Re: The foam did not do it

The purpose of this investigation has been to independently establish a
cause for the loss of Columbia and the STS-107 crew. The caib uses the
plasma as a catch all solution, but seems to be bound once again by a
“modest breach” of 140 sq inches, and the real physical properties
of plasma, thus “sneak flow” had to occur. This unique flow of
matter was even explained by a caib member as “smart plasma”.
Let’s take a moment and step back, most things or explanations in the
physical universe appear complicated, but when we finally do understand
them, we usually find how simple the solution was. So when the
explanation for an accident is so convoluted and new physical
properties are invented, it’s time to be open to a different
solution. As I have been analyzing the caib report there are many
statements for which I could not find satisfactory answers, or factual
scientifically arrived conclusions. It is very healthy for questions,
and debate to take place when such events happen in history, or we may
never learn from our mistakes. For instance the starfire image is not
used by the caib in any conclusions or findings, but is placed amongst
the final conclusions, without mention of the fact that an asymmetric
profile would demonstrate anomalous thermal events. Presentation of
information is a choice of the authors, not the reader, and publishers
of scientific information have an obligation to present information in
an unbiased manner. If a theory is true it is reproducible, and
subject to peer review, then questioning a report or theory does not
require motivation, nor is the reader responsible for burden of proof,
but instead it is the caib’s foam impact theory.

LACK OF CORRELATION what force was used for foam impact, and what force
what used for correlation to sts-107’s ascent data?

Caib report vol2 part d12 page 382
“Impact on Panel #8 for Test Impact Condition
A computation was performed for the impact test condi-tions on the
Panel #8 impact, where the angles were =5.5, =5.0, with an
impact speed of 777 ft/s (237 m/s). The ge-ometry of Panel #8 is more
complicated, as there are various thicknesses of RCC in the panel as
described above. “

Caib report vol2 part d12 page 380
“RCC Panel #8
777 ft/s (237 m/s) =5.5°, =5.0° 25.5” up from carrier panel
7.3” from 7-8 T-seal 30° clocking angle Load: 9150 lb (4.07×109
dynes) Panel stress: 43.2 ksi (298 MPa) Rib stress: 33.4 ksi (230 MPa)
Displacement: 2.5 in (63 mm) Velocity: 137 ft/s (41.8 m/s) “

Critical thinking and use of logic is important for the application of
the science. Cross referencing and analysis of the caib’s foam
impact theory, reveals a lack of correlation. The caib provided many
many facts, but did not correlate the forces required for rcc failure
at the time foam impact to any sensor data on Columbia from ascent on
jan 16, 2003.


Below is a just a sampling of the sources I have used in conducting
three years of research. All the information that I have used to show
the invalidity of foam impact causing a breach has come strictly from
nasa and caib sources. The simple fact remains the caib could not and
did not verify foam impact causing a breach through columbia’s own
sensor data, and we have all learned the hard way when a vehicle is
speaking to you as Columbia could through her sensors, we should
listen. The foam did not breach Columbias left wing on ascent on jan
16 2003, or the on board sensors would have detected it, that is a
fact.

1. caib report vol 1,
vol 2 part 1-20, vol III part 1-4 ,vol IV part 1-IV,vol V part 1-13,
vol 6 part 1-10
2. STS-107 Flight rules, STS-107 in flight anomalies, STS-107 shift
reports 1-16, STS-107 MMT team notes jan 16-30, STS-107 press kit
4. STS-90 orbiter processing notes, STS-90 in flight anomalies,
5. STS-93 orbiter processing notes, STS-93 in flight anomalies,
6. STS-109 orbiter processing notes, STS-109 in flight anomalies,
7. Nasa/cr-1998-208859
8. Nasa Technical Memorandum 104267
9. Nasa/tp-2003-210780
10. Ntsb/aar-02/01 pb2002-910402
11. Nsts 104046 revision d
12. Nasa-hdbk-7005 march 13, 2001
13. “Hypervelocity impact resistance of reinforced carbon–carbon/
carbon–foam thermal protection systems
M. Grujicic a,*, B. Pandurangan a, C.L. Zhao a, S.B. Biggers a, D.R.
Morgan b
a Department of Mechanical Engineering, Clemson University, 241
Engineering Innovation Building,
Received 24 March 2005; accepted 20 July 2005”
14. Nasa Technical Memorandum 88281
15. Nasa Technical Memorandum 104761
16. Space Shuttle Program Flight Planning and Assessment
Engineering Design
17. Final Report: September 12, 1996
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) DC-XA
Clipper Graham Mishap Investigation Report
18. “A MODEL OF COMMUNICATION IN SUPPORT OF
DISTRIBUTED ANOMALY RESPONSE AND REPLANNING”
19. http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/delta2_launch_030129.html
20. http://www.aero.org/news/current/picosat-jpl.html
21. http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/spacewarn/spx591.html
22. http://celestrak.com/NORAD/documentation/tle-fmt.shtml
23. http://www.michiganaero.com/satellitedocking/index.shtml
24. http://legislative.nasa.gov/hearings/readdy9-23.html
25. INTRODUCTION TO THEORY OF HYPERSONIC
FLOW AND AEROTHERMODYNAMICS OF
ATMOSPHERIC ENTRY
26. http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/reference/sodb/212.pdf
27
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/1988/sts-apu.html#sts-apu
28. Space Travel A Technological Frontier
Alan R. De Old, Joseph W. Judge, Terri-Lynn Judge
Davis Publications, Inc, Worcester, and Massachusetts: 1989
29. Space Technology
Kenneth Gatland
Harmony Books, NY, NY: 1981
30. Houston Chronicle.com
HoustonChronicle.com - Special Report: Columbia's Last mission
http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/special/03/columbia/whathappened/index.html
31 NASA STS 107 mission home page http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: The foam did not do it
    ... ASCENT INFORMATION ... The caib stated clearly the alleged event of high velocity foam impact ... was not detected by Columbia many sensors. ...
    (sci.space.shuttle)
  • Re: The foam did not do it
    ... If the alleged breach or rcc failure occurred on sts-107's ascent jan ... The caib extensively provided data from ... The foam impact testing proved a hole could be produced by foam impact, ...
    (sci.space.shuttle)