Re: Shuttle Safety [was: Re...

Our discussion about orbiter safety can be healthy and progressive but
not while using illogical statements such as "as safe as you want it
to be" which is essentially an attempt to secure acceptance of a
conclusion by your emotional identification with what I want rather
than on the basis of adequate scientific evidence.

Given the fact I have cited nasa's own sources in demonstrating that
possible compromises in the safety margins the
administrator/engineers/managers rely on for their decision making
process, it is therefore not my happiness that determines validity,
just as your emotional demands for funding sources does not, but what
does is the scientific body of knowledge from which I have based my
conclusions that the current shuttle pra does not reflect reality.

The concept of funding a qra is to obtain an understanding of the
actual risks, and given the fact the fod/contamination/sedimentation of
the orbiters hydraulic fluid has demonstrated a pattern of causing
anomalies in crit1 components, and yet this cause was neglected in the
current risk analysis, the current risk analysis does not reflect
reality, and overarches with its estimations of risk. Therefore nasa
managers cannot state what the risk values are with any mission using
the current overarching pra, and an updated qra is necessary to gain
back what we thought had, and that is an understanding of the orbiter
system. This understanding has not been achieved as I mentioned above
because the many entities and centers comprising the shuttle program
have never had their data standardized for a complete analysis.

The purpose of setting a priority of safety first does in fact break
the repeated cycle you mentioned, as many necessary safety upgrades
such as the EAPU have fallen by the way side caught in such a vicious
cycle, of proving that an unknown reduction in risk is worth the
investment. I have cited many sources from nasa that stated the
necessity improvement of risk analysis and safety in the shuttle
program all the way from the rogers commission to the caib, and the
historical slippage in safety that occurred after the challenger was
partially due to budgetary concerns, the caib determined budgetary
concerns as well contributed to the Columbia tragedy, and still as im
attempting to place safety first in order to prioritize our spending
with safety upgrades you argue about where the money is going to come
from. It all starts by us subjectively deciding that safety is the
highest priority, and the congress who we motivate through political
activism will reflect our priorities and provide more funding for
safety in the space program. This in increase in safety will start
with a complete program qra, which will provide the administrator,
managers/engineers with a better understanding of the actual risks
associated with the orbiter, and be able to prioritize safety upgrades
based on this updated risk assessment, request funding based on those
priorities, which will provide the program the best chance to safely
complete the stated operational mission of space station construction
by 2010.
tom


Malcolm Bacchus wrote:
In article <1153696930.626710.261890@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
columbiaaccidentinvestigation@xxxxxxxxx (columbiaaccidentinvestigation)
wrote:

*From:* "columbiaaccidentinvestigation"
<columbiaaccidentinvestigation@xxxxxxxxx>
*Date:* 23 Jul 2006 16:22:10 -0700

I am seeking cost estimates and conducting interviews to determine the
cost for a complete shuttle program qra, and will post the information
as I receive it.

snip

The purpose of setting a priority of safety first does in fact break
the repeated cycle you mentioned,

Don't post them as you receive them. Come back to us when you have an
estimate for (a) the cost and (b) the time it will take to make the
shuttle as save as you want it to be.

Malcolm B

.

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