Re: Shuttle Safety [was: Re...

I am seeking cost estimates and conducting interviews to determine the
cost for a complete shuttle program qra, and will post the information
as I receive it. Gathering estimates will start funding estimation
process, and like many jobs yes prioritizing is a necessity, that is
why I stated previously in this thread the
FOD/contamination/sedimentation of the hydraulic fluid is a key place
to start as the fluid connects crit1 components.

But once again, the scientific validity of my postings in this thread
do not rest on my subjective ability to convince people to spend money,
for example the qualities for funding that you have established are
subjective as well, and if properly motivated you may deem additional
funding for safety upgrades, which is not a scientifically arrived at
conclusion, but changes with you opinion.

The concept of funding a qra is to obtain an understanding of the
actual risks, and given the fact the fod/contamination/sedimentation of
the orbiters hydraulic fluid has demonstrated a pattern of causing
anomalies in crit1 components, and yet this cause was neglected in the
current risk analysis, the current risk analysis does not reflect
reality, and overarches with its estimations of risk. Therefore nasa
managers cannot state what the risk values are with any mission using
the current overarching pra, and an updated qra is necessary to gain
back what we thought had, and that is an understanding of the orbiter
system. This understanding has not been achieved as I mentioned above
because the many entities and centers comprising the shuttle program
have never had their data standardized for a complete analysis.

The purpose of setting a priority of safety first does in fact break
the repeated cycle you mentioned, as many necessary safety upgrades
such as the EAPU have fallen by the way side caught in such a vicious
cycle, of proving that an unknown reduction in risk is worth the
investment. I have cited many sources from nasa that stated the
necessity improvement of risk analysis and safety in the shuttle
program all the way from the rogers commission to the caib, and the
historical slippage in safety that occurred after the challenger was
partially due to budgetary concerns, the caib determined budgetary
concerns as well contributed to the Columbia tragedy, and still as im
attempting to place safety first in order to prioritize our spending
with safety upgrades you argue about where the money is going to come
from. It all starts by us subjectively deciding that safety is the
highest priority, and the congress who we motivate through political
activism will reflect our priorities and provide more funding for
safety in the space program. This in increase in safety will start
with a complete program qra, which will provide the administrator,
managers/engineers with a better understanding of the actual risks
associated with the orbiter, and be able to prioritize safety upgrades
based on this updated risk assessment, request funding based on those
priorities, which will provide the program the best chance to safely
complete the stated operational mission of space station construction
by 2010.
tom


Malcolm Bacchus wrote:
In article <1153680701.477716.224120@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
columbiaaccidentinvestigation@xxxxxxxxx (columbiaaccidentinvestigation)
wrote:

"Experience has shown why Quantitative Risk Assesment is needed: To
improve safety in design, operation, maintenance, and upgrade
(throughout) life cycle, To help ensure mission success; To improve
performance; and To reduce design, operation and maintenance costs, To
support management decisions"

Nothing there talks about making safety the number one priority.


Now once again your question of how to fund safety upgrades is the
exact concern I share myself, and the asap shares as well.

What do you mean by this?

If safety is to be the number one priority, which you think it is, your
first concern will to quantify how you can judge safety upgrades - only
after that can you think about funding them.

I ask you again: if $1bn extra will gain a 0.01% decrease in the risk of
death do you always wait for it?

What if it is $10bn or $100bn?

You are way away from considering funding upgrades until you can
quantify the cost and if you can't rank priorities you will never be
able to quantify the cost.

On the other hand, I don't have a "concern" over funding safety
upgrades, because I think the approach should be entirely the reverse of
yours. I would work out my mission objectives. Then I would find out how
much the American public was willing to give me to fund those
objectives. The risk to lives would then come out as a result of
this calculation. If the risk was acceptable to those whose lives were
at risk, we'd fly. If they weren't we'd see if the taxpayer was willing
to pay more or give up some of the objectives. We'd go around the loop
until the risks were down to an acceptable level. But that doesn't make
safety the first priority, it makes it one of a number of inputs.

Now remind me, how does your approach work? If $1bn extra could gain a
0.01% decrease in the risk of death do you stop flying until you get
your extra £1bn?

Malcolm B

.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Shuttle Safety [was: Re...
    ... possible compromises in the safety margins the ... current risk analysis, the current risk analysis does not reflect ... and that is an understanding of the orbiter ... The purpose of setting a priority of safety first does in fact break ...
    (sci.space.shuttle)
  • Re: Shuttle Safety [was: Re...
    ... Nothing there talks about making safety the number one priority. ... if $1bn extra will gain a 0.01% decrease in the risk of ... You are way away from considering funding upgrades until you can ...
    (sci.space.shuttle)
  • Re: Shuttle Safety [was: Re...
    ... My conclusion and writings to make safety the highest priority in our ... X which you could spend which will reduce the chance of risk slightly. ... safety is always hedged around by these constraints. ...
    (sci.space.shuttle)
  • Re: Saturn V
    ... for vehicle or mission failure depends on the combined risks for the ... The practice of risk analysis is not ... Managing and understanding risks for better safety has a long history ...
    (sci.space.history)
  • Re: Kettling
    ... asked what the Police have learned about crowd control sine then, ... on 26th April "johnmids2006" in respect of kettling wrote "I ... like that without running the risk of a disaster - and yes, ... worked with building safety issues. ...
    (uk.legal)