart (to save money or make things more efficient) and then pull them
apart when that solution does not work (because of dissimilarities in
approaches) - only to try and put them back together years down the
road. This time, trying to force operations and development together is
being proposed with the simple hope that it will save money.
This happened during and after the Space Station Freedom Program (Code
M and Code D for those of you who remember) when Space Shuttle and
Space Station (then under development) were together in one
organization - and then split apart - and then put back together. More
recently, SOMD and ESMD were created as separate organizations - one
(SOMD) - with a focus on the operation of exiting systems, the other
(ESMD) with a focus on the development of new systems.
Both of these proposed options aren't trying to build and operate the
best hardware. Rather they are attempts by NASA to try and do as much
as possible with an impossibly small budget - all while trying to take
on a whole new development program which will inevitably suffer from
the same problems as have plagued those that came before it.
What's Next?
Mike Griffin has give the go-ahead to take the next 90 days to try and
see if this alternative plan could work. If the economics do not pan
out, NASA would default back to the serial processing approach.
One has to ask, however, if killing the shuttle prematurely and
deliberately hobbling the space station was what the President called
for in January 2004. Moreover, you also have to wonder how this will
sit with Congress. If NASA is so eager to halt the ISS before it can
finally deliver on 20-plus years of promises - and risk international
animosity in the process - what is to stop NASA from walking away from
its new exploration plans next decade - just as things are about to
start happening.
NASA has an attention deficit disorder. At some point NASA has to grow
up and decide to finish things they promised the taxpayer, politicians,
and foreign partners that they'd do - and not walk away from these
things when the luster fades or the money is tight - or when the going
gets tough.
.
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